韓策三 (Stratagems of Han III) — Chinese ink painting

Chapter 28 of 33 · Han state

韓策三

Stratagems of Han III

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或謂韓公仲

Someone Addresses Han's Gongzhong

或謂韓公仲曰:「夫孿子之相似者,唯其母知之而已;利害之相似者,唯智者知之而已。今公國,其利害之相似,正如孿子之相似也。得以其道為之,則主尊而身安;不得其道,則主卑而身危。今秦、魏之和成,而非公適束之,則韓必謀矣。若韓隨魏以善秦,是為魏從也,則韓輕一度,主卑矣。秦已善韓,必將欲置其所愛信者,令用事於韓以完之,是公危矣。今公與安成君為秦、魏之和,成固為福,不成亦為福。秦、魏之和成,而公適束之,是韓為秦、魏之門戶也,是韓重而主尊矣。安成君東重於魏,而西貴於秦,操右契而為公責德於秦、魏之主,裂地而為諸侯,公之事也。若夫安韓、魏而終身相,公之下服,此主尊而身安矣。秦、魏不終相聽者也。齊怒於不得魏,必欲善韓以塞魏;魏不聽秦,比務善韓以備秦,是公擇布而割也。秦、魏和,則兩國德公;不和,則兩國爭事公。所謂成為福,不成亦為福者也。願公之無疑也。」

Someone says to Gongzhong: "Twins who look alike — only their mother can tell them apart. Advantages and disadvantages that look alike — only a wise man can distinguish them.

Your state's advantages and disadvantages resemble each other as closely as twins. Handle them correctly, and the ruler is honored and you are safe. Handle them incorrectly, and the ruler is humbled and you are in danger.

Now, if the Qin-Wei reconciliation succeeds and you are not the one who brokered it, then Han will be plotted against. If Han follows Wei in accommodating Qin, Han becomes Wei's subordinate — Han's weight drops a level, and the ruler is diminished. Once Qin has made friends with Han, it will want to install its own trusted favorites to run Han's affairs — and you will be in danger.

But if you and the Lord of Ancheng broker the Qin-Wei reconciliation, success is good fortune and failure is also good fortune.

If the reconciliation succeeds and you are the broker, then Han becomes the gateway between Qin and Wei — Han's weight increases, and the ruler is honored. The Lord of Ancheng will be valued in the east by Wei and esteemed in the west by Qin. Holding the right half of the tally, he demands gratitude from both Qin and Wei on your behalf. To be enfeoffed with land and ranked among the feudal lords — that is within your reach. Or simply to stabilize Han and Wei and serve as chancellor for life — that is a lesser but still comfortable outcome. Either way, the ruler is honored and you are safe.

Qin and Wei will not always agree. If they quarrel, Qi, angry at losing Wei, will seek to court Han as a check on Wei. Wei, defying Qin, will seek to court Han as a shield against Qin. You will choose your cloth and cut as you please.

If Qin and Wei reconcile, both states are grateful to you. If they do not, both compete for your favor. This is what is meant by 'success is good fortune, failure is also good fortune.' I urge you not to hesitate."

Notes

1context

The twin metaphor at the opening is more than decorative — it frames Han's strategic situation as one where the correct and incorrect paths look nearly identical. The advisor's core insight is about brokerage: if you are the indispensable mediator between two great powers, you profit whether they agree or not. It is a theory of small-state survival through intermediation rather than military strength.

2context

The phrase 'success is good fortune, failure is also good fortune' (成為福,不成亦為福) is the section's thesis and one of the clearest statements of Han's optimal strategy in the entire Zhanguoce: position yourself as the broker, not the commodity.

或謂公仲

Someone Addresses Gongzhong

或謂公仲曰:「今有一舉可以忠於主,便於國,利於身,願公之行之也。今天下散而事秦,則韓最輕矣;天下合而離秦,則韓最弱矣;合離之相續,則韓最先危矣。此君國長民之大患也。今公以韓先合於秦,天下隨之,是韓以天下事秦,秦之德韓也厚矣。韓與天下朝秦,而獨厚取德焉,公行之計,是其於主也至忠矣。天下不合秦,秦令而不聽,秦必起兵以誅不服。秦久天下結怨構難,而兵不決,函息士民以待其釁,公行之計,是其於國也,大便也。昔者,周佼以西周善於秦,而封於梗陽;周啟以東周善於秦,而封於平原。今公以韓善秦,韓之重於兩周也無計,而秦之爭機也,萬於周之時。今公以韓為天下先合於秦,秦必以公為諸侯,以明示天下,公行之計,是其於身大利也。願公之加務也。」

Someone says to Gongzhong: "I have a single proposal that will be loyal to your ruler, convenient for the state, and profitable for yourself. I hope you will act on it.

When the world is divided and each state serves Qin individually, Han counts for the least. When the world unites and opposes Qin, Han is the weakest. When coalition and fragmentation alternate, Han is the first to face danger. This is the great peril for any ruler who governs the state and leads the people.

If you lead Han in being the first to align with Qin and the world follows, then Han has delivered All-Under-Heaven to Qin — and Qin's gratitude to Han will be immense. While Han and the rest of the world pay court to Qin, Han alone reaps a disproportionate reward. Implementing this plan is the ultimate loyalty to your ruler.

If the world does not align with Qin, and Qin's orders go unheeded, Qin will certainly raise armies to punish the disobedient. While Qin and the world exhaust each other in prolonged enmity, Han sits back, rests its people, and waits for opportunities. Implementing this plan is supremely convenient for the state.

In former times, Zhou Jiao used West Zhou's friendship with Qin to gain a fief at Gengyang. Zhou Qi used East Zhou's friendship with Qin to gain a fief at Pingyuan. Now if you use Han's friendship with Qin — Han outweighs both Zhous immeasurably, and the stakes today are ten thousand times greater than in the Zhou era. If you lead Han in being first to align with Qin, Qin will certainly make you a feudal lord to announce the policy to All-Under-Heaven. Implementing this plan is enormously profitable for yourself.

I urge you to redouble your efforts."

Notes

1context

This is the most cold-eyed articulation of Han's structural dilemma in the entire Zhanguoce. The triple bind — weakest when the world is united, least important when it is divided, first to suffer when it shifts — is an accurate description of a small state trapped between great powers. The advisor's solution is equally cold: be the first to capitulate, collect the reward for early surrender, and let everyone else fight. It is Vichy France logic, and it is presented without moral judgment.

