孤憤

Scholars of wisdom and technique must be far-sighted and keenly perceptive -- without keen perception, they cannot illuminate private interests. Scholars capable of applying the law must be resolute and unflinchingly upright -- without unflinching uprightness, they cannot correct treachery.

A minister who follows orders and attends to affairs, who administers his office according to the law -- this is not what is meant by a 'powerful man.' A powerful man is one who acts without authorization, who undermines the law to benefit his private interests, who drains the state to enrich his household, whose power is sufficient to manipulate his ruler. This is what is meant by a powerful man.

When scholars of wisdom and legal technique are perceptive, and when their counsel is heeded and employed, they will illuminate the hidden schemes of powerful men. When scholars capable of applying the law are unflinchingly upright, and when their counsel is heeded and employed, they will correct the treacherous conduct of powerful men. Therefore, when scholars of wisdom and law are employed, the exalted and powerful ministers will inevitably fall outside the standard.

This is why scholars of law and technique and those who hold power are irreconcilable enemies who cannot coexist.

When those who hold power monopolize control of essential affairs, then both external and internal actors serve their purposes. If feudal lords do not work through them, their business goes unanswered -- therefore rival states litigate on their behalf. If officials do not work through them, their careers do not advance -- therefore ministers serve their purposes. If palace attendants do not work through them, they cannot get close to the ruler -- therefore those at the ruler's left and right conceal things for them. If scholars do not work through them, their stipends are meager and their status low -- therefore scholars speak on their behalf.

These four supports are the means by which treacherous ministers ornament themselves. Powerful men cannot be loyal to the ruler yet advance their own enemies; the ruler cannot pierce through the four supports to clearly examine his ministers. Therefore the ruler grows ever more obstructed while the great ministers grow ever more powerful.

Those who hold power are almost always trusted and loved by the ruler, and moreover have the advantage of long familiarity. They conform to the ruler's heart, share his likes and dislikes, and advance through channels he is accustomed to. Their offices and ranks are exalted, their partisans numerous, and the entire state speaks on their behalf.

By contrast, the scholar of law and technique who wishes to gain the ruler's ear has no relationship of trust and affection, no advantage of long acquaintance. Moreover, he intends to use arguments of law and technique to correct the ruler's biased inclinations -- which means opposing the ruler's own preferences. His position is lowly and base; he has no faction and stands alone.

To compete from a position of distance and estrangement against one of intimacy and trust -- the odds are against him. To compete as a newcomer against one of long acquaintance -- the odds are against him. To compete by opposing the ruler's preferences against one who shares them -- the odds are against him. To compete from a position of lowliness against one of eminence -- the odds are against him. To compete with a single voice against an entire state -- the odds are against him.

The scholar of law and technique holds these five disadvantages, works at impossible odds, and moreover cannot even gain an audience. The man who holds power rides five corresponding advantages and speaks privately before the ruler morning and evening. How, then, can the scholar of law and technique ever advance? And when can the ruler ever be enlightened?

Thus when resources guarantee defeat and the two cannot coexist, how can scholars of law and technique avoid danger? Those who can be framed with charges are destroyed through public law. Those who cannot be smeared with accusations are finished off by private assassination. Thus those who advocate law and technique and thereby oppose the ruler's favorites will, if not executed by official punishment, certainly die by the private blade.

Meanwhile, those who form factions and cliques to obstruct the ruler, who twist their words to serve private ends, are certain to be trusted by the powerful. Those whose services can be borrowed for campaigns of attack are ennobled with offices and ranks. Those who cannot be credited with fine names are given weight through external connections. Thus those who obstruct the ruler and flock to private gates, if not made prominent through official rank, are certain to gain weight through external power.

Today rulers do not cross-reference and verify before executing punishments, and do not wait for demonstrated merit before granting rank and stipend. How then can the scholar of law and technique risk death to advance his counsel? And why would the treacherous minister willingly step back from his advantages? Therefore the ruler grows ever more diminished, while the private gates grow ever more exalted.

Although Yue is wealthy in territory and strong in arms, the rulers of the Central States all know it is of no use to them, saying: 'It is beyond our control.' Now if a ruler possesses a state with vast territory and a large population, yet the ruler is obstructed and the great ministers monopolize power -- that state has become Yue. To fail to recognize the similarity to Yue while failing to recognize the dissimilarity to one's own state -- this is failure of perception.

