謀攻 (Attack by Stratagem) — Chinese ink painting

Chapter 3 of 13

謀攻

Attack by Stratagem

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不戰而屈人之兵

Subduing the Enemy Without Fighting

孫子曰:凡用兵之法,全國為上,破國次之;全軍為上,破軍次之;全旅為上,破旅次之;全卒為上,破卒次之;全伍為上,破伍次之。是故百戰百勝,非善之善者也;不戰而屈人之兵,善之善者也。

Master Sun said: In the conduct of war, it is best to take the enemy's state whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is inferior. It is best to capture the enemy's army whole; to destroy it is inferior. It is best to capture a brigade whole; to destroy it is inferior. It is best to capture a company whole; to destroy it is inferior. It is best to capture a squad whole; to destroy it is inferior.

Therefore, to win a hundred battles in a hundred engagements is not the highest excellence. The highest excellence is to subdue the enemy's army without fighting at all.

Notes

1context

The descending hierarchy from 國 (state) to 軍 (army, ~12,500 men) to 旅 (brigade, ~500 men) to 卒 (company, ~100 men) to 伍 (squad, 5 men) follows the standard Zhou military organization. Sunzi applies the principle of 'taking whole' at every level.

2translation

全 (quan, 'whole/intact') vs 破 (po, 'shatter/break') — this is the central opposition of the chapter. 全 means to gain control without destruction; 破 means to gain control through destruction. Sunzi regards destruction as wasteful: you inherit ruins instead of resources.

3context

不戰而屈人之兵 ('subdue the enemy's army without fighting') is perhaps the single most famous line in the Sunzi. It encapsulates his entire strategic philosophy: the supreme commander wins through superior planning, diplomacy, and positioning, making actual battle unnecessary.

上兵伐謀

The Hierarchy of Warfare

故上兵伐謀,其次伐交,其次伐兵,其下攻城。攻城之法,為不得已。修櫓轒轀,具器械,三月而後成;距闉,又三月而後已。將不勝其忿,而蟻附之,殺士三分之一,而城不拔者,此攻之災也。

The highest form of warfare is to attack the enemy's strategy. The next best is to disrupt his alliances. The next is to attack his army in the field. The worst is to besiege his cities.

Siege warfare is undertaken only when there is no alternative. To construct mantlets and armored wagons and to prepare siege equipment requires three months. To build earthen ramps against the walls takes another three months. If the general cannot master his fury and sends his men swarming up the walls like ants, he will lose a third of his troops — and the city will still not fall. This is the calamity of siege warfare.

Notes

4context

伐謀 ('attack the enemy's strategy') means defeating the enemy at the planning stage — disrupting his plans before they can be executed. 伐交 ('disrupt his alliances') means isolating the enemy diplomatically. These two levels of warfare require intelligence and diplomacy rather than military force.

5context

轒轀 (fen wen) were large armored siege wagons with protective roofs, used to approach city walls under cover. 距闉 (ju yin) were earthen siege ramps built against city walls to allow attackers to reach the top — massive construction projects requiring enormous labor.

6translation

蟻附 (yi fu, 'ants climbing') is a vivid metaphor for a massed infantry assault on city walls — soldiers climbing scaling ladders in dense swarms like ants crawling up a wall. The image emphasizes both the desperation and the futility of the tactic.

必以全爭於天下

Contending for All-Under-Heaven Through Wholeness

故善用兵者,屈人之兵而非戰也,拔人之城而非攻也,毀人之國而非久也,必以全爭於天下,故兵不頓而利可全,此謀攻之法也。

Therefore the skilled commander subdues the enemy's army without battle, captures his cities without siege, and overthrows his state without prolonged campaigns. He must contend for All-Under-Heaven with the principle of wholeness intact. Thus his forces are not worn down, and his gains are complete.

This is the method of attack by stratagem.

Notes

7translation

全爭於天下 ('contend for All-Under-Heaven with wholeness intact'): the paradox at the heart of Sunzi's thought. The commander who seeks total victory must avoid total war. By preserving what he conquers rather than destroying it, he gains genuine power rather than pyrrhic victories.

用兵之法

Rules of Engagement by Relative Strength

故用兵之法,十則圍之,五則攻之,倍則分之,敵則能戰之,少則能守之,不若則能避之。故小敵之堅,大敵之擒也。

The principles of military operations are: if you outnumber the enemy ten to one, surround him. If five to one, attack him. If two to one, divide him. If equally matched, you may engage him. If slightly inferior, you may defend against him. If greatly outmatched, you must evade him.