2context

The tripartite structure — 'loyal to the ruler, convenient for the state, profitable for yourself' — is a deliberate appeal to all of Gongzhong's motivations simultaneously. The advisor knows that arguments from principle alone will not move a Warring States chancellor; you need to show the personal upside too.

韓人攻宋

Han Attacks Song

韓人攻宋,秦王大怒曰:「吾愛宋,與新城、陽晉同也。韓珉與我交,而攻我所愛,何也?」蘇秦為韓說秦王曰:「韓珉之攻宋,所以為王也。以韓之強,輔之以宋,楚、魏必恐。恐,必西面事秦。王不折一兵,不殺一人,無事而割安邑,此韓珉之所祈於秦也。」秦王曰:「吾固患韓之難知,一從一橫,此其說何也?」對曰:「天下國令韓可知也。韓故已攻宋矣,其西面事秦,以完成、自輔;不西事秦,則宋地不安矣。中國白頭游敖之士,皆積智欲離秦、韓之交。伏軾結靷西馳者,未有一人言善韓者也;伏軾結靷東馳者,未有一人言善秦者也。皆不欲韓、秦之合者何也?則晉、楚智而韓、秦愚也。晉、楚合,必議韓、秦;韓、秦合,必圖晉、楚。請以決事。」秦王曰:「善。」

Han attacks Song. The King of Qin is furious, saying: "I love Song as much as Xincheng and Yangjin. Han Min has an alliance with me, yet he attacks a state I love. Why?"

Su Qin, speaking for Han, tells the King of Qin: "Han Min attacks Song precisely on Your Majesty's behalf. With Han's strength, augmented by Song's resources, Chu and Wei will certainly be alarmed. Alarmed, they will face west and serve Qin. Without breaking a single weapon or killing a single man, you gain Anyi — this is what Han Min hopes to offer Qin."

The King of Qin says: "I have always found Han inscrutable — one moment in the coalition, the next in alignment. What is the explanation?"

Su Qin replies: "All the states make Han predictable. Han has already attacked Song. If it faces west and serves Qin, it completes its position and strengthens itself. If it does not serve Qin, Song's territory will never be secure.

"The white-haired wandering scholars of the Central States all concentrate their wits on splitting the Qin-Han alliance. Those driving west have not one good word for Han. Those driving east have not one good word for Qin. Why does no one want Qin and Han united? Because the other states are clever and Qin-Han are being foolish. When the other states combine, they plot against Qin and Han. When Qin and Han combine, they can plot against the others. Let this settle the matter."

The King of Qin says: "Very well."

Notes

1context

Su Qin's reframing is audacious: Han's attack on Qin's protectorate is actually a favor to Qin. The argument only works because he can point to second-order effects (Chu and Wei's alarm leading to Qin deference) that are plausible enough to offset the first-order offense. His observation about the itinerant scholars — that those going west trash Han and those going east trash Qin — is a sharp meta-comment on the lobbying ecosystem of the Warring States.

2person韓珉Hán Mín

Han Min (韓珉) was a Han statesman who appears in multiple Zhanguoce chapters. The King of Qin's complaint that Han is 'inscrutable' (難知) — 'one moment coalition, the next alignment' — captures the fundamental unpredictability of Han's foreign policy, which was less strategic ambiguity than genuine desperation.

或謂韓王

Someone Addresses the King of Han

或謂韓王曰:「秦王欲出事於梁,而於攻絳、安邑,韓計將安出矣?秦之欲伐韓,以東窺周室,甚唯寐忘之。今韓不察,因欲與秦,必為山東大禍矣。秦之欲攻梁也,於得梁以臨韓,恐梁之不聽也,故欲病之以國交也。王不察,因欲中立,梁必怒於韓之不與己,必折為秦用,韓必舉矣。願王熟慮之也。不如急發重使之趙、梁,約復為兄弟,使山東皆以銳師戍韓、梁之西邊,非為此也,山東無以救亡,此萬世之計也。秦之欲并天下而王之也,不與古同。事之雖如子之事父,猶將亡之也。行雖如伯夷,猶將亡之也。行雖如桀、紂,猶將亡之也。雖善事之無益也。不可以為存,適足以自令亟亡也。然則山東非能從親,合而相堅如一者,必皆亡矣。」

Someone says to the King of Han: "The King of Qin intends to move against Wei and attack Jiang and Anyi. What will Han's strategy be?

Qin's desire to attack Han in order to peer eastward at the Zhou royal domain — this is something it thinks about even in its sleep. If Han fails to perceive this and tries to accommodate Qin, it will bring catastrophe upon all the states east of the mountains.

Qin wants to attack Wei because taking Wei gives it a position overlooking Han. Fearing Wei will not comply, Qin seeks to weaken it through diplomatic pressure. If Your Majesty fails to perceive this and tries to remain neutral, Wei will be furious that Han has not joined it and will break and serve Qin instead. Then Han will be finished.

I urge Your Majesty to deliberate carefully. Better to send major embassies urgently to Zhao and Wei, renew the brotherhood pact, and have all the eastern states station their best troops along the western borders of Han and Wei. Without this, the eastern states have no way to avoid destruction. This is a plan for ten thousand generations.

Qin's intention to annex All-Under-Heaven and rule as king is unlike anything in antiquity. Even if you serve Qin as a son serves his father, it will still destroy you. Even if you conduct yourself like Bo Yi, it will still destroy you. Even if you conduct yourself like Jie and Zhou — it will still destroy you.

Serving Qin well gains nothing. It cannot preserve you; it only ensures your own quicker destruction. Therefore, if the eastern states cannot unite in a firm coalition as solid as one body, they will all surely perish."

Notes

1context

This is the Zhanguoce's most explicit and despairing statement of the anti-Qin case. The advisor's central argument — that Qin will destroy you regardless of how you behave, whether as a loyal servant, a righteous sage, or a tyrant — removes all the usual strategic calculations and leaves bare the structural reality: Qin's goal is total conquest, and nothing Han can do unilaterally will prevent it. The only hope is collective defense. The passage reads like a strategic last will and testament.

2person伯夷/桀/紂Bó Yí / Jié / Zhòu

Bo Yi (伯夷) was the legendary paragon of righteousness who starved rather than serve an unjust ruler. Jie (桀) and Zhou (紂) were the archetypal tyrants of the Xia and Shang dynasties. The advisor's point: Qin's appetite is indifferent to your virtue or vice.

