Chapter 25 of 33 · Wei state

魏策四

The Stratagems of Wei IV

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獻書秦王

A Letter Presented to the King of Qin

（闕文）獻書秦王曰：「昔竊聞大王之謀出事於梁，謀恐不出於計矣，願大王之熟計之也。梁者，山東之要也。有虵於此，擊其尾，其首救；擊其首，其尾救；擊其中身，首尾皆救。今梁王，天下之中身也。秦攻梁者，是示天下要斷山東之脊也，是山東首尾皆救中身之時也。山東見亡必恐，恐必大合，山東尚強，臣見秦之必大憂可立而待也。臣竊為大王計，不如南出。事於南方，其兵弱，天下必能救，地可廣大，國可富，兵可強，主可尊。王不聞湯之伐桀乎?試之弱密須氏以為武教，得密須氏而湯之服桀矣。今秦國與山東為讎，不先以弱為武教，兵必大挫，國必大憂。」秦果南攻蘭田、鄢、郢。

[The beginning is lost.] A letter is presented to the King of Qin: "I have heard that Your Majesty plans to campaign against Liang. I fear this plan may not be well calculated, and I urge Your Majesty to reconsider carefully.

Liang is the strategic linchpin of the east. Consider a snake: strike its tail, and its head comes to the rescue; strike its head, and its tail comes to the rescue; strike its middle, and both head and tail come to the rescue. The King of Liang is the middle of All-Under-Heaven's body. If Qin attacks Liang, it demonstrates to All-Under-Heaven an intent to sever the spine of the eastern states — and that is precisely when the eastern states will rally to rescue the middle. When the eastern states see destruction approaching, they will be frightened; when frightened, they will form a grand coalition. The eastern states are still strong, and I can see that Qin's great troubles will follow immediately.

I humbly suggest to Your Majesty: better to advance southward. Campaign in the south, where the armies are weak and no one in All-Under-Heaven will be able to come to the rescue. Territory can be vastly expanded, the state enriched, the army strengthened, the sovereign exalted. Has Your Majesty not heard of Tang's conquest of Jie? He first tested himself against the weak Mixu clan as a military exercise, and once he had subdued the Mixu, Tang went on to subjugate Jie. Now Qin and the eastern states are enemies — if you do not first practice on the weak, your armies will suffer great setbacks and your state great anxiety."

Qin does indeed advance south and attacks Lantian, Yan, and Ying.

Notes

1textual

The text begins with 闕文 (quē wén), meaning 'text missing' — the speaker's identity is lost. The snake metaphor that follows is famous enough to survive its anonymous author.

2context

Liang (梁) is the common name for Wei's capital Daliang (大梁), modern Kaifeng, and here stands for the state of Wei itself. The 'snake' metaphor — that Wei occupies the central position in the eastern alliance — is geographically accurate: Wei sat between Zhao to the north and Han/Chu to the south, making it the fulcrum of any east-west confrontation.

3place郢Yǐng

Ying (郢) was the capital of Chu. Qin's capture of Ying in 278 BC by general Bai Qi was a catastrophic blow to Chu and validated the anonymous letter-writer's advice: attack the weak south first, not the well-connected center. Whether the advice actually influenced Qin's decision is unknowable, but the Zhanguoce wants you to think it did.

4person湯Tāng

Tang (湯) is the legendary founder of the Shang dynasty who overthrew the tyrant Jie (桀) of the Xia. The Mixu (密須) clan was a minor power that Tang subdued first as a warm-up. The analogy: don't fight the strong before you've practiced on the weak.

