八經 (Eight Canons) — Chinese ink painting

韓非子 Hanfeizi · Chapter 48

八經

Eight Canons

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一、因情

Canon I: Governing According to Human Nature

凡治天下,必因人情。人情者,有好惡,故賞罰可用;賞罰可用,則禁令可立而治道具矣。君執柄以處勢,故令行禁止。柄者,殺生之制也;勢者,勝眾之資也。廢置無度則權瀆,賞罰下共則威分。是以明主不懷愛而聽,不留說而計。故聽言不參,則權分乎奸;智力不用,則君窮乎臣。故明主之行制也天,其用人也鬼。天則不非,鬼則不困。勢行教嚴,逆而不違,毀譽一行而不議。故賞賢罰暴,譽善之至者也;賞暴罰賢,舉惡之至者也:是謂賞同罰異。賞莫如厚,使民利之;譽莫如美,使民榮之;誅莫如重,使民畏之;毀莫如惡,使民恥之。然後一行其法,禁誅於私家,不害功罪。賞罰必知之,知之,道盡矣。

In governing All-Under-Heaven, one must work according to human nature. Human nature includes likes and dislikes; therefore rewards and punishments can be employed. When rewards and punishments can be employed, prohibitions and ordinances can be established, and the instruments of governance are complete.

The ruler grasps the handles and occupies the position of power; therefore his orders are carried out and his prohibitions are enforced. The handles are the controls over life and death; positional advantage is the resource for overcoming the multitude. If appointments and dismissals follow no standard, authority is cheapened. If rewards and punishments are shared with those below, the ruler's awe is divided.

Therefore the enlightened ruler does not listen out of personal affection, nor does he calculate based on flattering persuasion. If he listens to words without cross-checking, power will be divided among the treacherous. If he does not apply his intelligence and strength, the ruler will be outmaneuvered by his ministers.

The enlightened ruler's exercise of institutional control is like Heaven: impartial. His employment of men is like spirits: inscrutable. Like Heaven, he cannot be faulted; like spirits, he cannot be confounded. When positional advantage is exercised and instruction is strict, opposition ceases and dissent does not arise. Praise and blame proceed in a single track without debate.

To reward the worthy and punish the violent is the highest praise of goodness. To reward the violent and punish the worthy is the highest promotion of evil -- this is called rewarding the same and punishing what differs. Rewards should be generous, so the people will desire them. Praise should be fine, so the people will glory in it. Punishments should be heavy, so the people will fear them. Condemnation should be severe, so the people will be ashamed of it. Then apply the law uniformly, prohibit punishment through private channels, and do not interfere with the assessment of merit and fault. When rewards and punishments are certainly known, that knowledge is the completion of the Way.

Notes

1translation

柄 (handles) refers to the 'two handles' (二柄) of reward and punishment that the ruler must personally control. 勢 (positional advantage) is the institutional power inherent in the ruler's position, distinct from personal ability.

2context

The comparison of the ruler's governance to Heaven (天) and spirits (鬼) draws on Daoist imagery: the ideal ruler acts with impersonal regularity (like the natural order) and unfathomable inscrutability (like the spirit world), preventing ministers from predicting or manipulating his decisions.

二、主道

Canon II: The Way of the Ruler

力不敵眾,智不盡物。與其用一人,不如用一國,故智力敵而群物勝。揣中則私勞,不中則任過。下君盡己之能,中君盡人之力,上君盡人之智。是以事至而結智,一聽而公會。聽不一則後悖於前,後悖於前則愚智不分;不公會則猶豫而不斷,不斷則事留。自取一,則毋道墮壑之累。故使之諷,諷定而怒。是以言陳之曰,必有策籍。結智者事發而驗,結能者功見而謀成敗。成敗有徵,賞罰隨之。事成則君收其功,規敗則臣任其罪。君人者合符猶不親,而況於力乎?事智猶不親,而況於懸乎?故非用人也不取同,同則君怒。使人相用則君神,則下盡。下盡下,則臣上不因君,而主道畢矣。

One man's strength cannot match the multitude; one man's intelligence cannot exhaust all things. Rather than employ one man, it is better to employ a whole state -- thus individual intelligence is outmatched and the collective prevails. If the ruler guesses correctly, he labors privately to no purpose; if he guesses wrong, he bears the blame. The inferior ruler exhausts his own abilities; the middling ruler exhausts others' strength; the superior ruler exhausts others' intelligence.