謂鄭王(一)

Addressing the King of Zheng (I)

謂鄭王曰:「昭釐侯,一世之明君也;申不害,一世之賢士也。韓與魏敵侔之國也,申不害與昭釐侯執笏而見梁君,非好卑而惡尊也,非慮過而議失也。申不害之計事,曰:『我執笏於魏,魏君必得志於韓,必外靡於天下矣,是魏弊矣。諸侯惡魏必事韓,是我免於一人之下,而信於萬人之上也。夫弱魏之兵,而重韓之權,莫如朝魏。』昭釐侯聽而行之,明君也;申不害慮而言之,忠臣也。今之韓弱於始之韓,而今之秦強於始之秦。今秦有梁君之心矣,而王與諸臣不務為尊秦以定韓者,臣竊以為王之明為不如昭釐侯,而王之諸臣忠莫如申不害也。」

Someone tells the King of Zheng: "Marquis Zhao Li was a brilliant ruler of his generation. Shen Buhai was a wise minister of his generation. Han and Wei were evenly matched states.

When Shen Buhai and Marquis Zhao Li held their tablets and paid court to the lord of Wei, it was not because they preferred humility over dignity, nor because their judgment was poor. Shen Buhai's calculation was: 'If I hold my tablet before Wei, Wei's lord will grow complacent about Han and will inevitably overextend himself abroad — which weakens Wei. The other feudal lords, resentful of Wei, will turn to Han. I will be beneath one man but trusted by ten thousand. To weaken Wei's army while increasing Han's influence — nothing works better than paying court to Wei.'

Marquis Zhao Li listened and acted on it — that is a brilliant ruler. Shen Buhai devised it and spoke it — that is a loyal minister.

Today's Han is weaker than the Han of that era, and today's Qin is stronger than the Qin of that era. Qin now has the same ambitions the lord of Wei once had. Yet Your Majesty and your ministers are not working to honor Qin in order to stabilize Han.

I humbly submit that Your Majesty's wisdom does not match Marquis Zhao Li's, and your ministers' loyalty does not match Shen Buhai's."

Notes

1context

The 'King of Zheng' (鄭王) here means the King of Han, since Han's capital was at the former Zheng capital. The advisor's argument is provocative: strategic humiliation can be a weapon. Shen Buhai deliberately humbled Han before Wei in order to make Wei complacent and overextended. The same logic applies to Qin — humble yourself before Qin, let Qin grow reckless, and wait for the backlash. It is appeasement reframed as judo.

2context

The closing insult — 'your wisdom doesn't match the old marquis, and your ministers' loyalty doesn't match Shen Buhai' — is the kind of thing that either gets you hired as a chief advisor or gets you executed. Warring States rhetoric operated on the assumption that rulers respected candor, which was not always a safe assumption.

謂鄭王(二)

Addressing the King of Zheng (II)

「昔者,穆公一勝於韓原而霸西州,晉文公一勝於城濮而定天下,此以一勝立尊令,成功名於天下。今秦數世強矣,大勝以千數,次勝以百數,大之不王,小之不霸,名尊無所立,制令無所行,然而《春秋》用兵者,非以求主尊成名於天下也。昔先王之攻,有為名者,有為實者。為名者攻其心,為實者攻其形。昔者,吳與越戰,越人大敗,保於會稽之上。吳人入越而戶撫之。越王使大夫種行成於吳,請男為臣,女為妾,身執禽而隨諸御。吳人果聽其辭,與成而不盟,此攻其心者也。其後越與吳戰,吳人大敗,亦請男為臣,女為妾,反以越事吳之禮事越。越人不聽也,遂殘吳國而禽夫差,此攻其形者也。今將攻其心乎,宜使如吳;攻其形乎,宜使如越。夫攻形不如越,而攻心不如吳,而君臣、上下、少長、貴賤,畢呼霸王,臣竊以為猶之井中而謂曰:『我將為爾求火也。』」

"In former times, Duke Mu won a single victory at Hanyuan and became hegemon of the western lands. Duke Wen of Jin won a single victory at Chengpu and stabilized All-Under-Heaven. Each used a single victory to establish authority and achieve fame throughout the world.

Now Qin has been powerful for several generations. Its major victories number in the thousands, its minor victories in the hundreds. Yet it has neither become king in the grand sense nor hegemon in the lesser. Its authority has nowhere to stand; its commands have nowhere to run.

The reason the Spring and Autumn Annals record military campaigns is not merely that rulers sought honor and fame throughout the world. The attacks of the former kings were of two kinds: those fought for reputation and those fought for substance. Those fought for reputation attack the enemy's spirit. Those fought for substance attack the enemy's physical form.

When Wu and Yue fought, the men of Yue were badly defeated and held out on Mount Kuaiji. The men of Wu entered Yue and went door to door to pacify them. The King of Yue sent Grand Officer Zhong to negotiate with Wu, offering to make the men slaves and the women concubines, and to carry birds and beasts in attendance upon Wu's lord. The men of Wu accepted these terms, made peace without a covenant — this was attacking the enemy's spirit.

Afterward, Yue and Wu fought again, and the men of Wu were badly defeated. They too offered to make their men slaves and their women concubines, reversing the protocol by which Yue had served Wu. The men of Yue did not accept. They destroyed the state of Wu and captured Fu Chai — this was attacking the enemy's physical form.

Now, will Qin attack the spirit? Then it should act like Wu. Will it attack the physical form? Then it should act like Yue. But Qin's attacks on physical form do not match Yue's, and its attacks on spirit do not match Wu's. Yet from ruler to minister, top to bottom, young to old, noble to base, everyone shouts 'Hegemon! King!'

I humbly think this is like being at the bottom of a well and saying: 'I shall go find fire for you.'"

Notes

1context

The Wu-Yue analogy is deployed to devastating effect. Wu won through magnanimity ('attacking the spirit' — accepting Yue's surrender and pacifying the population), while Yue later won through ruthlessness ('attacking the form' — refusing Wu's surrender and destroying the state). The point: Qin does neither effectively. It wins battles endlessly but neither inspires submission nor achieves total conquest. The well-and-fire metaphor at the end suggests Qin's imperial pretensions are absurdly disconnected from reality — though history would prove this advisor wrong.

2person夫差Fū Chāi

Fu Chai (夫差, r. 495–473 BC) was the last king of Wu, defeated and driven to suicide by King Goujian of Yue. The Wu-Yue rivalry is one of the foundational narratives of Chinese strategic thought.