八年謂魏王

In the Eighth Year, a Warning to the King of Wei

八年，（闕文）謂魏王曰：「昔曹恃齊而輕晉，齊伐釐、莒而晉人亡曹。繒恃齊以悍越，齊和子亂而越人亡繒。鄭恃魏以輕韓，伐榆關而韓氏亡鄭。原恃秦、翟以輕晉，秦、翟年穀大凶而晉人亡原。中山恃齊、魏以輕趙，齊、魏伐楚而趙亡中山。此五國所以亡者，皆其所恃也。非獨此五國為然而已也，天下之亡國皆然矣。夫國之所以不可恃者多，其變不可勝數也。或以政教不修，上下不輯，而不可恃者；或有諸侯鄰國之虞，而不可恃者；或以年穀不登，稸積竭盡，而不可恃者；或化於利，比於患。臣以此知國之不可必恃也。今王恃楚之強，而信春中君之言，以是質秦，而久不可知。即春申君有變，是王獨受秦患也。即王有萬乘之國，而以一人之心為命也，臣以此為不完，願王之熟計之也。」

In the eighth year, [the speaker's name is lost] says to the King of Wei: "In the past, Cao relied on Qi and took Jin lightly — Qi attacked Li and Ju, and Jin destroyed Cao. Zeng relied on Qi to bully Yue — Qi suffered internal disorder under He Zi, and Yue destroyed Zeng. Zheng relied on Wei to take Han lightly, attacked Yuguan — and Han destroyed Zheng. Yuan relied on Qin and the Di to take Jin lightly — Qin and the Di suffered a great famine, and Jin destroyed Yuan. Zhongshan relied on Qi and Wei to take Zhao lightly — Qi and Wei attacked Chu, and Zhao destroyed Zhongshan.

These five states were destroyed precisely because of what they relied upon. And it is not these five alone — every state that has ever been destroyed perished for the same reason. The reasons why an ally cannot be relied upon are many, and the variables are beyond counting. Sometimes governance and education are neglected, ruler and ruled are not in harmony, and the ally becomes unreliable. Sometimes neighboring states pose threats that make the ally unreliable. Sometimes harvests fail and stores are exhausted, making the ally unreliable. Sometimes the ally is seduced by profit or driven by disaster.

From all this I know that one can never be certain of an ally. Now Your Majesty relies on Chu's strength and trusts the words of Lord Chunshen, and on this basis you confront Qin — but the long-term outcome is unknowable. Should Lord Chunshen suffer any reversal, Your Majesty alone will bear the brunt of Qin's wrath. You possess a state of ten thousand chariots, yet you stake your fate on one man's loyalty. I consider this incomplete planning, and I urge Your Majesty to reconsider carefully."

Notes

1context

The litany of five destroyed states is a magnificent argument by accumulation. Each case follows the same structure: X relied on Y to bully Z, Y became unavailable, Z destroyed X. The repetition is the point — the speaker is establishing a law of political physics. The uncomfortable corollary, which the speaker is too polite to state outright: you, King of Wei, are about to become case number six.

2person春申君Chūn Shēn Jūn

Lord Chunshen (春申君), i.e., Huang Xie (黃歇, d. 238 BC), was one of the 'Four Lords' of the Warring States and chief minister of Chu. He was eventually assassinated by Li Yuan in a palace coup — which is exactly the kind of 'reversal' the anonymous speaker warns about. The warning proved prescient.

3context

The core argument — that depending on a single foreign ally is existentially dangerous — is one of the few pieces of Zhanguoce strategic advice that is genuinely timeless. The speaker's observation that alliances can fail for reasons having nothing to do with the current relationship (famine, internal coups, distant wars) anticipates what modern strategists call 'systemic risk.' The fact that every state in the Zhanguoce ignores this advice with metronomic regularity is, perhaps, the book's deepest lesson.

魏王問張旄

The King of Wei Questions Zhang Mao

魏王問張旄曰：「吾欲與秦攻韓，何如?」張旄對曰：「韓且坐而胥亡乎?且割而從天下乎?」王曰：「韓且割而從天下。」張旄曰：「韓怨魏乎?怨秦乎?」王曰：「怨魏。」張旄曰：「韓強秦乎?強魏乎?」王曰：「強秦。」張旄曰：「韓且割而從其所強，與所不怨乎?且割而從其所不強，與其所怨乎?」王曰：「韓將割而從其所強，與其所不怨。」張旄曰：「攻韓之事，王自知矣。」

The King of Wei asks Zhang Mao: "I wish to join Qin in attacking Han — what do you think?"

