三守 (The Three Safeguards) — Chinese ink painting

韓非子 Hanfeizi · Chapter 16

三守

The Three Safeguards

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三守不完之害

The Harm When the Three Safeguards Are Incomplete

人主有三守。三守完,則國安身榮;三守不完,則國危身殆。何謂三守?人臣有議當途之失,用事之過,舉臣之情,人主不心藏而漏之近習能人,使人臣之欲有言者,不敢不下適近習能人之心,而乃上以聞人主,然則端言直道之人不得見,而忠直日疏。愛人,不獨利也,待譽而後利之;憎人不獨害也,待非而後害之。然則人主無威而重在左右矣。惡自治之勞憚,使群臣輻湊之變,因傳柄移藉,使殺生之機,奪予之要在大臣,如是者侵。此謂三守不完。三守不完,則劫殺之徵也。

A ruler has three safeguards. When the three safeguards are complete, the state is secure and the ruler honored. When the three safeguards are incomplete, the state is endangered and the ruler imperiled. What are the three safeguards?

First: When a minister identifies the failures of those in power, the errors of those managing affairs, or the true character of officials, and the ruler does not keep this in his heart but leaks it to intimate favorites and powerful attendants -- then any minister who wishes to speak up dares not do so without first accommodating the wishes of those favorites, and only then reports upward to the ruler. Consequently, men of upright speech and direct conduct cannot gain an audience, and the loyal and forthright become ever more estranged.

Second: When the ruler rewards someone, he does not act on his own judgment but waits for praise from others before conferring benefit; when he punishes someone, he does not act on his own judgment but waits for condemnation from others before inflicting harm. In this case, the ruler has no authority of his own, and the real weight rests with those at his left and right.

Third: When the ruler dislikes the labor of governing personally and allows ministers to converge and manage transformations of affairs, thereby passing the handle of power and transferring the instruments of authority so that the mechanisms of life and death and the essentials of giving and taking rest with the great ministers -- this is encroachment.

These constitute the three safeguards being incomplete. When the three safeguards are incomplete, it is a sign that coercion and assassination will follow.

Notes

1context

This short chapter distills the Legalist theory of sovereignty into three essential principles: information security (do not leak intelligence), independent judgment (do not outsource decisions), and personal governance (do not delegate the mechanisms of power). Each safeguard addresses a specific vulnerability through which ministers capture sovereign authority.

2translation

柄 ('handle') and 藉 ('instrument/credential') are key Legalist metaphors for the tools of sovereign power. 傳柄移藉 ('passing the handle and transferring the instrument') describes the moment when real authority leaves the ruler's hands, even if formal titles remain.

3translation

殺生之機 ('the mechanisms of life and death') refers to the power to execute or spare -- the ultimate expression of sovereign authority. When this power rests with ministers rather than the ruler, sovereignty has been effectively transferred.

三劫之形

The Three Forms of Coercion

凡劫有三:有明劫,有刑劫,人臣有大臣之尊,外操國要以資群臣,使外內之事非已不得行。雖有賢良,逆者必有禍,而順者必有福。然則群臣直莫敢忠主憂國以爭社稷之利害。人主雖賢,不能獨計,而人臣有不敢忠主,則國為亡國矣。此謂國無臣。國無臣者,豈郎中虛而朝臣少哉?群臣持祿養交,行私道而不效公忠,此謂明劫。鬻寵擅權,矯外以勝內,險言禍福得失之形,以阿主之好惡。人主聽之,卑身輕國以資之,事敗與主分其禍,而功成則臣獨專之。諸用事之人,壹心同辭以語其美,則主言惡者必不信矣。此謂事劫。至於守司囹圄,禁制刑罰,人臣擅之,此謂刑劫。三守不完,則三劫者起;三守完,則三劫者止。三劫止塞,則王矣。

There are three forms of coercion: overt coercion, operational coercion, and penal coercion.

When a minister holds the eminence of a great minister, externally controlling the essential levers of state to supply resources to other ministers, making it so that no internal or external affair can proceed without his involvement -- then even if there are worthy and capable men, those who oppose him will certainly suffer, while those who comply will certainly prosper. Consequently, no minister dares to be loyal to the ruler, to worry about the state, or to contend over the interests of the altars of soil and grain. Though the ruler may be capable, he cannot plan alone; and when no minister dares to be loyal -- that state is a ruined state. This is called 'a state without ministers.' A state without ministers does not mean the palace corridors are empty or that court officials are few. It means that ministers draw their stipends and cultivate their connections, pursue private interests and do not demonstrate public loyalty. This is called overt coercion.

When a minister sells favor and monopolizes power, manipulates external affairs to override internal governance, makes threatening pronouncements about fortune and misfortune, gain and loss, and panders to the ruler's likes and dislikes -- the ruler heeds him, debases himself and diminishes the state to supply him. When affairs fail, the minister shares the blame with the ruler; when affairs succeed, the minister alone claims the credit. All those involved in managing affairs speak with one heart and one voice to praise his merits, so that anyone who speaks ill to the ruler is certainly not believed. This is called operational coercion.

When it comes to controlling the prisons and monopolizing the apparatus of punishment -- when a minister seizes this, it is called penal coercion.

When the three safeguards are incomplete, the three forms of coercion arise. When the three safeguards are complete, the three forms of coercion are stopped. When the three forms of coercion are stopped and blocked, then the ruler can achieve kingship.

Notes

1context

The three forms of coercion correspond inversely to the three safeguards: leaking information enables overt coercion (ministers know the ruler's mind); outsourcing judgment enables operational coercion (ministers capture the decision process); delegating authority enables penal coercion (ministers control the instruments of force). The chapter's symmetrical structure embodies the Legalist belief that political pathology is systematic and therefore susceptible to systematic remedy.

2translation

國無臣 ('a state without ministers') is a paradox: the court is full of officials, but none of them function as ministers in the proper sense -- they serve the powerful minister, not the ruler. This is institutional capture: the forms of governance persist while the substance has been hollowed out.

Edition & Source

Text
《韓非子》 Hanfeizi
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription, 《四部叢刊》本
Commentary
Han Fei (韓非), Warring States period