謂鄭王(三)

Addressing the King of Zheng (III)

「東孟之會,聶政、陽堅刺相兼君。許異蹴哀侯而殪之,立以為鄭君。韓氏之眾無不聽令者,則許異為之先也。是故哀侯為君,而許異終身相焉。而韓氏之尊許異也,猶其尊哀侯也。今日鄭君不可得而為也,雖重申相之焉,然而吾弗為云者,豈不為過謀哉!昔齊桓公九合諸侯,未嘗不以周襄王之命。然則雖尊襄王,桓公亦定霸矣。九合之尊桓公也,猶其尊襄王也。今日天子不可得而為也,雖為桓公吾弗為云者,豈不為過辯而不知尊哉!韓氏之士數十萬,皆戴哀侯以為君,而許異獨取相焉者,無他;諸侯之君,無不任事於周室也,而桓公獨取霸者,亦無他也。今強國將有帝王之釁,而以國先者,此桓公、許異之類也。豈可不謂善謀哉?夫先與強國之利,強國能王,則我必為之霸;強國不能王,則利用辟其兵,使之無伐我。然則強國事成,則我立帝而霸;強國之事不成,猶之厚德我也。今與強國,強國之事成則有福,不成則無患,然則先與強國者,聖人之計也。」

"At the Eastern Meng assembly, Nie Zheng and Yang Jian stabbed the chancellor and the ruler alike. Xu Yi kicked Duke Ai to death and installed himself as the lord of Zheng. None of Han's people refused to obey — because Xu Yi had been the first to act. Thus when Duke Ai became ruler, Xu Yi served as chancellor for life. And the people of Han revered Xu Yi just as they revered Duke Ai.

Today one cannot become lord of Zheng — even if offered the chancellorship multiple times, one would still decline it, some say. Is that not excessive caution?

In former times, Duke Huan of Qi convened the feudal lords nine times, always in the name of King Xiang of Zhou. Though he honored King Xiang, Duke Huan was the established hegemon. The assembled lords revered Duke Huan as much as they revered King Xiang.

Today one cannot become Son of Heaven — even if offered Duke Huan's position, one would decline, some say. Is that not excessive fastidiousness that fails to recognize honor?

Tens of thousands of Han's warriors all supported Duke Ai as their lord, yet Xu Yi alone obtained the chancellorship — for no other reason than being first. All the feudal lords served the Zhou court, yet Duke Huan alone achieved hegemony — for no other reason than being first.

Now a powerful state is poised to seize the imperial opportunity. To commit one's state to it first — this is the path of Duke Huan and Xu Yi. Can anyone call this anything but good strategy?

Align early with the powerful state's interests. If the powerful state succeeds in becoming king, I will certainly be its hegemon. If it fails, I will have used my early support to deflect its armies so it does not attack me.

If the powerful state's enterprise succeeds, I am established as its partner in empire. If it fails, it is still deeply grateful to me.

Commit to the powerful state: if it succeeds, there is fortune; if it fails, there is no harm. Therefore, to commit early to the powerful state is the calculation of a sage."

Notes

1context

This is the most fully developed argument for Han bandwagoning with Qin in the entire Zhanguoce. The advisor builds his case through two historical parallels — Xu Yi (who gained the chancellorship by being first to act in a crisis) and Duke Huan of Qi (who gained hegemony by being first to serve the Zhou court) — and derives a general principle: whoever commits first to the winning side reaps the greatest rewards. The argument directly contradicts Section 4's anti-Qin coalition argument, and the Zhanguoce presents both without resolving the contradiction.

2person齊桓公 / 周襄王Qí Huán Gōng / Zhōu Xiāng Wáng

Duke Huan of Qi (齊桓公, r. 685–643 BC) was the first recognized hegemon of the Spring and Autumn period. King Xiang of Zhou (周襄王, r. 651–619 BC) was the Zhou king in whose name Duke Huan convened the feudal lords.

韓陽役於三川而欲歸

Han Yang Serves in the Three Rivers and Wishes to Return

韓陽役於三川而欲歸,足強為之說韓王曰:「三川服矣,王亦知之乎?役且共貴公子。」王於是召諸公子役於三川者而歸之。

Han Yang is serving in the Three Rivers region and wishes to return. Zu Qiang persuades the King of Han on his behalf, saying: "The Three Rivers have been pacified. Is Your Majesty aware? The service is about to benefit certain noble princes."

The king thereupon recalls all the princes serving in the Three Rivers and brings them home.

Notes

1context

Zu Qiang's persuasion works by insinuation: he hints that the princes' continued service in the Three Rivers is building them an independent power base that could threaten the king. The king, alarmed by the suggestion that his sons might be accumulating influence, immediately recalls them — which happens to be exactly what Han Yang wanted.

秦大國

Qin Is a Great State

秦,大國也。韓,小國也。韓甚疏秦。然而見親秦,計之,非金無以也,故賣美人。美人之賈貴,諸侯不能買,故秦買之三千金。韓因以其金事秦,秦反得其金與韓之美人。韓之美人因言於秦曰「韓甚疏秦。」從是觀之,韓亡美人與金,其疏秦乃始益明。故客有說韓者曰:「不如止淫用,以是為金以事秦,是金必行,而韓之疏秦不明。美人知內行者也,生物善為計者,不見內行。」

Qin is a great state. Han is a small state. Han is quite estranged from Qin. Wishing to appear friendly to Qin, Han calculates that only gold will serve — so it sells a beautiful woman. The price of the beauty is so high that no other feudal lord can afford her. Qin buys her for three thousand gold.

Han then uses that same gold to pay tribute to Qin. Qin thus gets back its gold and Han's beauty as well. The beauty then tells Qin: "Han is quite estranged from Qin."

Viewed from this angle: Han has lost both its beauty and its gold, and its estrangement from Qin has become even more obvious.

A visiting advisor tells Han: "You would do better to cut your frivolous spending and use the savings to serve Qin directly. The gold will be accepted, and your estrangement from Qin will not be exposed. A beautiful woman knows the private affairs of the inner court. A creature that lives and schemes well should not be allowed to see what goes on inside."

Notes

1context

This passage is a miniature tragicomedy of small-state diplomacy. Han sells a spy (in the form of a beautiful woman) to the enemy to raise money to bribe the enemy — and then the spy reports back that Han is not sincere. The money has traveled in a circle, the beauty is now a hostile intelligence asset, and Han's position is worse than before. The advisor's conclusion — just pay directly and stop creating your own surveillance problems — is pragmatic to the point of bleakness.