Zhang Mao replies: "Will Han simply sit and wait to be destroyed? Or will it cede territory and join with All-Under-Heaven?"

The King says: "Han will cede territory and join with All-Under-Heaven."

"Will Han resent Wei, or resent Qin?"

"Resent Wei."

"Is Han stronger than Qin, or stronger than Wei?"

"Stronger than Qin."

"Will Han cede territory and align with the one that is stronger and that it does not resent? Or will it cede territory and align with the one that is weaker and that it does resent?"

The King says: "Han will cede territory and align with the stronger and unresented party."

Zhang Mao says: "The matter of attacking Han — Your Majesty already knows the answer."

Notes

1person張旄Zhāng Máo

Zhang Mao (張旄) was a Wei advisor. His Socratic method here — asking the King a sequence of questions whose answers lead inexorably to a conclusion the King supplies himself — is one of the cleanest demonstrations of persuasion technique in the Zhanguoce. He never says 'don't attack Han.' He makes the King say it.

2context

The logic is airtight: if you attack Han, Han will ally with Qin (which it doesn't resent and which is stronger) and then both will come for you. By joining Qin to attack Han, Wei would be strengthening its own eventual destroyer. The King's answer to each question tightens the noose by one more notch, and by the end there is simply nothing left to argue about.

客謂司馬食其

A Guest Addresses Sima Shiqi

客謂司馬食其曰：「慮久以天下為可一者，是不知天下者也。欲獨以魏支秦者，是又不知魏者也。謂茲公不知此兩者，又不知茲公者也。然而茲公為從，其說何也?從則茲公重，不從則茲公輕，茲公之處重也，不實為期。子何不疾及三國方堅也，自賣於秦，秦必受子。不然，橫者將圖子以合於秦，是取子之資，而以資子之讎也。」

A guest says to Sima Shiqi: "Anyone who has long considered that All-Under-Heaven can be unified — that person does not understand All-Under-Heaven. Anyone who thinks Wei alone can resist Qin — that person does not understand Wei. And anyone who says Master Zi does not understand these two things — that person does not understand Master Zi.

But if Master Zi advocates the north-south coalition despite knowing all this, what is his reasoning? Simple: if there is a coalition, Master Zi is important; if there is no coalition, Master Zi is unimportant. Master Zi's commitment to the coalition is not based on substance — it is based on his desire to remain important.

Why don't you quickly take advantage of the current firmness of the three-state alliance and sell yourself to Qin? Qin will certainly accept you. If you don't act now, the pro-Qin faction will use you as a bargaining chip to buy Qin's favor — taking your capital and investing it in your enemy."

Notes

1person司馬食其Sīmǎ Shì Qí

Sima Shiqi (司馬食其) was apparently a Wei official. The name is unusual and may be a transcription variant.

2context

The guest's analysis of Master Zi's motives is devastatingly cynical — and probably accurate. The observation that a coalition diplomat's career depends on the coalition existing is one of the Zhanguoce's sharpest insights into the incentive structure of Warring States politics. The coalition (合縱) was, among other things, a jobs program for strategists. Remove the threat of Qin and half the political class would be unemployed.

魏秦伐楚

Wei and Qin Attack Chu

魏、秦伐楚，魏王不欲。樓緩謂魏王曰：「王不與秦攻楚，楚且與秦攻王。王不如令秦、楚戰，王交制之也。」

Wei and Qin are to attack Chu, but the King of Wei is unwilling. Lou Huan says to the King of Wei: "If Your Majesty does not join Qin in attacking Chu, then Chu will join Qin in attacking you. Better to let Qin and Chu fight each other while Your Majesty manipulates both sides."

Notes

1person樓緩Lóu Huǎn

Lou Huan (樓緩) appears here as a Wei advisor (he also appears in Zhao chapters). His advice — let two strong states exhaust each other while you play kingmaker — is the classic weak-state survival strategy. Whether a state as weak as Wei could actually 'manipulate both sides' is another question entirely.

