亡征四十七
The Forty-Seven Signs of Ruin
凡人主之國小而家大，權輕而臣重者，可亡也。簡法禁而務謀慮，荒封內而恃交援者，可亡也。群臣為學，門子好辯，商賈外積，小民內困者，可亡也。好宮室台榭陂池，事車服器玩，好罷露百姓，煎靡貨財者，可亡也。用時日，事鬼神，信卜筮而好祭祀者，可亡也。聽以爵不以眾言參驗，用一人為門戶者，可亡也。官職可以重求，爵祿可以貨得者，可亡也。緩心而無成，柔茹而寡斷，好惡無決而無所定立者，可亡也。饕貪而無厭，近利而好得者，可亡也。喜淫辭而不周於法，好辯說而不求其用，濫於文麗而不顧其功者，可亡也。淺薄而易見，漏泄而無藏，不能周密而通群臣之語者，可亡也。很剛而不和，愎諫而好勝，不顧社稷而輕為自信者，可亡也。恃交援而簡近鄰，怙強大之救而侮所迫之國者，可亡也。羈旅僑士，重帑在外，上間謀計，下與民事者，可亡也。民信其相，下不能其上，主愛信之而弗能廢者，可亡也。境內之傑不事，而求封外之士，不以功伐課試，而好以各問舉錯，羈旅起貴以陵故常者，可亡也。輕其適正，庶子稱衡，太子未定而主即世者，可亡也。大心而無悔，國亂而自多，不料境內之資而易其鄰敵者，可亡也。國小而不處卑，力少而不畏強，無禮而侮大鄰，貪愎而拙交者，可亡也。太子已置，而娶於強敵以為後妻，則太子危，如是，則群臣易慮者，可亡也。怯懾而弱守，蚤見而心柔懦，知有謂可，斷而弗敢行者，可亡也。出君在外而國更置，質太子未反而君易子，如是則國摧；國摧者，可亡也。挫辱大臣而狎其身，刑戮小民而逆其使，懷怒思恥而專習則賊生，賊生者，可亡也。大臣兩重，父兄眾強，內黨外援以爭事勢者，可亡也。婢妾之言聽，愛玩之智用，外內悲惋而數行不法者，可亡也。簡侮大臣，無禮父兄，勞苦百姓，殺戮不辜者，可亡也。好以智矯法，時以行雜公，法禁變易，號令數下者，可亡也。無地固，城郭惡，無畜積，財物寡，無守戰之備而輕攻伐者，可亡也。種類不壽，主數即世，嬰兒為君，大臣專制，樹羈旅以為黨，數割地以待交者，可亡也。太子尊顯，徒屬眾強，多大國之交，而威勢蚤具者，可亡也。變褊而心急，輕疾而易動發，心悁忿而不訾前後者，可亡也。主多怒而好用兵，簡本教而輕戰攻者，可亡也。貴臣相妒，大臣隆盛，外藉敵國，內困百姓，以攻怨讎，而人主弗誅者，可亡也。君不肖而側室賢，太子輕而庶子伉，官吏弱而人民桀，如此則國躁；國躁者，可亡也。藏恕而弗發，懸罪而弗誅，使群臣陰贈而愈憂懼，而久未可知者，可亡也。出軍命將太重，邊地任守太尊，專制擅命，徑為而無所請者，可亡也。後妻淫亂，主母畜穢，外內混通，男女無別，是謂兩主；兩主者，可亡也，後妻賤而婢妾貴，太子卑而庶子尊，相室輕而典謁重，如此則內外乖；內外乖者，可亡也。大臣甚貴，偏黨眾強，壅塞主斷而重擅國者，可亡也。私門之官用，馬府之世絀，鄉曲之善舉者，可亡也。官職之勞廢，貴私行而賤公功者，可亡也。公家虛而大臣實，正戶貧而寄寓富，耕戰之士困，末作之民利者，可亡也。見大利而不趨，聞禍端而不備，淺薄於爭守之事，而務以仁義自飾者，可亡也。不為人主之孝，而慕瓜夫之孝，不顧社稷之利，而聽主母之令，女子用國，刑餘用事者，可亡也。辭辯而不法，心智而無術，主多能而不以法度從事者，可亡也。親臣進而故人退，不肖用事而賢良伏，無功貴而勞苦賤，如是則下怨；下怨者，可亡也。父兄大臣祿秩過功，章服侵等，宮室供養大侈，而人主弗禁，則臣心無窮，臣心無窮者，可亡也。公胥公孫與民同門，暴慠其鄰者，可亡也。
When the ruler's domain is small but the great households are large, when the ruler's authority is light but ministers are powerful -- that state may be ruined.