張丑之合齊楚講於魏

Zhang Chou Mediates Between Qi and Chu on Wei's Behalf

張丑之合齊、楚講於魏也,謂韓公仲曰:「今公疾攻魏之運,魏急,則必以地和於齊、楚,故公不如勿攻也。魏緩則必戰。戰勝,攻運而取之易矣。戰不勝,則魏且內之。」公仲曰:「諾。」張丑因謂齊、楚曰:「韓已與魏矣。以為不然,則蓋觀公仲之攻也。」公仲不攻,齊、楚恐,因講於魏,而不告韓。

Zhang Chou mediates a Qi-Chu peace on Wei's behalf. He tells Han's Gongzhong: "If you press your attack on Wei's supply lines now, Wei will be desperate and will buy off Qi and Chu with territory. So you should not attack. If Wei feels no pressure, it will fight. If it wins, you can take the supply base easily. If it loses, Wei will hand it over."

Gongzhong says: "Agreed."

Zhang Chou then tells Qi and Chu: "Han has already sided with Wei. If you doubt it, watch whether Gongzhong attacks."

Gongzhong does not attack. Qi and Chu are alarmed. They make peace with Wei and do not inform Han.

Notes

1context

Zhang Chou runs a beautiful double-cross. He gives Gongzhong genuinely good advice (don't attack Wei's supply lines), but the real purpose is to use Gongzhong's inaction as evidence to Qi and Chu that Han has allied with Wei. Qi and Chu, panicking, rush to settle with Wei — which was Zhang Chou's objective all along. Gongzhong has been used as a prop in someone else's stage play, and the 'agreed' he gave was his own undoing.

或謂韓相國

Someone Addresses Han's Chancellor

或謂韓相國曰:「人之所以善扁鵲者,為有臃腫也;使善扁鵲而無臃腫也,則人莫之為之也。今君以所事善平原君者,為惡於秦也;而善平原君乃所以惡於秦也。願君之熟計之也。」

Someone says to Han's chancellor: "People value Bian Que because they have tumors. If they valued Bian Que but had no tumors, nobody would bother.

Now, the reason you cultivate the Lord of Pingyuan is to offset your bad relations with Qin. But cultivating the Lord of Pingyuan is precisely what makes your relations with Qin bad. I urge you to consider this carefully."

Notes

1person扁鵲 / 平原君Biǎn Què / Píngyuán Jūn

Bian Que (扁鵲) was the legendary physician of antiquity. The Lord of Pingyuan (平原君) was one of Zhao's 'Four Lords.' The medical metaphor is pointed: the cure is causing the disease.

2context

A tight little paradox in two sentences: you seek the Zhao alliance because Qin threatens you, but the Zhao alliance is why Qin threatens you. The advisor is describing a security dilemma — the defensive measure provokes the very threat it was designed to counter.

公仲使韓珉之秦求武隧

Gongzhong Sends Han Min to Qin to Request Wusui

公仲使韓珉之秦求武隧,而恐楚之怒也。唐客謂公仲曰:「韓之事秦也,且以求武隧也,非弊邑之所憎也。韓已得武隧,其形乃可以善楚。臣願有言,而不敢為楚計。今韓之父兄得眾者毋相,韓不能獨立,勢必不善楚。王曰:『吾欲以國輔韓珉而相之可乎?父兄惡珉,珉必以國保楚。』」公仲說,薦唐客於諸公,而使之主韓、楚之事。

Gongzhong sends Han Min to Qin to request Wusui but fears Chu's anger. A guest from Tang tells Gongzhong: "Han's service to Qin is aimed at recovering Wusui — this is not something our humble city resents. Once Han has recovered Wusui, it will be in a position to befriend Chu.

"I have something to say, though I dare not claim to be strategizing for Chu. At present, the Han nobles with popular followings are not serving as chancellor. Han cannot stand alone and will inevitably have poor relations with Chu.

"The king could say: 'I wish to use the state's support to install Han Min as chancellor — would that work? The noble families hate Han Min, so Han Min will certainly rely on Chu to protect his position.'"

Gongzhong is pleased. He recommends the Tang guest to the other lords and puts him in charge of Han-Chu affairs.

Notes

1context

The Tang guest's pitch neatly resolves Gongzhong's dilemma (how to approach Qin without angering Chu) by pointing out that installing a chancellor who is hated domestically will make that chancellor dependent on Chu for survival. It is a way to bind Han to Chu through personnel politics rather than treaties — and it works because Gongzhong can see the personal angle too.

韓相公仲珉使韓侈之秦

Chancellor Gongzhong Min Sends Han Chi to Qin

韓相公仲珉使韓侈之秦,請攻魏,秦王說之。韓侈在唐,公仲珉死。韓侈謂秦王曰:「魏之使者謂後相韓辰曰:『公必為魏罪韓侈。』韓辰曰:『不可。秦王仕之,又與約事。』使者曰:『秦之仕韓侈也,以重公仲也。今公仲死,韓侈之秦,秦必弗入。入,又奚為挾之以恨魏王乎?』韓辰患之,將聽之矣。今王不召韓侈,韓侈且伏於山中矣。」秦王曰:「何意寡人如是之權也!令安伏?」召韓侈而仕之。

Han's Chancellor Gongzhong Min sends Han Chi to Qin to request an attack on Wei. The King of Qin is pleased. Han Chi is at Tang when Gongzhong Min dies.

Han Chi tells the King of Qin: "Wei's envoy told the new chancellor Han Chen: 'You must punish Han Chi on Wei's behalf.' Han Chen said: 'I cannot. The King of Qin employed him and made agreements with him.' The envoy said: 'Qin employed Han Chi to honor Gongzhong. Now Gongzhong is dead. If Han Chi goes to Qin, Qin will certainly not receive him. And if Qin does receive him, why would it use him to antagonize Wei?'

"Han Chen is worried and is about to comply. If Your Majesty does not summon me, I will be hiding in the mountains."

The King of Qin says: "Who would have thought I was so easily manipulated! As if I would let you hide." He summons Han Chi and employs him.

Notes

1context

Han Chi saves himself by reporting — or inventing — a conversation that implies the King of Qin is weak and easily influenced. The king, stung by the suggestion that Wei's envoy considers him predictable, asserts his autonomy by doing exactly what Han Chi wants. It is reverse psychology deployed as a survival tactic: tell the king what his enemies expect him to do, and his pride will make him do the opposite.