穰侯攻大梁

The Marquis of Rang Attacks Daliang

穰侯攻大梁，乘北郢，魏王且從。謂穰侯曰：「君攻楚得宛、穰以廣陶，攻齊得剛、博以廣陶，得許、鄢陵以廣陶，秦王不問者，何也?以大梁之未亡也。今日大梁亡，許、鄢陵必議，議則君必窮。為君計者，勿攻便。」

The Marquis of Rang attacks Daliang, having already taken Bei-Ying. The King of Wei is about to submit. Someone says to the Marquis of Rang: "You attacked Chu and gained Wan and Rang to expand Tao. You attacked Qi and gained Gang and Bo to expand Tao. You gained Xu and Yanling to expand Tao. The King of Qin has never questioned any of this — why? Because Daliang still stands. The day Daliang falls, Xu and Yanling will be scrutinized, and once they are scrutinized, you will be ruined. In planning for you, my lord: do not attack — that would be more advantageous."

Notes

1person穰侯Ráng Hóu

The Marquis of Rang (穰侯) is Wei Ran (魏冉), the powerful Qin chancellor and uncle of King Zhaoxiang. His personal fief of Tao was located far from Qin's core territory, near the borders of Qi and Wei. The speaker's argument is that Wei Ran has been using Qin's wars to expand his personal domain — and the King of Qin tolerates this only because those wars are ongoing. Once Wei is destroyed, the king will audit the books.

2place陶Táo

Tao (陶), near modern Dingtao, Shandong, was Wei Ran's personal fief. It was awkwardly distant from Qin proper, which meant Wei Ran needed buffer territories around it — territories he acquired by conveniently directing Qin's armies to attack states neighboring his own holdings. The speaker's insight is that this personal empire depends on the continuation of war; peace would expose it.

3context

This is one of the Zhanguoce's more remarkable arguments: don't conquer your enemy, because your own position depends on the enemy's existence. It's a perfect illustration of how Warring States ministers' private interests could diverge from their state's strategic interests — Wei Ran needed Wei to survive so that he could keep skimming territory off the wars against it. Fan Sui later used exactly this logic to bring Wei Ran down.

白珪謂新城君

Bai Gui Addresses Lord Xincheng

白珪謂新城君曰：「夜行者能無為奸，不能禁狗使無吠己也。故臣能無議君於王，不能禁人議臣於君也。」

Bai Gui says to Lord Xincheng: "A man who walks at night can avoid committing crimes, but he cannot stop the dogs from barking at him. Likewise, I can refrain from criticizing you before the King, but I cannot stop others from criticizing me before you."

Notes

1person白珪Bái Guī

Bai Gui (白珪, also written 白圭) was a Wei minister and legendary merchant-philosopher. This is one of the most compressed and quotable passages in the Zhanguoce — two sentences that capture the entire problem of court politics. You can control your own behavior but not others' perception of it.

2translation

The night-walker metaphor works on multiple levels: being innocent is not enough to prevent accusation; those who patrol the dark will always attract suspicion; and the dogs (i.e., rivals and slanderers) don't distinguish between thieves and honest men. It's a preemptive defense disguised as a proverb.

秦攻韓之管

Qin Attacks Han's City of Guan

秦攻韓之管，魏王發兵救之。昭忌曰：「夫秦強國也，而韓、魏壤梁。不出攻則已，若出攻，非於韓也必魏也。今幸而於韓，此魏之福也。王若救之，夫解攻者，必韓之管也；致攻者，必魏之梁也。」魏王不聽，曰：「若不因救韓，韓怨魏，西合於秦，秦、韓為一，則魏危。」遂救之。秦果釋管而攻魏。魏王大恐，謂昭忌曰：「不用子之計而禍至，為之奈何?」昭忌乃為之見秦王曰：「臣聞明主之聽也，不以挾私為政，是參行也。願大王無攻魏，聽臣也。」秦王曰：「何也?」昭忌曰：「山東之眾，時合時離，何也哉?」秦王曰：「不識也。」曰：「天下之合也，以王之不必也；其離也，以王之必也。今攻韓之管，國危矣，未卒而移兵於梁，合天下之從，無精於此者矣。以為秦之求索，必不可支也。故為王計者，不如齊趙，秦已制趙，則燕不敢不事秦，荊、齊不能獨從。天下爭敵於秦，則弱矣。」秦王乃止。