Therefore when affairs arise, he binds men to their proposals, listens impartially, and convenes them publicly. If listening is not impartial, later decisions will contradict earlier ones, and the wise and foolish cannot be distinguished. If he does not convene them publicly, he will hesitate without deciding, and unresolved affairs will accumulate. If he takes a single course for himself, he avoids the burden of falling into the pit.

He has them present their proposals; once the proposals are fixed, he holds them to account. Thus when proposals are submitted, they must be recorded in the registers. Those who are bound to their proposals are verified when affairs unfold; those who are bound to their abilities are evaluated when results reveal the success or failure of their plans. Success and failure leave evidence; rewards and punishments follow accordingly. When affairs succeed, the ruler collects the credit; when plans fail, the ministers bear the blame.

One who rules men does not even personally verify tallies -- how much less should he exert himself physically? He does not personally investigate intelligence -- how much less should he operate in uncertainty? Therefore in employing men, he does not select those who agree with him; if they agree, the ruler should be suspicious. When men check one another in their employment, the ruler becomes divine and those below give their utmost. When those below fully exhaust themselves for those below them, ministers no longer depend on the ruler for advancement -- and the Way of the ruler is complete.

Notes

1context

The three grades of ruler (下君, 中君, 上君) is a famous formulation: the worst ruler does everything himself, the middling ruler leverages others' labor, and the best ruler leverages others' intelligence. This aligns with the Daoist concept of wu wei (non-action) applied to statecraft.

2translation

合符 (matching tallies) refers to the administrative practice of split tallies -- a bamboo or bronze tally split in two, with one half held by the ruler and one by the official, matched to verify authorization. Even this mechanical verification, Han Fei says, should be delegated.

三、起亂

Canon III: Sources of Disorder

知臣主之異利者王,以為同者劫,與共事者殺。故明主審公私之分,審利害之地,奸乃無所乘。亂之所生六也:主母,後姬,子姓,弟兄,大臣,顯賢。任吏責臣,主母不放;禮施異等,後姬不疑;分勢不貳,庶適不爭;權籍不失,史弟不侵;下不一門,大臣有擁;禁賞必行,顯賢不亂。臣有二因,謂外內也。外曰畏,內曰愛。所畏之求得,所愛之言聽,此亂臣之所因也。外國之置諸吏者,結誅親暱重帑,則外不籍矣;爵祿循功,請者俱罪,則內不因矣。外不籍,內不因,則奸充塞矣。官襲節而進,以至大任,智也。其位至而任大者,以三節持之:曰質,曰鎮,曰固。親戚妻子,質也;爵祿厚而必,鎮也;參伍責怒,固也。賢者止於質,貪饕化於鎮,奸邪窮於固。忍不制則下上,小不除則大誅,而名實當則徑之。生害事,死傷名,則行飲食;不然,而與其仇:此謂除陰奸也。醫曰詭,詭曰易。易功而賞,見罪而罰,而詭乃止。是非不泄,說諫不通,而易乃不用。父兄賢良播出曰游禍,其患鄰敵多資。僇辱之人近習曰狎賊,其患發忿疑辱之心生。藏怒持罪而不發曰增亂,其患僥倖妄舉之人起。大臣兩重提衡而不踦曰卷禍,其患家隆劫殺之難作。脫易不自神曰彈威,其患賊夫酖毒之亂起。此五患者,人主之不知,是有劫殺之事。廢置之事,生於內則治,生於外則亂。是以明主以功論之內,而以利資之外,其故國治而敵亂。即亂之道:臣憎,則起外若眩;臣愛,則起內若藥。

He who understands that minister and ruler have divergent interests will become king. He who considers their interests the same will be coerced. He who shares power with ministers will be killed. Therefore the enlightened ruler carefully distinguishes public from private and examines the terrain of benefit and harm, so that treachery finds no opening.

Disorder arises from six sources: the ruler's mother, the consorts, the heir and sons, brothers, great ministers, and prominent worthies. If officials are properly appointed and ministers held accountable, the ruler's mother will not overstep. If ritual distinctions of rank are maintained, the consorts will not harbor ambitions. If the division of power allows no duality, legitimate and illegitimate sons will not contend. If the registers of authority are not lost, brothers will not encroach. If access to the ruler is not monopolized through a single gate, great ministers will not build factions. If prohibitions and rewards are reliably enforced, prominent worthies will not cause disorder.

