備內

The peril of a ruler lies in trusting others. If he trusts others, he is controlled by them. The relationship between a minister and his lord is not one of blood kinship -- it is the constraint of political circumstance that compels service. Therefore ministers ceaselessly scrutinize their lord's mind, never resting for an instant, while the ruler sits above in idle arrogance. This is how rulers come to be coerced and sovereigns murdered.

If a ruler places great trust in his sons, treacherous ministers exploit the sons to advance their private interests. Thus Li Dui manipulated the King of Zhao and starved King Wuling to death. If a ruler places great trust in his wife, treacherous ministers exploit the wife to advance their private interests. Thus the actor Shi aided Lady Li Ji in murdering Crown Prince Shensheng and enthroning Xi Qi. If even a wife, who is closest, and a son, who is dearest, cannot be trusted, then nothing else can be trusted at all.

Moreover, among the lords of ten thousand chariots and the princes of a thousand chariots, there are queens, consorts, and crown princes who wish for the ruler's early death. How do we know this? The bond between husband and wife is not one of blood. When there is love, they are close; when love fades, they grow distant. The saying goes: 'If the mother is favored, her child is embraced.' The reverse follows: if the mother falls out of favor, her child is cast aside.

A man of fifty has not lost his appetite for beauty. A woman of thirty has already seen her beauty fade. When a woman of fading beauty serves a man who still craves it, she finds herself neglected and degraded, and she fears her son will not be named heir. This is why queens and consorts come to hope for the ruler's death. For only when the mother becomes dowager and the son becomes sovereign are all commands obeyed and all prohibitions enforced; the pleasures of men and women are no less than those of the former lord, and she wields the power of ten thousand chariots without question. This is why poisoned wine and smothering in the dark are employed.

Thus the Taozuo Annals states: 'Of rulers who die of illness, fewer than half truly die of illness.' If the ruler does not understand this, the resources of disorder multiply. Therefore it is said: when many people stand to profit from the ruler's death, the ruler is in danger.

Thus Wang Liang cherished his horses, and King Goujian of Yue cherished his men -- the one for racing, the other for war. A physician who is skilled at sucking wounds and holding blood in his mouth does so not from kinship but because profit drives him.

Thus the carriage-maker wishes people to be rich and noble; the coffin-maker wishes people to die young. It is not that the carriage-maker is benevolent and the coffin-maker is cruel -- if people are not noble, carriages do not sell; if people do not die, coffins find no buyers. The coffin-maker's feelings are not hatred of people; his profit lies in people's deaths.

So too, once the factions of the queen, the consorts, and the crown prince have formed, they wish for the ruler's death. If the ruler does not die, their power cannot grow. Their feelings are not hatred of the ruler; their profit lies in his death. Therefore the ruler must never fail to scrutinize those who stand to gain from his demise.

Thus when halos encircle the sun and moon, the danger lies outside; but when a man guards against those he hates, disaster comes from those he loves. Therefore the enlightened ruler undertakes no venture without cross-checking, and eats no unusual food. He listens far and examines near, auditing both internal and external failings. He compares consistent and conflicting reports to discern factional alignments. He collates multiple sources of verification to test the substance of what is claimed. He holds later results against earlier promises, governs the multitude according to law, and examines numerous threads to gain a comprehensive view.

When officers receive no unearned rewards and commit no unpunished transgressions, when executions are always warranted and crimes never pardoned, then treachery and corruption have no room to pursue private ends.

When corvee labor is heavy, the people suffer. When the people suffer, rival power centers arise. When rival power centers arise, tax exemptions and privileges proliferate. When exemptions proliferate, the nobility grows rich. To impoverish the people in order to enrich the great men, and to build up rival power bases that serve the ministers -- this is not in the long-term interest of the realm.

Therefore it is said: when corvee labor is light, the people are at ease. When the people are at ease, no excessive power accumulates below. When no excessive power accumulates below, rival power centers are eliminated. When rival power centers are eliminated, authority rests with the sovereign.

Now, that water conquers fire is perfectly clear. Yet place a pot between them: the water boils away above while the fire blazes undiminished below. The water has lost the very means by which it conquers. The principle that good governance prohibits corruption is even clearer than this. Yet when law-enforcing ministers act as the pot -- interposing themselves between ruler and reality -- the law remains bright only in the ruler's mind, while the means of prohibiting corruption have already been lost.

In the traditions handed down from high antiquity and in the records of the Spring and Autumn Annals, those who broke the law, committed treason, and perpetrated great villainy were invariably men of high rank and noble station. Yet the laws and penalties that are prepared and enforced always fall upon the lowly and humble. Thus the common people despair, with nowhere to appeal.

When great ministers collude and conspire, forming a united front to obscure the sovereign, feigning enmity in public while allying in private -- to create an appearance of impartiality -- and serving as each other's eyes and ears to watch for the ruler's vulnerabilities, the ruler is screened off with no way to learn the truth. He holds the title of sovereign but not the reality; the ministers monopolize the law and exercise it themselves. The Son of Heaven of Zhou was just such a case.

When a ruler lends his power and authority to others, superior and subordinate trade places. This is why a ruler must never lend his power to his ministers.