A small force that fights stubbornly will be captured by a larger one.

Notes

8context

These force ratios became standard doctrine in Chinese military thinking. The ratios are guidelines, not rigid rules — Sunzi himself elsewhere emphasizes that a skilled commander can overcome numerical disadvantage through superior positioning and deception.

9translation

小敵之堅,大敵之擒 — literally 'a small enemy's stubbornness is a large enemy's capture.' The point is that courage and determination are not substitutes for strategic sense. A smaller force that refuses to retreat when it should will be destroyed.

將者國之輔

The General as Bulwark of the State

夫將者,國之輔也。輔周則國必強,輔隙則國必弱。

The general is the bulwark of the state. If the bulwark is complete, the state will surely be strong. If the bulwark is flawed, the state will surely be weak.

Notes

10translation

輔 (fu) literally means the cheek-piece on a chariot wheel — a structural support without which the wheel collapses. Sunzi's metaphor presents the general not as the wheel itself (the state) but as the critical component that holds it together.

君之患於軍者三

Three Ways a Ruler Can Bring Disaster Upon His Army

故君之所以患於軍者三:不知軍之不可以進而謂之進,不知軍之不可以退而謂之退,是為縻軍;不知三軍之事,而同三軍之政,則軍士惑矣;不知三軍之權,而同三軍之任,則軍士疑矣。三軍既惑且疑,則諸侯之難至矣,是謂亂軍引勝。

There are three ways a ruler can bring disaster upon his army:

To order an advance when he does not know the army cannot advance, or to order a retreat when he does not know the army cannot retreat — this is called hobbling the army.

To interfere in the army's administration without understanding military affairs — this confuses the officers and men.

To interfere in the army's command without understanding military authority — this makes the officers and men doubtful.

When the army is confused and doubtful, the rival lords will seize the moment. This is called throwing the army into disorder and inviting defeat.

Notes

11translation

縻軍 (mi jun, 'hobbling the army'): 縻 means to tether or hobble an animal. The image is of a ruler who keeps the army on a leash, preventing it from acting according to battlefield conditions.

12context

三軍 (san jun, 'three armies') refers to the standard Zhou-era military organization dividing forces into upper, middle, and lower armies. By the Warring States period it simply meant 'the entire army' or 'all the armed forces.'

13context

This passage articulates the principle of civilian-military separation: the ruler sets strategic objectives, but the general must have operational autonomy. Civilian micromanagement of military operations is a recurring cause of defeat in Chinese military history — and in military history generally.

知勝有五

Five Ways to Foreknow Victory

故知勝有五:知可以戰與不可以戰者勝,識衆寡之用者勝,上下同欲者勝,以虞待不虞者勝,將能而君不御者勝。此五者,知勝之道也。

There are five ways to foreknow victory:

He who knows when to fight and when not to fight will win.

He who understands how to employ both large and small forces will win.

He whose ranks are united in purpose will win.

He who is prepared and waits for the unprepared will win.

He whose general is capable and whose ruler does not interfere will win.

These five are the way to foreknow victory.

Notes

14context

上下同欲 ('upper and lower share the same desire'): this echoes the concept of 道 (moral cause) from Chapter 1 — the alignment of ruler, general, and people toward a common purpose. Sunzi considers this political unity a military factor, not merely a political one.

15translation

將能而君不御 ('the general is capable and the ruler does not interfere'): this fifth condition directly follows from the preceding section on royal interference. Sunzi insists that the ruler's role is to select a competent general — and then get out of the way.

知彼知己

Know the Enemy, Know Yourself

故曰:知彼知己,百戰不殆;不知彼而知己,一勝一負;不知彼不知己,每戰必殆。

Therefore I say: Know the enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. Know yourself but not the enemy, and for every victory you will suffer a defeat. Know neither the enemy nor yourself, and you will be in peril in every battle.

Notes

16context

知彼知己,百戰不殆 is the most quoted line in all of Chinese military literature and has passed into common usage as a proverb. It encapsulates Sunzi's rationalist approach to warfare: victory depends on intelligence (in both senses of the word), not on courage, numbers, or divine favor.

17textual

殆 (dai) means 'peril' or 'danger,' not 'defeat.' Sunzi's claim is carefully calibrated: knowledge does not guarantee victory, but it guarantees you will not be caught in a disastrous situation. The distinction between 'not being in peril' and 'winning every battle' is deliberate.

Edition & Source

Text
《孫子兵法》 Sunzi Bingfa
Edition
《武經七書》(Seven Military Classics) canonical text
Commentary
Cao Cao (曹操) and the Eleven Commentators tradition