Ministers have two avenues of leverage: external and internal. The external is fear; the internal is love. When what is feared can be obtained and what is loved has its words heeded -- these are what disloyal ministers exploit. If foreign-placed officials are controlled by executing their intimates and confiscating their treasuries, then the external avenue is closed. If ranks and salaries follow merit and those who make requests are all punished, then the internal avenue is closed. With the external avenue closed and the internal avenue closed, treachery is sealed off.

When an official advances through successive ranks to reach a position of great responsibility, that is intelligence. To control those who have reached high positions and great responsibility, use three restraints: hostages, stabilization, and security. His relatives and wife and children serve as hostages. Generous and reliable salaries serve as stabilization. Cross-checking and accountability serve as security. The worthy are restrained by hostages; the greedy are transformed by stabilization; the treacherous are exhausted by security.

If one tolerates without controlling, the subordinate will usurp the superior. If small offenses are not removed, great punishments will follow. When name and reality match, proceed directly. If keeping someone alive harms affairs but killing him would damage the ruler's reputation, then use food and drink. If not, hand him over to his enemies. This is called removing hidden traitors.

Deception is called subterfuge; subterfuge is called exchange. Reward verified achievements and punish visible crimes, and subterfuge will cease. When right and wrong are not leaked and proposals and remonstrances are not freely communicated, then exchange will not be employed.

When the father, brothers, and worthy men of a family are scattered abroad, this is called 'roaming calamity' -- the danger is that neighboring enemies gain resources. When men who have been humiliated are placed in the ruler's intimate circle, this is called 'familiar poison' -- the danger is that rage and resentful hearts arise. When anger is stored and crimes held but not acted upon, this is called 'accumulated disorder' -- the danger is that reckless and presumptuous men arise. When two great ministers hold the balance equally without either prevailing, this is called 'coiled calamity' -- the danger is that powerful houses will seize and kill. When the ruler is casual and does not cultivate an air of divine mystery, this is called 'flicked authority' -- the danger is that poison and assassination will arise.

These five dangers, if the ruler does not perceive them, lead to coercion and assassination. When matters of appointment and dismissal originate from within, there is order; when they originate from without, there is disorder. Therefore the enlightened ruler evaluates merit internally and deploys resources externally -- thus his own state is well ordered and his enemies fall into disorder. The way disorder approaches: when a minister is hated, he stirs trouble externally like a dizzying spell; when a minister is loved, he stirs trouble internally like a drug.

Notes

1context

This is one of the most ruthless passages in the Hanfeizi. The 'six sources of disorder' represent the people closest to the ruler -- his own family and inner circle -- whom Han Fei identifies as the greatest threats to his power. The advice to use 'food and drink' (poisoning) and to hand enemies over to their foes reflects the brutal realism of Warring States court politics.

2translation

質 (hostages) refers to the practice of keeping a minister's family members at court as guarantees of loyalty. This was standard practice in Warring States interstate and intrastate relations.

3translation

參伍 (cross-checking) is a key Legalist administrative technique: comparing information from multiple independent sources to detect inconsistencies and deception.

四、立道

Canon IV: Establishing Methods of Verification

參伍之道:行參以謀多,揆伍以責失。行參必拆,揆伍必怒。不拆則瀆上,不怒則相和。拆之徵足以知多寡,怒之前不及其眾。觀聽之勢,其征在比周而賞異也,誅毋謁而罪同。言會眾端,必揆之以地,謀之以天,驗之以物,參之以人。四征者符,乃可以觀矣。參言以知其誠,易視以改其澤,執見以得非常。一用以務近習,重言以懼遠使。舉往以悉其前,即邇以知其內,疏置以知其外。握明以問所暗,詭使以絕黷泄。倒言以嘗所疑,論反以得陰奸。設諫以綱獨為,舉錯以觀奸動。明說以誘避過,卑適以觀直謟。宣聞以通未見,作斗以散朋黨。深一以警眾心,泄異以易其慮。似類則合其參,陳過則明其固。知辟罪以止威,陰使時循以省衷。漸更以離通比。下約以侵其上:相室,約其廷臣;廷臣,約其官屬;兵士,約其軍吏;遣使,約其行介;縣令,約其辟吏;郎中,約其左右;後姬,約其宮媛。此之謂條達之道。言通事泄,則術不行。

The method of cross-checking and verification: conduct triple-checking to detect multiple schemes; apply five-way assessment to identify failures. Triple-checking must involve separation; five-way assessment must involve confrontation. Without separation, the ruler's authority is cheapened; without confrontation, subordinates collude.