When people say Qi 'perished,' they do not mean its territory and cities vanished -- they mean the Lu clan lost control and the Tian clan usurped it. When people say Jin 'perished,' they do not mean its territory and cities vanished -- they mean the Ji clan lost control and the Six Ministers monopolized it.

Today, when great ministers grasp the handle of power and make decisions alone while the ruler above fails to reclaim authority -- this is a ruler who lacks discernment. One who shares the same symptoms as a dead man cannot be kept alive. One who follows the same course as a ruined state cannot be preserved. To follow in the footsteps of Qi and Jin while hoping for national security -- this cannot be achieved.

The difficulty of implementing law and technique is not limited to states of ten thousand chariots -- states of a thousand chariots face the same problem. The ruler's intimate attendants are not necessarily wise, yet when the ruler finds someone wise and listens to him, he then discusses that person's words with his attendants -- this is deliberating wisdom with fools. The ruler's intimate attendants are not necessarily worthy, yet when the ruler finds someone worthy and honors him, he then discusses that person's conduct with his attendants -- this is evaluating worthiness with the unworthy. When the wise must have their strategies decided by fools, and the worthy must have their conduct assessed by the unworthy, then scholars of wisdom and worth are humiliated, and the ruler's judgment goes awry.

Among ministers who seek office, the cultivated ones rely on integrity and purity to secure their standing, and the intelligent ones use competent administration to advance their careers. Cultivated ministers cannot bribe people with gifts -- they rely on their integrity and moreover cannot bend the law to gain results. Thus cultivated and intelligent ministers do not serve the ruler's intimates and do not seek audiences through solicitation.

But the ruler's intimates are no Bo Yi in their conduct. When their demands go unmet and bribes do not arrive, the accomplishments of competent administration are suppressed while words of slander and false accusation arise. When administrative competence is controlled by intimate favorites, and integrity is determined by slander and praise, then cultivated and intelligent officials are marginalized, and the ruler's discernment is blocked.

When merit and achievement are not used to judge wisdom and conduct, when cross-referencing and verification are not used to investigate crimes and errors, and instead the ruler listens to the words of intimate favorites, then incompetent men fill the court and corrupt fools occupy official positions.

The affliction of a ten-thousand-chariot state is that great ministers become too powerful. The affliction of a thousand-chariot state is that intimate favorites are too trusted. This is the common affliction of all rulers.

Moreover, when ministers commit great crimes and rulers make great errors, the interests of minister and ruler are fundamentally opposed. How can this be demonstrated? The ruler's interest lies in appointing the capable to office; the minister's interest lies in gaining office without capability. The ruler's interest lies in granting rank and stipend to those with merit; the minister's interest lies in gaining wealth and eminence without achievement. The ruler's interest lies in employing outstanding talent; the minister's interest lies in using factions to serve private ends.

As a result, the state's territory is diminished while private households grow wealthy; the ruler is debased while the great ministers grow powerful. The ruler loses his positional advantage while ministers gain control of the state; the ruler ends up called a 'subordinate vassal' while the chief minister splits the tallies of command.

This is how ministers deceive rulers and serve their private interests. Among today's powerful ministers, those who retain their favor when the ruler shifts his position number not two or three in ten. Why? Because the crimes of ministers are great. Ministers with great crimes are those whose conduct deceives the ruler -- their offenses merit death.

The wise, being far-sighted and fearing death, will certainly not follow the powerful. The worthy, being upright and ashamed to deceive their ruler alongside treacherous ministers, will certainly not follow the powerful either. Therefore the followers of those who hold power are invariably either fools who do not recognize danger, or the corrupt who do not avoid treachery.

Great ministers gather these foolish and corrupt men around them, deceiving the ruler above and plundering the people below, forming factions and cliques, speaking with one mouth, confusing the ruler and undermining the law, disordering the people, causing the state to be endangered and diminished, and the ruler to be exhausted and humiliated. This is a great crime.

When ministers commit great crimes and the ruler does not prohibit them -- this is a great error. When the ruler makes great errors above and ministers commit great crimes below, to seek a state that does not perish is impossible.