When laws and prohibitions are neglected in favor of scheming, when domestic territory is left untended while relying on foreign allies -- it may be ruined.
When ministers pursue scholarship, the sons of great houses delight in debate, merchants accumulate wealth abroad while the common people suffer in poverty at home -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler delights in palaces, terraces, pavilions, and pools; when he is preoccupied with carriages, clothing, and curios; when he exhausts the commoners and squanders the treasury -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler consults auspicious days, serves ghosts and spirits, trusts in divination, and is fond of sacrificial rites -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler makes decisions based on rank rather than cross-referencing multiple sources, and uses a single person as gatekeeper -- it may be ruined.
When offices can be obtained through persistent solicitation and ranks can be purchased with bribes -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is lax and accomplishes nothing, soft and irresolute, unable to decide what he likes or dislikes, with no firm position -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is insatiably greedy, fixated on immediate profit, and covetous -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler delights in excessive rhetoric without grounding it in law, loves debate without seeking practical application, and indulges in literary beauty without regard for results -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is shallow and easily read, leaks information without discretion, and cannot keep counsel but reveals everything to his ministers -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is rigidly stubborn and uncooperative, rejects remonstrance and loves to prevail, disregards the altars of soil and grain and recklessly trusts his own judgment -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler relies on distant allies while slighting nearby neighbors, and depends on the rescue of great powers while insulting the states pressing against him -- it may be ruined.
When itinerant foreign advisers have heavy treasuries abroad, participate in high-level planning above, and meddle in the people's affairs below -- it may be ruined.
When the people trust the chief minister, the subordinates cannot be controlled by their superiors, yet the ruler loves and trusts the minister and cannot dismiss him -- it may be ruined.
When outstanding men within the borders go unemploved while foreign scholars are sought from outside, when appointments are not based on merit and achievement but on reputation and interviews, and when itinerant foreigners are elevated to dominance over established officials -- it may be ruined.
When the legitimate heir is treated lightly, when concubines' sons claim equal standing, when the crown prince has not been settled and the ruler dies -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is arrogant and unrepentant, the state is disordered yet the ruler congratulates himself, and he does not assess domestic resources before provoking neighboring rivals -- it may be ruined.
When the state is small yet does not adopt a humble position, when strength is meager yet does not fear the powerful, when propriety is lacking yet great neighbors are insulted, and when the ruler is greedy and obstinate yet clumsy in diplomacy -- it may be ruined.
When the crown prince has been installed but the ruler takes a new wife from a powerful rival state, thereby endangering the crown prince and causing ministers to reconsider their allegiances -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is timid and weak in defense, perceives threats early but is too soft-hearted to act, knows what should be done and decides upon it but dares not carry it out -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is abroad and the state installs a replacement, or the crown prince is held hostage unreturned while the ruler changes the succession -- such a state is broken; a broken state may be ruined.
When great ministers are humiliated and treated with contempt, when commoners are punished and their livelihoods disrupted, when those harboring resentment and brooding on shame plot in secret -- assassins are born; where assassins are born, it may be ruined.
When great ministers have dual loyalties, when fathers and brothers command powerful followings, and when internal factions and external allies contend for control -- it may be ruined.
When slave-girls' words are heeded and favorite playthings' schemes are employed, when inner and outer chambers are in turmoil and lawless acts are frequent -- it may be ruined.
When great ministers are treated with contempt, fathers and brothers without courtesy, the commoners worked to exhaustion, and the innocent put to death -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler uses cleverness to override the law, mixes private conduct with public affairs, changes legal prohibitions constantly, and issues orders repeatedly -- it may be ruined.
When there is no defensible terrain, the city walls are in poor condition, there are no stores or stockpiles, wealth and goods are scarce, there are no preparations for defense, yet the ruler rashly launches attacks -- it may be ruined.