The evidence from separation is sufficient to reveal the scope of the problem; the confrontation must be targeted before the group can coordinate. The key to the method of observing and listening: the sign lies in those who form factions yet receive differential rewards, and in those who are punished without being consulted yet share the same guilt.

When statements converge from multiple sources, you must assess them against the terrain, plan against the seasons, verify against physical evidence, and cross-check against people. When these four verifications align, then observation is reliable.

Cross-check statements to ascertain sincerity. Change the angle of observation to alter perspectives. Seize upon what is observed to detect the unusual. Employ a single standard to manage those in the inner circle. Emphasize the weight of words to intimidate distant envoys. Raise past events to fully understand earlier conduct. Approach those nearby to learn the interior. Place men at a distance to learn the exterior. Grasp what is clear to question what is dark. Deploy deceptive missions to prevent leaks.

Reverse your words to test what you suspect. Argue the opposite to detect hidden treachery. Set up opportunities for remonstrance to catch those who act alone. Make arrangements to observe treacherous movements. Offer clear explanations to lure those who evade blame. Adopt a humble posture to distinguish the upright from the sycophantic. Publicize what you have heard to reach what you have not seen. Create rivalries to scatter factional alliances.

Probe deeply into one matter to alert all minds. Leak divergent information to shift their calculations. When cases appear similar, combine the verification data. When errors are exposed, clarify the underlying pattern. Recognize those who evade punishment to maintain authority. Secretly dispatch inspectors at intervals to examine loyalty. Gradually rotate personnel to break up entrenched alliances.

Use those below to check those above: the chief minister checks the court officials; the court officials check the departmental subordinates; the common soldiers check the military officers; dispatched envoys check the traveling intermediaries; county magistrates check the local clerks; the palace attendants check the ruler's immediate entourage; the consorts check the palace ladies. This is called the method of systematic penetration. If words circulate and affairs leak, then techniques cannot be applied.

Notes

1context

This canon is essentially a manual of intelligence and counter-intelligence techniques for the ruler. The methods described -- planting false information, creating rivalries, using subordinates to spy on superiors -- constitute one of the most detailed bureaucratic surveillance systems in pre-modern political thought.

2translation

條達之道 (the method of systematic penetration) describes a layered surveillance system where each level of the bureaucracy monitors the level above it, creating overlapping checks that prevent any single point of failure.

五、類柄

Canon V: Categories of the Handles of Power

明主,其務在周密。是以喜見則德償,怒見則威分。故明主之言隔塞而不通,周密而不見。故以一得十者,下道也;以十得一者,上道也。明主兼行上下,故奸無所失。伍、官、連、縣而鄰,謁過賞,失過誅。上之於下,下之於上,亦然。是故上下貴賤相畏以法,相誨以和。民之性,有生之實,有生之名。為君者有賢知之名,有賞罰之實。名實俱至,故福善必聞矣。

The enlightened ruler's essential task lies in being thorough and secretive. If his pleasure is visible, then his favor can be manipulated. If his anger is visible, then his authority is divided. Therefore the enlightened ruler's words are blocked and sealed so they do not circulate, thorough and secretive so they are not perceived.

To gain ten from investing one is the way of the subordinate. To gain one from investing ten is the way of the superior. The enlightened ruler practices both the superior and inferior ways, so that treachery has nowhere to escape.

Groups of five, official networks, chains of liability, and county-level neighbors are linked together: those who report offenses are rewarded; those who fail to report are punished. What applies from superior to subordinate applies equally from subordinate to superior. Therefore at every level, the noble and the humble fear one another through the law and instruct one another in harmony.

Human nature has the substance of life and the name of life. For the ruler, there is the name of wisdom and worthiness, and the substance of rewards and punishments. When name and substance are both present, then the blessing of goodness will inevitably be known.

Notes

1translation

伍 (groups of five) refers to the mutual responsibility system where groups of five households were collectively liable for each other's conduct. This system of collective punishment was a cornerstone of Legalist social control, later institutionalized by Shang Yang in Qin.

2person商鞅Shang Yang

Shang Yang (商鞅), the Legalist reformer of Qin (d. 338 BC), is the figure most associated with implementing the mutual responsibility (連坐) system referenced here, though Han Fei does not name him in this passage.

