算地 (Calculating the Land) — Chinese ink painting

商君書 Shangjunshu · Chapter 6

算地

Calculating the Land

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地與民之平衡

Balancing Land and Population

凡世主之患,用兵者不量力,治草萊者不度地。故有地狹而民眾者,民勝其地;地廣而民少者,地勝其民。民勝其地,務開;地勝其民者,事徠。

開,則行倍。民過地,則國功寡而兵力少;地過民,則山澤財物不為用。夫棄天物、遂民淫者,世主之務過也,而上下事之,故民眾而兵弱,地大而力小。

The worry of all rulers in the world is that those who employ armies do not measure their strength, and those who develop waste lands do not calculate their territory. Thus some have narrow territory but numerous people — the people exceed the land; others have broad territory but few people — the land exceeds the people. Where the people exceed the land, effort must be directed toward opening new territory; where the land exceeds the people, affairs must be directed toward attracting immigrants.

Opening new territory doubles the return on effort. When the people exceed the land, the state's accomplishments are few and its military strength is small. When the land exceeds the people, the resources of mountains and marshes go unused. To abandon heaven's resources and indulge the people's dissoluteness — this is the critical error of rulers in the world. When both ruler and subjects engage in this, the people are numerous yet the army is weak, the land is vast yet strength is meager.

任地待役之律

The Standards for Assigning Land and Preparing for Service

故為國任地者:山林居什一,藪澤居什一,藪谷流水居什一,都邑蹊道居什四,此先王之正律也。故為國分田數:小畝五百,足待一役,此地不任也;方土百里,出戰卒萬人者,數小也。此其墾田足以食其民,都邑遂路足以處其民,山林、藪澤、谿谷足以供其利,藪澤堤防足以畜。故兵出,糧給而財有餘;兵休,民作而畜長足。此所謂任地待役之律也。

今世主有地方數千里,食不足以待役實倉,而兵為鄰敵,臣故為世主患之。夫地大而不墾者,與無地同;民眾而不用者,與無民同。故為國之數,務在墾草;用兵之道,務在壹賞。私利塞於外,則民務屬於農;屬於農,則朴;朴,則畏令。私賞禁於下,則民力摶於敵;摶於敵,則勝。奚以知其然也?夫民之情,朴則生勞而易力,窮則生知而權利。易力則輕死而樂用,權利則畏罰而易苦。易苦則地力盡,樂用則兵力盡。夫治國者,能盡地力而致民死者,名與利交至。

Therefore in allocating territory for the state: mountains and forests occupy one-tenth, marshes and wetlands one-tenth, valleys and waterways one-tenth, and cities, towns, and roads four-tenths — this is the standard law of the former kings. Thus in allocating field acreage for the state: five hundred small mu are sufficient to support one service obligation — this is the minimum land assignment. A territory of a hundred square li that can field ten thousand battle-ready soldiers — this number is small. Such a territory has enough cultivated fields to feed its people, enough cities, towns, and roads to house its people, enough mountains, forests, marshes, wetlands, and valleys to supply its resources, and enough marshes and dikes for storage. Therefore when the army marches out, grain supplies are adequate and wealth has a surplus; when the army rests, the people work and livestock and stores are ample. This is called the standard for assigning land and preparing for service.

Now the rulers of the world possess territories of several thousand square li, yet their food supply is insufficient to sustain their service obligations or fill their granaries, and their armies are menaced by neighboring enemies — this is why your minister worries on behalf of the rulers of the world. Great territory that is not cultivated is the same as no territory; a numerous population that is not employed is the same as no population. Therefore the art of governing the state lies above all in cultivating waste land; the way of employing armies lies above all in unifying rewards. When private profit is blocked externally, the people devote themselves to agriculture; devoted to agriculture, they are simple; simple, they fear commands. When private rewards are prohibited below, the people's strength is concentrated against the enemy; concentrated against the enemy, they prevail. How do we know this is so? By the nature of the people: when simple, they produce labor and readily exert their strength; when impoverished, they develop cunning and calculate profit. Those who readily exert their strength regard death lightly and gladly serve; those who calculate profit fear punishment and readily endure hardship. Those who readily endure hardship will exhaust the land's capacity; those who gladly serve will exhaust the army's capacity. One who governs the state and can exhaust the land's capacity while bringing the people to risk their lives — both fame and profit will arrive together.