Qin attacks Han's city of Guan. The King of Wei dispatches troops to rescue Han. Zhao Ji objects: "Qin is a powerful state, and Han and Wei are adjacent to Liang. When Qin sallies forth, if it does not attack Han, it must attack Wei. That Qin has fortunately chosen to attack Han is Wei's good luck. If Your Majesty rescues Han, the one relieved of attack will be Han's Guan — but the one that draws the attack will be Wei's Liang."

The King of Wei does not listen, saying: "If we do not rescue Han now, Han will resent Wei and ally westward with Qin. If Qin and Han become one, then Wei is in danger." He proceeds with the rescue.

Qin does indeed abandon Guan and attacks Wei. The King of Wei is terrified and says to Zhao Ji: "I did not follow your advice, and disaster has arrived — what shall we do?"

Zhao Ji then goes to see the King of Qin on Wei's behalf: "I have heard that an enlightened ruler's governance does not permit private grudges to become policy — that is the way of balanced conduct. I urge Your Majesty not to attack Wei, and to hear me out."

The King of Qin says: "Why?"

Zhao Ji says: "The eastern states sometimes unite and sometimes scatter — why is that?"

The King of Qin says: "I do not know."

"They unite because Your Majesty acts unpredictably; they scatter because Your Majesty acts consistently. Now you attack Han's Guan, and before you finish, you shift your army to Liang — there is no better way to unite All-Under-Heaven's coalition than this. They will conclude that Qin's demands can never be satisfied. Therefore, in planning for Your Majesty: better to first subdue Zhao. Once Qin controls Zhao, Yan will not dare refuse to serve Qin, and Chu and Qi cannot sustain a coalition alone. When All-Under-Heaven tries to oppose Qin individually, each will be weak."

The King of Qin desists.

Notes

1person昭忌Zhāo Jì

Zhao Ji (昭忌) was a Wei advisor who warned against rescuing Han and was proved right almost immediately. His second act — going to Qin to clean up the mess — required considerably more nerve than his first. He essentially tells the King of Qin: your unpredictability is your biggest strategic weakness, because it's the one thing that unites your enemies.

2context

Zhao Ji's argument to the King of Qin contains a genuinely profound strategic insight: coalitions form not because the enemy is strong, but because the enemy is unpredictable. If Qin attacked states in a consistent, predictable pattern, each state could calculate whether it was safe and many would choose appeasement. By switching targets mid-campaign, Qin convinces everyone that they're next, which is the one thing guaranteed to produce a united front.

3place管Guǎn

Guan (管), near modern Zhengzhou, Henan, was a Han border city. Liang (梁), i.e., Daliang, was Wei's capital. The geographic proximity of these targets is precisely the problem — Qin's army could pivot from one to the other in days.

秦趙構難而戰

Qin and Zhao Clash in War

秦、趙構難而戰。謂魏王曰：「不如齊、趙而構之秦。王不構趙，趙不以毀構矣；而構之秦，趙必復斗，必重魏；是並制秦、趙之事也。王欲焉而收齊、趙攻荊，欲焉而收荊、趙攻齊，欲王之東長之待之也。」

Qin and Zhao are locked in war. Someone says to the King of Wei: "Better to reconcile with Zhao and then negotiate with Qin. If Your Majesty does not reconcile with Zhao, Zhao will not use its desperate straits as a basis for negotiation. But if you reconcile with Zhao first and then negotiate with Qin, Zhao will surely resume fighting and will value Wei's support. This allows you to control the affairs of both Qin and Zhao simultaneously. Should you wish, you can rally Qi and Zhao to attack Chu; should you wish, you can rally Chu and Zhao to attack Qi. I urge Your Majesty to wait in the east as the leader."