六、參言

Canon VI: Cross-Checking Statements

聽不參,則無以責下;言不督乎用,則邪說當上。言之為物也以多信,不然之物,十從雲疑,百人然乎,千人不可解也。吶者言之疑,辯者言之信。奸之食上也,取資乎眾,籍信乎辯,而以類飾其私。人主不饜忿而待合參,其勢資下也。有道之主聽言,督其用,課其功,功課而賞罰生焉,故無用之辯不留朝。任事者知不足以治職,則放官收。說大而夸則窮端,故奸得而怒。無故而不當為誣,誣而罪臣。言必有報,說必責用也,故朋黨之言不上聞。凡聽之道,人臣忠論以聞奸,博論以內一,人主不智則奸得資。明主之道,己喜,則求其所納;己怒,則察其所構;論於已變之後,以得毀譽公私之徵。眾諫以效智故,使君自取一以避罪,故眾之諫也敗。君之取也,無副言於上以設將然,今符言於後以知謾誠語。明主之道,臣不得兩諫,必任其一語;不得擅行,必合其參,故奸無道進矣。

If the ruler listens without cross-checking, he has no basis on which to hold subordinates accountable. If words are not measured against utility, then perverse doctrines will reach the ruler. The nature of words is that repetition breeds belief: something untrue, if ten people affirm it, becomes doubtful; if a hundred affirm it, becomes plausible; if a thousand affirm it, becomes indisputable. The tongue-tied man's words invite doubt; the eloquent man's words inspire trust. When treachery feeds upon the ruler, it draws resources from the crowd, borrows credibility from eloquence, and uses apparent parallels to adorn its private purposes.

If the ruler does not restrain his anger and instead awaits the convergence of cross-checked evidence, his institutional power will depend on those below. The ruler who possesses the Way listens to words, supervises their application, and evaluates results. When results are evaluated, rewards and punishments follow -- therefore useless eloquence does not linger at court. When those entrusted with affairs prove to lack the knowledge to govern their posts, they are dismissed and their authority reclaimed. When grand claims are exaggerated, the endpoints are exposed -- thus treachery is caught and punished. Words without basis that do not match reality constitute slander, and the slanderer is punished. When every statement must be answered for and every argument must produce results, then the words of factions will not reach the ruler's ears.

The general principles of listening: ministers argue loyally to expose treachery, and debate broadly to arrive at unity. If the ruler lacks intelligence, treachery gains resources. The way of the enlightened ruler: when he feels pleasure, he investigates what was offered to produce it. When he feels anger, he examines what was fabricated to provoke it. He deliberates after events have changed, to obtain the evidence of praise and blame, public and private.

When the multitude remonstrances to demonstrate their cleverness, they let the ruler choose one course in order to evade blame themselves -- therefore collective remonstrance fails. When the ruler makes his choice, he leaves no supplementary words above to establish expectations, but later matches statements to outcomes to distinguish deception from sincerity. The way of the enlightened ruler: ministers may not offer contradictory advice but must commit to a single statement. They may not act on their own authority but must submit to cross-checking. Therefore treachery has no avenue to advance.

Notes

1context

This canon addresses information warfare within the court. Han Fei recognizes that eloquence is not correlated with truth, and that consensus can be manufactured. His solution is institutional: hold every speaker accountable for the practical results of their advice.

七、聽法

Canon VII: Methods of Administrative Listening

官之重也,毋法也;法之息也,上暗也。上暗無度,則官擅為;官擅為,故奉重無前;則征多;征多故富。官之富重也,亂功之所生也。明主之道取於任,賢於官,賞於功。言程,主喜,俱必利;不當,主怒,俱必害;則人不私父兄而進其仇讎。勢足以行法,奉足以給事,而私無所生,故民勞苦而輕官。任事者毋重,使其寵必在爵;外官者毋私,使其利必在祿;故民尊爵而重祿。爵祿,所以賞也;民重所以賞也,則國治。刑之煩也,名之繆也,賞譽不當則民疑,民之重名與其重賞也均。賞者有誹焉,不足以勸;罰者有譽焉,不足以禁。明主之道,賞必出乎公利,名必在乎為上。賞譽同軌,非誅俱行。然則民無榮於賞之內。有重罰者必有惡名,故民畏。罰,所以禁也;民畏所以禁,則國治矣。

Officials become powerful when there is no law. The law falls into disuse when the ruler is benighted. When the ruler is benighted and has no standards, officials act arbitrarily. When officials act arbitrarily, their emoluments swell without limit, and exactions multiply. When exactions multiply, they grow rich. When officials grow rich and powerful, disorder and the corruption of merit arise.