名利之所湊

Where Fame and Profit Converge

民之性:飢而求食,勞而求佚,苦則索樂,辱則求榮,此民之情也。民之求利,失禮之法;求名,失性之常。奚以論其然也?今夫盜賊上犯君上之所禁,而下失臣民之禮,故名辱而身危,猶不止者,利也。其上世之士,衣不煖膚,食不滿腸,苦其志意,勞其四肢,傷其五臟,而益裕廣耳,非性之常也,而為之者,名也。故曰:名利之所湊,則民道之。

主操名利之柄而能致功名者,數也。聖人審權以操柄,審數以使民。數者,臣主之術,而國之要也。故萬乘失數而不危、臣主失術而不亂者,未之有也。

The nature of the people: when hungry they seek food, when exhausted they seek rest, when suffering they seek pleasure, when humiliated they seek honor — this is the people's disposition. In seeking profit, people abandon the constraints of propriety; in seeking fame, they depart from the norms of their nature. How do we know this? Consider that bandits and thieves violate the ruler's prohibitions above and fail in the proprieties of ministers and subjects below — their names are disgraced and their persons endangered, yet they do not stop. Why? Profit. Consider the scholars of the highest antiquity who wore clothes that did not warm their skin, ate food that did not fill their bellies, tormented their wills and spirits, exhausted their limbs, and injured their organs, ever expanding and extending — this is not the norm of human nature, yet they did it. Why? Fame. Therefore it is said: where fame and profit converge, the people will follow that path.

The ruler holds the levers of fame and profit, and to achieve meritorious results through these is a matter of technique. The sage examines authority to grasp the levers and examines technique to employ the people. Technique is the art governing the relationship between ruler and minister, and the essential matter of the state. There has never been a state of ten thousand chariots that lost its technique yet avoided peril, nor a ruler-minister relationship that lost its art yet avoided disorder.

五民之害

The Harm of the Five Types of People

今則不然。世主之所以加務者,皆非國之急也。身有堯、舜之行,而功不及湯、武之略者,此執柄之罪也。臣請語其過。夫治國舍勢而任說說,則身剽而功寡。故事《詩》、《書》談說之士,則民游而輕其君;事處士,則民遠而非其上;事勇士,則民競而輕其禁;技藝之士用,則民剽而易徙;商賈之士佚且利,則民緣而議其上。故五民加於國用,則田荒而兵弱。談說之士資在於口,處士資在於意勇士資在於氣,技藝之士資在於手,商賈之士資在於身。故天下一宅,而圜身資。民資重於身,而偏托勢於外。挾重資,歸偏家,堯、舜之所難也。故湯、武禁之,則功立而名成。聖人非能以世之所易勝其所難也,必以其所難勝其所易。故民愚,則知可以勝之;世知,則力可以勝之。臣愚,則易力而難巧;世巧,則易知而難力。

Yet this is not the case today. What the rulers of the world exert themselves upon is all non-essential to the state. Those whose personal conduct matches Yao and Shun yet whose achievements fall short of Tang and Wu's strategic accomplishments — this is the fault of how they handle the levers of power. Allow your minister to speak of their errors. If in governing the state one abandons positional advantage and relies on persuasive talk, one's person is imperiled and accomplishments are few. If one patronizes scholars of the Odes, Documents, and persuasive talk, the people will wander and hold their ruler in contempt. If one patronizes recluse scholars, the people will grow distant and criticize their superiors. If one patronizes brave warriors, the people will compete recklessly and treat prohibitions lightly. If technically skilled people are employed, the people will become volatile and prone to migration. If merchants are at leisure and profiting, the people will find pretexts to criticize their superiors. Thus if these five types of people are added to the state's employ, fields go barren and the army grows weak. The capital of persuasive scholars lies in their mouths; the capital of recluses lies in their ideas; the capital of brave warriors lies in their spirit; the capital of the technically skilled lies in their hands; the capital of merchants lies in their persons. The whole world is one dwelling, and they circulate their person-capital. When the people's capital is weighted on their persons and their dependence is placed outside the state — carrying heavy capital and returning to some remote household — this is what even Yao and Shun would find difficult. Therefore Tang and Wu prohibited this, and their achievements were established and their names accomplished. The sage does not overcome what is difficult with what the world finds easy; he must overcome what is easy with what is difficult. When the people are simple, knowledge can prevail over them; when the world is knowledgeable, strength can prevail over it. When the people are simple, it is easy to apply strength and hard to use cleverness; when the world is clever, it is easy to apply knowledge and hard to use strength.

名利出於農戰

Fame and Profit Must Issue from Agriculture and Warfare

故神農教耕而王天下,師其知也;湯、武致強而征諸侯,服其力也。今世巧而民淫,方效湯、武之時,而行神農之事,以隨世禁。故千乘惑亂,此其所加務者過也。

民之生:度而取長,稱而取重,權而索利。明君慎觀三者,則國治可立,而民能可得。國之所以求民者少,而民之所以避求者多,入使民屬於農,出使民壹於戰,故聖人之治也,多禁以止能,任力以窮詐。兩者偏用,則境內之民壹;民壹,則農;農,則朴;朴,則安居而惡出。故聖人之為國也,民資藏於地,而偏托危於外。資藏於地則朴,托危於外則惑。民入則朴,出則惑,故其農勉而戰戢也。民之農勉則資重,戰戢則鄰危。資重則不可負而逃,鄰危則不歸。於無資、歸危外托,狂夫之所不為也。故聖人之為國也,觀俗立法則治,察國事本則宜。不觀時俗,不察國本,則其法立而民亂,事劇而功寡。此臣之所謂過也。

Therefore Shennong taught plowing and became king of the world — they submitted to his knowledge. Tang and Wu brought about strength and campaigned against the feudal lords — they submitted to their force. Now the world is clever and the people dissolute; to imitate the era of Tang and Wu while practicing the policies of Shennong, following the prohibitions of that age — this is why states of a thousand chariots are confused and disordered, because what they exert themselves upon is wrong.