客卿為韓謂秦王

A Guest Minister Speaks to the King of Qin on Han's Behalf

客卿為韓謂秦王曰:「韓珉之議,知其君不知異君,知其國不致可異國。辟公仲者,秦勢能詘之。秦之強,首之者,珉為疾矣。進齊、宋之兵至首垣,遠薄梁郭,所以不及魏者,以為成而過南陽之道,欲以四國西首也。所以不者,皆曰以燕亡於齊,魏亡於秦,陳、蔡亡於楚,此皆絕地形,群臣比周以蔽其上,大臣為諸侯輕國也。今王位正,張儀之貴,不得議公孫郝,是從臣不事大臣也;公孫郝之貴,不得議甘茂,則大臣不得事近臣矣。貴賤不相事,各得其位,輻湊以事其上,則群臣之賢不肖,可得而知也。王之明一也。公孫郝嘗疾齊、韓而不加貴,則為大臣不敢為諸侯輕國矣。齊、韓嘗因公孫郝而不受,則諸侯不敢因群臣以為能矣。外內不相為,則諸侯之情偽可得而知也。王之明二也。公孫郝、樗里疾請無攻韓,陳四辟去,王猶攻之也。甘茂約楚、趙而反敬魏,是其講我,茂且攻宜陽,王猶校之也。群臣之知,無幾於王之明者,臣故願公仲之國以侍於王,而無自左右也。」

A guest minister speaks to the King of Qin on Han's behalf: "Han Min's counsel knows his own lord but not foreign lords; knows his own state but cannot fathom other states. Those who would suppress Gongzhong — Qin's power can bend them. As for Qin's strength, Han Min has been the foremost in resisting it.

He advanced Qi and Song's forces to Shouyu, pressing near Wei's capital walls. The reason they did not reach Wei was that he calculated to pass through Nanyang's route and lead four states westward against Qin. The reason this failed — everyone says it is because Yan fell to Qi, Wei fell to Qin, Chen and Cai fell to Chu. These were all cases where geography cut them off, ministers formed cliques to blind their rulers, and great ministers treated the state lightly on behalf of foreign lords.

Now Your Majesty's position is correct. Zhang Yi, despite his eminence, cannot overrule Gongsun Hao — this means junior ministers do not encroach upon senior ministers. Gongsun Hao, despite his eminence, cannot overrule Gan Mao — this means senior ministers do not encroach upon the king's intimates. When high and low do not encroach upon each other, each finding their proper place, all converging like spokes to serve the hub above — then the worthy and unworthy among your ministers can be known. This is Your Majesty's first clarity.

Gongsun Hao resented Qi and Han but was not promoted for it — this means great ministers will not dare treat the state lightly on behalf of foreign lords. Qi and Han tried to work through Gongsun Hao but were not received — this means foreign lords will not dare use your ministers as proxies. When external and internal affairs do not serve each other, the sincerity and duplicity of the feudal lords can be known. This is Your Majesty's second clarity.

Gongsun Hao and Chuli Ji urged against attacking Han. Chen presented four objections and withdrew. Yet Your Majesty still attacked. Gan Mao allied with Chu and Zhao and then showed deference to Wei — and while his peace was being negotiated, Your Majesty still evaluated his proposal to attack Yiyang independently.

Your ministers' intelligence does not approach Your Majesty's clarity. I therefore hope that Gongzhong's state may attend upon Your Majesty without being manipulated by those around you."

Notes

1context

This is one of the most complex passages in the Han chapters — a meta-analysis of Qin's internal governance presented as a compliment to the Qin king. The 'guest minister' argues that Qin's greatness lies not in its military power but in its institutional clarity: ministers cannot encroach on each other's domains, foreign powers cannot corrupt domestic officials, and the king's judgment overrides all advisors. The flattery is strategic: by praising the Qin system, the speaker makes the case that Han should deal directly with the king and bypass the courtiers.

韓珉相齊

Han Min Serves as Chancellor of Qi

韓珉相齊,令吏逐公疇豎,大怒於周之留成陽君也。謂韓珉曰:「公以二人者為賢人也,所入之國,因用之乎?則不如其處小國。何也?成陽君為秦去韓,公疇豎,楚王善之。今公因逐之,二人者必入秦、楚,必為公患。且明公之不善於天下。天下之不善公者,與欲有求於齊者,且收之,以臨齊而市公。」

Han Min serves as chancellor of Qi. He orders officials to expel Gongchou Shu and is furious that Zhou has harbored the Lord of Chengyang.

Someone tells Han Min: "You consider these two men worthless. But whichever state takes them in will use them. Better that they remain in small states. Why? The Lord of Chengyang left Han for Qin's sake, and Gongchou Shu is in favor with the King of Chu.

Now you expel them. These two men will certainly go to Qin and Chu and will certainly become threats to you. Moreover, you are revealing to All-Under-Heaven that you have enemies. Everyone who dislikes you, and everyone who wants something from Qi, will rally around these men, use them against Qi, and leverage them against you."

Notes

1context

The advisor's warning is about the unintended consequences of persecution: exiling your enemies sends them to your rivals, who will weaponize their grievances against you. Better to keep your enemies close and powerless in small states than to drive them into the arms of great powers with an axe to grind. The principle applies to any political system, not just Warring States diplomacy.

或謂山陽君

Someone Addresses the Lord of Shanyang

或謂山陽君曰:「秦封君以山陽,齊封君以莒。齊、秦非重韓則賢君之行也。今楚攻齊取莒,上及不交齊,次弗納於君,是棘齊、秦之威而輕韓也。」山陽君因使之楚。

Someone says to the Lord of Shanyang: "Qin enfeoffed you with Shanyang. Qi enfeoffed you with Ju. Qi and Qin did this not because they value Han, but because they respect your personal conduct.

Now Chu attacks Qi and takes Ju. At the highest level, it refuses to engage with Qi; at the next level, it fails to restore the land to you. This is to spite the authority of Qi and Qin while treating Han with contempt."

The Lord of Shanyang sends him to Chu.

Notes

1context

The advisor frames Chu's seizure of Ju as an insult to Qi, Qin, and Han simultaneously — making it in the Lord of Shanyang's interest to confront Chu. The real goal is probably to provoke a diplomatic incident between Chu and Han that serves someone else's purposes.