When the ruling line does not live long, rulers die in rapid succession, infants are made rulers, great ministers monopolize power, itinerant foreigners are cultivated as factions, and territory is repeatedly ceded to maintain alliances -- it may be ruined.
When the crown prince is excessively honored and prominent, his followers numerous and powerful, his foreign alliances with great states extensive, and his authority and leverage fully established before his accession -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is narrow-minded and impatient, quick-tempered and easily provoked, hot-headed and resentful without considering consequences -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is prone to anger and fond of using military force, neglects fundamental education while rashly launching campaigns -- it may be ruined.
When powerful ministers are jealous of one another, when great ministers have grown excessively influential, when they borrow support from rival states externally and oppress the commoners internally to attack their personal enemies, and the ruler does not punish them -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler is incompetent but a secondary consort is capable, the crown prince is weak but a concubine's son is strong, officials are feeble but the populace is unruly -- such a state is unstable; an unstable state may be ruined.
When the ruler conceals his resentments and does not express them, suspends punishments and does not carry them out, causing ministers to secretly bribe one another while growing ever more anxious, with no one knowing the ruler's intentions for a long time -- it may be ruined.
When generals are given too much authority over armies, when border commanders are too exalted in their posts, when they exercise independent command and act unilaterally without seeking authorization -- it may be ruined.
When the queen consort is licentious, the queen mother harbors depravity, inner and outer chambers intermingle freely, and no distinction is maintained between men and women -- this is called 'two rulers'; where there are two rulers, it may be ruined. When the queen consort is debased and slave-girls are exalted, when the crown prince is diminished and concubines' sons are elevated, when the chief minister is slighted and the master of petitions holds the power -- this creates discord between inner and outer; where inner and outer are in discord, it may be ruined.
When great ministers are exceedingly powerful, their factions strong and numerous, obstructing and blocking the ruler's decisions while heavily monopolizing the state -- it may be ruined.
When officials of private households are employed, when established offices are marginalized, and when local favorites are promoted -- it may be ruined.
When the toil of official service goes unrewarded, when private conduct is valued over public achievement -- it may be ruined.
When the public treasury is empty while great ministers' coffers are full, when registered households are poor while resident aliens are wealthy, when farmers and soldiers are destitute while merchants and artisans prosper -- it may be ruined.
When great advantage appears but is not pursued, when the beginnings of disaster are heard but no preparations are made, when matters of contention and defense are treated lightly while the ruler busies himself with adorning his reputation through benevolence and righteousness -- it may be ruined.
When the ruler does not practice the filial piety appropriate to a sovereign but admires the filial piety of a commoner, when he disregards the interests of the altars of soil and grain and heeds the commands of the queen mother, when women govern the state and castrated men manage affairs -- it may be ruined.
When rhetoric is eloquent but lawless, the mind is clever but without technique, the ruler has many abilities but does not govern through legal standards -- it may be ruined.
When new favorites advance while old associates are pushed aside, when the incompetent manage affairs while the worthy and capable are hidden, when the meritless are honored and the hardworking are debased -- those below resent; where those below resent, it may be ruined.
When fathers, brothers, and great ministers receive stipends and ranks beyond their achievements, when their insignia and clothing exceed their station, when their palaces and provisions are extravagantly excessive, and the ruler does not prohibit it -- ministers' ambitions become limitless; where ministers' ambitions are limitless, it may be ruined.
When princes and royal grandsons share the same gates as commoners and tyrannize their neighbors -- it may be ruined.
Notes
This chapter is a comprehensive diagnostic checklist of political pathology. The forty-seven signs cover nearly every conceivable form of institutional dysfunction: weak sovereignty, corrupt bureaucracy, succession crises, diplomatic incompetence, military overextension, moral posturing, and more. Each sign is stated as a conditional ('may be ruined'), not a certainty -- the concluding section clarifies this distinction.
可亡也 ('may be ruined') is carefully chosen: Han Fei does not say 'will certainly be ruined' (必亡) but identifies structural vulnerabilities. Any single sign is a crack; multiple signs together become fatal.
刑餘 ('the punishment-remainders') refers to castrated officials, i.e., eunuchs. Han Fei views eunuch influence as a sign of ruin because it represents the triumph of proximity over competence.