The nature of the people in life: they measure and take what is long, weigh and take what is heavy, calculate and seek what is profitable. If the enlightened ruler carefully observes these three things, then governance can be established and the people's abilities can be obtained. What the state demands of the people is little, while what the people use to evade those demands is much. Inwardly direct the people to devote themselves to agriculture; outwardly direct the people to commit themselves solely to warfare. Therefore the sage's governance employs many prohibitions to stop cunning, and relies on strength to exhaust deception. When both are employed together, the people within the borders are unified. When unified, they farm; when they farm, they are simple; when simple, they are content to stay and reluctant to leave. Therefore in the sage's governance of the state, the people's resources are stored in the land and their dependence for safety is placed on the danger beyond the borders. When resources are stored in the land, they are simple; when dependence is placed on external danger, they are watchful. Coming in, they are simple; going out, they are watchful — therefore they strive at agriculture and are disciplined in war. When the people strive at agriculture, their resources are weighty; when disciplined in war, their neighbors are in peril. When resources are weighty, one cannot shoulder them and flee; when neighbors are in peril, there is nowhere to go. To have no resources, to return to danger, to depend on others outside — not even a madman would do this. Therefore in the sage's governance of the state, he observes the customs and establishes law, then there is order; he examines the state's affairs and attends to fundamentals, then measures are appropriate. If one does not observe the customs of the time and does not examine the state's fundamentals, then the law will be established yet the people will be disordered, affairs will multiply yet accomplishments will be few. This is what your minister calls the error.

Notes

1person神農Shénnóng

Shennong (神農, 'the Divine Farmer') is a mythical culture hero credited with inventing agriculture and herbal medicine. He represents the earliest, simplest stage of governance when instruction alone sufficed to rule.

刑賞之本

The Foundations of Punishment and Reward

夫刑者,所以禁邪也;而賞者,所以助禁也。羞辱勞苦者,民之所惡也;顯榮佚樂者,民之所務也。故其國刑不可惡而爵祿不足務也,此亡國之兆也。

刑人復漏,則小人辟淫而不苦刑,則徼倖於民、上;徼於民、上以利。求顯榮之門不一,則君子事勢以成名。小人不避其禁,故刑煩。君子不設其令,則罰行。刑煩而罰行者,國多奸,則富者不能守其財,而貧者不能事其業,田荒而國貧。田荒,則民詐生;國貧,則上匱賞。故聖人之為治也,刑人無國位,戮人無官任。刑人有列,則君子下其位;衣錦食肉,則小人冀其利。

君子下其位,則羞功;小人冀其利,則伐奸。故刑戮者,所以止奸也;而官爵者,所以勸功也。今國立爵而民羞之,設刑而民樂之,此蓋法術之患也。

故君子操權一正以立術,立官貴爵以稱之,論榮舉功以任之,則是上下之稱平。上下之稱平,則臣得盡其力,而主得專其柄。

Punishment exists to prohibit evil; reward exists to assist in that prohibition. Shame, humiliation, toil, and hardship are what the people detest; display, glory, leisure, and pleasure are what the people strive for. Therefore if a state's punishments are not dreaded and its ranks and salaries are not worth striving for, this is the omen of a doomed state.

If the punished are allowed back and the guilty escape, then petty men evade and act dissolute without suffering punishment, and they gamble on luck with both the people and the ruler — gambling for profit. If the gates to glory and honor are not unified, then gentlemen will manipulate power to achieve fame. When petty men do not avoid the prohibitions, punishments become onerous. When gentlemen do not observe the edicts, penalties are constantly enforced. When punishments are onerous and penalties constantly enforced, the state has much villainy — the wealthy cannot protect their property and the poor cannot pursue their livelihoods. Fields go barren and the state is impoverished. When fields are barren, the people resort to deception; when the state is impoverished, the ruler lacks the means to reward. Therefore in the sage's governance: the punished hold no state rank and the condemned hold no official appointment. If the punished have standing in the hierarchy, gentlemen lower themselves from their positions; if the punished wear silk and eat meat, petty men covet their advantage.

When gentlemen lower themselves, they feel shame about merit; when petty men covet advantage, villainy flourishes. Punishment and condemnation exist to stop villainy; office and rank exist to encourage merit. If the state establishes ranks that the people are ashamed of and institutes punishments that the people are happy about — this is indeed the affliction of a flawed legal art.

Therefore the ruler operates the levers of authority in a unified and correct manner to establish his art: he establishes offices, values ranks, and balances them properly; he evaluates glory and elevates merit to appoint properly. Then the balance between above and below is level. When the balance between above and below is level, ministers can fully exert their strength, and the ruler can exclusively control his levers of power.

Edition & Source

Text
《商君書》 Shangjunshu
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
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