趙魏攻華陽

Zhao and Wei Attack Huayang

趙、魏攻華陽,韓謁急於秦。冠蓋相望,秦不救。韓相國謂田苓曰:「事急,願公雖疾,為一宿之行。」田苓見穰侯,穰侯曰:「韓急乎?何國外使公來?」田苓對曰:「未急也。」穰侯怒曰:「是何言與?韓之急何以為公之王使乎?冠蓋相望,告弊邑甚急,公曰未急,何也?」田苓曰:「韓急,則將變矣。」穰侯曰:「公無見王矣,臣請令發兵救韓。」八日中,大敗趙、魏於華陽之下。

Zhao and Wei attack Huayang. Han desperately requests aid from Qin. An unbroken procession of envoys with official caps and carriage canopies — yet Qin does not rescue them.

Han's chancellor says to Tian Ling: "The situation is desperate. Even though you are ill, please make the trip in a single night."

Tian Ling meets the Marquis of Rang. The Marquis says: "Is Han desperate? Why has the state sent you, of all people?"

Tian Ling replies: "Not yet desperate."

The Marquis of Rang is furious: "What kind of answer is that? If Han were not desperate, why would the king send you? An unbroken line of envoys comes to our humble city saying it is extremely urgent — and you say it is not. Why?"

Tian Ling says: "If Han were truly desperate, it would have switched sides."

The Marquis of Rang says: "You need not see the king. I will order the army deployed to rescue Han."

Within eight days, Zhao and Wei are badly defeated at Huayang.

Notes

1person穰侯(魏冉)Ráng Hóu (Wèi Rǎn)

The Marquis of Rang (穰侯) is Wei Ran (魏冉), the powerful uncle of King Zhaoxiang of Qin and the dominant figure in Qin politics during the regency of Queen Dowager Xuan. His title comes from his fief at Rang.

2context

This episode is a near-duplicate of the Zhang Cui gambit from Chapter 27 (Section 1), using the same psychological trick: claiming Han is 'not yet desperate' in order to imply that Han still has the option of defecting. The Marquis of Rang, like Gan Mao before him, instantly reads the subtext — 'If we were truly desperate, we'd have gone to your enemies by now' — and acts. The speed of the rescue (eight days to total victory) shows that Qin's army was ready all along; what it needed was a sufficiently alarming diplomatic signal.

秦招楚而伐齊

Qin Invites Chu to Attack Qi

秦招楚而伐齊,冷向謂陳軫曰:「秦王必外向。楚之齊者知西不合於秦,必且務以楚合於齊。齊、楚合,燕、趙不敢不聽。齊以四國敵秦,是齊不窮也。」向曰:「秦王誠必欲伐齊乎?不如先收楚之齊者,楚之齊者先務以楚合於齊,則楚必即秦矣。以強秦而有晉、楚,則燕、趙不敢不聽,是齊孤矣。向請為公說秦王。」

Qin invites Chu to join in attacking Qi. Leng Xiang tells Chen Zhen: "The King of Qin will surely be looking outward. The pro-Qi faction in Chu, knowing Chu is not aligned with Qin in the west, will work to unite Chu with Qi. If Qi and Chu unite, Yan and Zhao will not dare refuse. With Qi leading four states against Qin, Qi will not be defeated."

Leng Xiang says: "If the King of Qin truly intends to attack Qi, it would be better to first win over the pro-Qi faction in Chu. Once the pro-Qi faction in Chu actively works to unite Chu with Qi, then Chu will certainly join Qin instead. With mighty Qin holding Jin and Chu, Yan and Zhao will not dare refuse — and Qi will be isolated.

"Allow me to make this argument to the King of Qin on your behalf."

Notes

1context

Leng Xiang's counter-intuitive logic: the way to prevent Chu from allying with Qi is to first co-opt Chu's pro-Qi faction. Once that faction is working to unite Chu with Qi, Chu's government (fearing overdependence on Qi) will swing toward Qin as a counterbalance. It is a provocation strategy — create the appearance of the very alignment you want to prevent, and the target will overcorrect in your favor.

韓氏逐向晉於周

Han Expels Xiang Jin to Zhou

韓氏逐向晉於周,周成恢為之謂魏王曰:「周必寬而反之,王何不為之先言,是王有向晉於周也。」魏曰:「諾。」成恢因為謂韓王曰:「逐向晉者韓也,而還之者魏也,豈如道韓反之哉!是魏有向晉於周,而韓王失之也。」韓王曰:「善。」亦因請復之。

Han expels Xiang Jin, who goes to Zhou. Zhou Chenghui tells the King of Wei on Xiang Jin's behalf: "Zhou will certainly be lenient and allow him to return. Why not speak first on his behalf? Then Your Majesty will have Xiang Jin's loyalty at Zhou."

The King of Wei says: "Agreed."

Chenghui then tells the King of Han: "It was Han that expelled Xiang Jin, but it is Wei that will restore him. Would it not be better for Han to restore him directly? Otherwise Wei will have Xiang Jin's loyalty at Zhou, and Your Majesty will have lost him."

The King of Han says: "Very well." He too requests Xiang Jin's restoration.

Notes

1context

Zhou Chenghui plays both sides with elegant efficiency: he tells Wei to act first (gaining Wei's cooperation), then tells Han that Wei is about to steal the credit (spurring Han to compete). The end result is that both Wei and Han are bidding for Xiang Jin's restoration — exactly what Chenghui wanted. It is competitive generosity manufactured by a third party.

張登請費緤

Zhang Deng Petitions on Behalf of Fei Xie

張登請費緤,曰:「請令公子年謂韓王曰:『費緤,西周讎之,東周寶之。此其家萬金,王何不召之,以為三川之守。是緤以三川與西周戒也,必盡其家以事王。西周惡之,必效先王之器以止王。』韓王必為之。西周聞之,必解子之罪,以解子之事。」

Zhang Deng petitions on behalf of Fei Xie. He says: "Have Prince Nian tell the King of Han: 'Fei Xie is hated by West Zhou and treasured by East Zhou. His family is worth ten thousand gold. Why not summon him and make him Governor of the Three Rivers? Fei Xie, using the Three Rivers as a base to stand guard against West Zhou, will spend his entire fortune serving Your Majesty. West Zhou, alarmed, will offer up the late kings' ritual vessels to stop you.'

The King of Han will certainly do it. When West Zhou hears of it, it will pardon your offense and settle your affairs."

