南面

The ruler's error lies in this: having appointed a minister, he then turns to those he has not appointed to guard against the first. The inevitable result is that those brought in as checks become enemies of those originally trusted, and the ruler ends up controlled by those he did not originally trust. Moreover, those now brought in to guard against others were themselves the very people previously guarded against.

A ruler who cannot make law clear and use it to constrain the authority of great ministers has no way to secure the loyalty of lesser men. When the ruler abandons law and uses ministers to check ministers, those who are allies will form cliques and praise each other, while those who are enemies will form factions and condemn each other. When praise and condemnation battle back and forth, the ruler is bewildered and confused.

As for ministers: without reputation, praise, and solicitation they have no way to advance; without overriding the law and monopolizing power they have no way to establish authority; without appropriating the appearance of loyalty and trustworthiness they have no way to avoid prohibition. These three are the resources for confusing the ruler and destroying the law.

When the ruler ensures that ministers, no matter how wise, may not override the law to monopolize power; no matter how virtuous in conduct, may not bypass merit to claim unearned precedence; no matter how loyal and trustworthy, may not set aside the law to avoid prohibition -- this is called making law clear.

A ruler can be lured by projects, and a ruler can be obstructed in counsel. Both must be carefully examined.

When a minister makes promises about projects lightly, requests few resources, and uses the project to deceive the ruler -- the ruler, lured and unexamining, approves and piles on more. The result is that the minister uses projects to control the ruler. This is called being lured. One who is lured by projects is trapped in calamity.

When initial claims are modest but subsequent costs are enormous, even if there are results, the minister's initial claims prove false. When false claims carry penalties and genuine results are necessarily rewarded, then ministers will not dare embellish their proposals to confuse the ruler. The ruler's method: ensure that a minister's initial claims cannot be contradicted by later ones, and later claims cannot contradict earlier ones. Even if a project has results, if the initial claims were false, the minister must bear the penalty. This is called holding subordinates accountable.

When a minister proposes a project to the ruler and fears criticism, he preemptively declares: 'Anyone who questions this project is jealous of its success.' The ruler stores this remark and ceases listening to other ministers. Other ministers fear this remark and dare not comment on the project. When both forces operate together, loyal ministers are shut out and sycophants alone are entrusted. This is called being obstructed in counsel. One who is obstructed in counsel is controlled by ministers.

The ruler's method: ensure that ministers bear responsibility both for speaking and for not speaking. Those who speak without clear reasoning and whose arguments cannot be verified -- this is the responsibility for speaking. Those who remain silent to avoid responsibility while holding important positions -- this is the responsibility for not speaking. When the ruler requires that those who speak must identify the reasoning behind their claims so that their substance can be verified, and those who do not speak must explain their positions so that they too are held accountable -- then ministers will not dare speak recklessly, nor will they dare remain silent. Both speech and silence carry responsibility.

When a ruler wishes to undertake a project but does not thoroughly understand its beginning and end, yet makes his desire known -- someone will undertake it. But if the undertaking cannot yield profit, it will necessarily return as harm. One who understands this principle governs by reason and discards desire.

There is a proper method for undertaking projects: when the returns are calculated as exceeding the costs, it may be done. A confused ruler does otherwise. He calculates the returns but not the costs. Even when costs double the returns, he does not recognize the harm -- gaining the name of achievement while losing the substance. In such a case, the achievement is small and the harm is great.

True achievement is when returns are large and costs are small. But when large expenditures go unpenalized and small results count as achievement, then ministers will make great expenditures to produce small results, and even when small results are achieved, the ruler also suffers harm.

Those who do not understand governance invariably say: 'Do not change antiquity; do not alter established customs.' Whether to change or not to change -- the sage does not heed such dogma. He simply pursues correct governance. Whether antiquity should not be changed and customs should not be altered depends on whether the ancient customs in question are sound or not.

If Yi Yin had not changed the Yin customs, and the Grand Duke had not changed the Zhou customs, then Tang and King Wu would never have become kings. If Guan Zhong had not altered Qi's system, and Guo Yan had not reformed Jin's, then Duke Huan and Duke Wen would never have achieved hegemony.

The reason people resist changing antiquity is that they dread disturbing the people's comfort. But to leave antiquity unchanged is to follow the tracks of disorder; to accommodate the people's hearts is to indulge treacherous conduct. When the people are foolish and do not recognize disorder, and the ruler above is cowardly and unable to reform -- this is a failure of governance.

A ruler who is perceptive enough to understand governance and severe enough to carry it out will establish proper governance even though it goes against the people. The proof is in Lord Shang's reforms of internal and external affairs, and in the initial resistance that met them.

Thus when Guo Yan first began his reforms, Duke Wen of Jin had armed guards; when Guan Zhong first began his reforms, Duke Huan of Qi had war chariots -- these were precautions to prepare against popular resistance. Foolish, stubborn, lazy, and idle people suffer from small costs and forget great benefits. Therefore they submit to flattering slanders and resist minor changes while losing long-term advantages. The people grow accustomed to disorder and are uncomfortable with good governance.