The way of the enlightened ruler: he selects by appointment, values by office, and rewards by merit. When proposals match the standard, the ruler is pleased and all benefit. When they do not match, the ruler is angered and all suffer harm. Under such conditions, men do not privately promote their fathers and brothers but will even advance their enemies. When positional advantage is sufficient to enforce the law and salaries are sufficient to fund operations, there is no room for private gain -- therefore the people toil willingly and regard their officials lightly.

Those entrusted with affairs must not be given excessive influence; their favor must depend solely on rank. Officials in the outer provinces must not have private interests; their benefit must depend solely on salary. Thus the people respect rank and value salary. Rank and salary are the instruments of reward. When the people value the instruments of reward, the state is well governed.

When punishments are confused and titles are misapplied, when rewards and praise are not appropriate, then the people become doubtful. The people value reputation as much as they value rewards. If those who are rewarded are criticized, the rewards are insufficient to encourage. If those who are punished are praised, the punishments are insufficient to deter.

The way of the enlightened ruler: rewards must arise from public benefit, and reputation must depend on service to the ruler. Rewards and praise follow the same track; condemnation and punishment proceed together. Under such conditions, the people find no basis for glory outside the system of rewards. Those who receive heavy punishment will inevitably bear an evil reputation -- therefore the people fear it. Punishment is the instrument of prohibition. When the people fear the instrument of prohibition, the state is well governed.

Notes

1context

This canon addresses the problem of officials enriching themselves through their positions. Han Fei's solution is to create a closed system where all prestige, income, and advancement flow exclusively through official channels controlled by the ruler.

2translation

賞譽同軌 (rewards and praise follow the same track) means that social prestige and material reward must be aligned -- the state must ensure that people admired by society are the same people rewarded by the state, not scholars, knights-errant, or other figures whose fame derives from sources outside the ruler's control.

八、主威

Canon VIII: The Ruler's Authority

行義示則主威分,慈仁聽則法制毀。民以制畏上,而上以勢卑下,故下肆很觸而榮於輕君之俗,則主威分。民以法難犯上,而上以法撓慈仁,故下明愛施而務賕紋之政,是以法令隳。尊私行以貳主威,行賕紋以疑法,聽之則亂治,不聽則謗主,故君輕乎位而法亂乎官,此之謂無常之國。明主之道,臣不得以行義成榮,不得以家利為功,功名所生,必出於官法。法之年外,雖有難行,不以顯焉,故民無以私名。設法度以齊民,信賞罰以盡民能,明誹譽以勸沮。名號、賞罰、法令三隅。故大臣有行則尊君,百姓有功則利上,此之謂有道之國也。

When private moral conduct is displayed, the ruler's authority is divided. When benevolence is heeded, the legal system is destroyed. The people fear their superiors through institutional control, yet when the ruler uses his positional advantage to humble himself before his subordinates, those below grow reckless and insolent, glorying in the custom of treating the ruler lightly -- thus the ruler's authority is divided.

The people find it difficult to violate the law when challenging their superiors, yet when the ruler bends the law to accommodate benevolence, those below make a show of love and generosity and devote themselves to the politics of bribery and patronage -- thus laws and ordinances collapse. When private conduct is honored so as to rival the ruler's authority, and when bribery is practiced so as to cast doubt upon the law: to heed this leads to disordered governance; to refuse to heed it leads to slander of the ruler. Therefore the ruler sits lightly upon his throne and the law is in chaos among the officials -- this is called a state without constancy.

The way of the enlightened ruler: ministers may not achieve glory through private moral conduct, nor may they claim merit through enriching their families. All merit and fame must originate from the official legal system. Beyond what the law prescribes, even difficult achievements shall not be publicized -- therefore the people have no path to private fame.

Establish legal standards to unify the people. Make rewards and punishments credible to exhaust the people's abilities. Clarify praise and blame to encourage and deter. Titles, rewards and punishments, and laws and ordinances -- these are the three pillars. When great ministers conduct themselves properly, they honor the ruler. When the common people achieve merit, they benefit the ruler. This is called a state that possesses the Way.

Notes

1context

This final canon directly attacks the Confucian ideal of moral rulership. Han Fei argues that a ruler who tolerates private moral fame (義) among his ministers is undermining his own authority, because ministers gain an independent source of prestige that competes with the state's institutional rewards.

2translation

三隅 (three pillars/corners) -- titles (名號), rewards and punishments (賞罰), and laws and ordinances (法令) -- are presented as the complete toolkit of governance. All three must be aligned under the ruler's exclusive control.

Edition & Source

Text
《韓非子》 Hanfeizi
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription, 《四部叢刊》本
Commentary
Han Fei (韓非), Warring States period