Notes

1context

Zhang Deng's plan exploits the East Zhou-West Zhou rivalry (the Zhou royal domain had split into two mini-states). By threatening to install West Zhou's enemy as governor of the adjacent Three Rivers region, Han can either shake down West Zhou for royal treasures or acquire a governor who will pay his own way. Meanwhile, Fei Xie gets his criminal record cleared. Everyone gets something — except West Zhou.

安邑之御史死

The Inspector of Anyi Dies

安邑之御史死,其次恐不得也。輸人謂安令曰:「公孫綦為人請御史於王,王曰:『彼固有次乎?吾難敗其法。』」因遽置之。

The inspector of Anyi dies. His deputy fears he will not be promoted. An intermediary tells the Commandant of An: "Gongsun Qi has petitioned the king on someone else's behalf for the inspector's post. The king said: 'Does the position not have a designated successor? It would be hard for me to break the rules.'"

The commandant immediately installs the deputy.

Notes

1context

A micro-level illustration of Warring States bureaucratic maneuvering. The intermediary invents (or reports) a story about a rival candidate to spur the commandant into immediate action. The king's supposed words — 'I can't break the rules' — are quoted specifically to reassure the commandant that appointing the deputy is legally safe. Whether the story is true is irrelevant; it achieves the desired result.

魏為九里之盟

Wei Proposes the Nine-Li Covenant

魏王為九里之盟,且復天子。房喜謂韓王曰:「勿聽之也,大國惡有天子,而小國利之。王與大國弗聽,魏安能與小國立之。」

The King of Wei proposes the Nine-Li Covenant, planning to restore the Son of Heaven. Fang Xi tells the King of Han: "Do not agree to this. Great states resent having a Son of Heaven, while small states benefit from it. If Your Majesty and the other great states refuse, how can Wei establish one with small states alone?"

Notes

1context

Fang Xi's analysis cuts through the ritual piety of 'restoring the Son of Heaven': a restored Zhou monarchy would constrain the powerful states while legitimizing the weak ones. Great powers have no interest in reconstituting an authority above themselves. The advice is to simply refuse — and without the major states' participation, Wei's initiative dies.

建信君輕韓熙

The Lord of Jianxin Slights Han Xi

建信君輕韓熙,趙敖為謂建信侯曰:「國形有之而存,無之而亡者,魏也。不可無而從者,韓也。今君之輕韓熙者,交善楚、魏也。秦見君之交反善於楚、魏也,其收韓必重矣。從則韓輕,橫則韓重,則無從輕矣。秦出兵於三川,則南圍鄢,蔡、邵之道不通矣。魏急,其救趙必緩矣。秦舉兵破邯鄲,趙必亡矣。故君收韓,可以無釁。」

The Lord of Jianxin slights Han Xi. Zhao Ao tells the Lord of Jianxin: "The state whose geography keeps it alive or kills it is Wei. The state that cannot be dispensed with in any coalition is Han.

You are slighting Han Xi because you prefer to cultivate Chu and Wei. When Qin sees that your alliances favor Chu and Wei, it will certainly move to co-opt Han with great urgency.

In the coalition, Han counts for little; in alignment with Qin, Han counts for much — so there is no benefit in making Han feel undervalued.

If Qin deploys troops in the Three Rivers, it will surround Yan to the south, and the roads through Cai and Shao will be cut. Wei, under pressure, will be slow to rescue Zhao. If Qin then raises its full army and breaks Handan, Zhao will certainly perish.

Therefore, winning over Han will keep you out of danger."

Notes

1context

Zhao Ao's argument is a chain of geopolitical dominoes: slight Han, and Qin co-opts it; Qin uses Han to block the Three Rivers; the Three Rivers blockade isolates Wei; Wei's isolation means no rescue for Zhao; Zhao falls. All from one act of diplomatic rudeness. The lesson: in a tightly coupled alliance system, disrespecting a small state can trigger a cascade of strategic failures.

段產謂新城君

Duan Chan Addresses the Lord of Xincheng

段產謂新城君曰:「夫宵行者能無為姦,而不能令狗無吠己。今臣處郎中,能無議君於王,而不能令人毋議臣於君。願君察之也。」

Duan Chan says to the Lord of Xincheng: "A man walking at night may commit no crime, yet he cannot stop the dogs from barking at him. I serve in the inner court. I may never speak against you to the king, but I cannot stop others from speaking against me to you. I hope you will look into the matter."

Notes

1context

A lovely little analogy. The night-walker and the barking dogs: innocence does not prevent accusation. Duan Chan is not defending himself against specific charges — he is preemptively inoculating the Lord of Xincheng against slander by anyone who might try to poison the relationship. The metaphor is so compact and memorable that it became proverbial.

段干越人謂新城君

Duangan Yueren Addresses the Lord of Xincheng

段干越人謂新城君曰:「王良之弟子駕,云取千里馬,遇造父之弟子。造父之弟子曰:『馬不千里。』王良弟子曰:『馬千里之馬也;服,千里之服也。而不能取千里,何也?』曰:『子紖牽長。故紖牽於事,萬分之一也,而難千里之行。』今臣雖不肖,於秦亦萬分之一也,而相國見臣,不釋塞者,是紖牽長也。」

Duangan Yueren says to the Lord of Xincheng: "A disciple of Wang Liang was driving a chariot, claiming he could cover a thousand li. He met a disciple of Zaofu. Zaofu's disciple said: 'That horse will not make a thousand li.'

Wang Liang's disciple said: 'The horse is a thousand-li horse. The harness is a thousand-li harness. Why can it not cover a thousand li?'

The reply: 'Your nose-rope is too long. The nose-rope is one ten-thousandth of the whole operation, yet it prevents the thousand-li journey.'

Now I may be unworthy — in Qin's affairs, I am one ten-thousandth. But when the chancellor receives me, he does not relax his guard. This is the nose-rope being too long."

Notes

1person王良 / 造父Wáng Liáng / Zàofù

Wang Liang (王良) and Zaofu (造父) were legendary charioteers of antiquity — the gold standard for the art of driving. Duangan Yueren uses their disciples to make a point about small frictions with large consequences.

2context

The nose-rope metaphor makes a precise point: a tiny impediment (the chancellor's distrust of a minor figure) can prevent a great achievement. Duangan Yueren is asking the Lord of Xincheng to intervene and get the chancellor to lower his guard — framing it not as a personal favor but as the removal of a small obstruction to a large enterprise.

Edition & Source

Text
《戰國策》 Zhanguoce
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
Commentary
鮑彪 (Bao Biao) Song dynasty commentary