Notes

1context

The advice is the classic middle-power playbook: when two great powers fight, the middleman's optimal strategy is to be friends with both and indispensable to each. The phrase 東長 (eastern leader) captures Wei's aspiration — to be the pivot that determines which coalition forms, without bearing the cost of any particular war. Whether Wei ever had the strength to actually play this role is debatable.

長平之役

The Battle of Changping

長平之役，平都君說魏王曰：「王胡不為從?」魏王曰：「秦許吾以垣雍。」平都君曰：「臣以垣雍為空割也。」魏王曰：「何謂也?」平都君曰：「秦、趙久相持於長平之下而無決。天下合於秦，則無趙；合於趙，則無秦。秦恐王之變也，故以垣雍餌王也。秦戰勝趙，王敢責垣雍之割乎?」王曰：「不敢。」「秦戰不勝趙，王能令韓出垣雍之割乎?」王曰：「不能。」「臣故曰，垣雍空割也。」魏王曰：「善。」

During the Battle of Changping, Lord Pingdu says to the King of Wei: "Why does Your Majesty not join the coalition?"

The King of Wei says: "Qin has promised me Yuanyong."

Lord Pingdu says: "I consider Yuanyong an empty concession."

The King of Wei says: "What do you mean?"

Lord Pingdu says: "Qin and Zhao have been locked in a prolonged stalemate at Changping with no resolution. If All-Under-Heaven joins Qin, there will be no Zhao; if it joins Zhao, there will be no Qin. Qin fears that Your Majesty might change sides, so it dangles Yuanyong as bait. If Qin defeats Zhao, would Your Majesty dare demand that Qin hand over Yuanyong?"

The King says: "I would not dare."

"If Qin fails to defeat Zhao, could Your Majesty compel Han to cede Yuanyong?"

The King says: "I could not."

"That is why I say Yuanyong is an empty concession."

The King of Wei says: "You are right."

Notes

1place長平Cháng Píng

Changping (長平), in modern Gaoping, Shanxi, was the site of the catastrophic battle in 260 BC where Qin's general Bai Qi annihilated a Zhao army of reportedly 400,000 men. It was the single most decisive battle of the Warring States period, and effectively sealed Qin's eventual unification of China.

2place垣雍Yuán Yōng

Yuanyong (垣雍) was apparently a Han territory that Qin promised to Wei. The territory was Han's to give, not Qin's — which is precisely Lord Pingdu's point. Qin was promising to deliver something it didn't own, in exchange for Wei's neutrality.

3context

Lord Pingdu's logic is ironclad and worth studying. A promise is worthless if you can't enforce it in either outcome. If Qin wins at Changping, a victorious Qin has no reason to pay up — and Wei is too weak to demand it. If Qin loses, the territory belongs to Han, and Wei can't extract it either. Heads Qin wins; tails Wei loses. The 'empty concession' (空割) is one of the Zhanguoce's great diagnostic concepts: a promise whose value is zero in every possible future state.

樓梧約秦魏

Lou Wu Arranges a Qin-Wei Summit

樓梧約秦、魏，將令秦王遇於境。謂魏王曰：「遇而無相，秦必置相。不聽之，則交惡於秦；聽之，則後王之臣，將皆務事諸侯之能令於王之上者。且遇於秦而相秦者，是無齊也，秦必輕王之強矣。有齊者，不若相之，齊必喜，是以有雍者與秦遇，秦必重王矣。」

Lou Wu arranges a meeting between Qin and Wei, planning for the King of Qin to meet the King of Wei at the border. Someone says to the King of Wei: "If you meet and have no chancellor present, Qin will certainly appoint one for you. If you refuse, you make an enemy of Qin. If you accept, then afterward all Your Majesty's ministers will devote themselves to serving whichever feudal lord can issue orders over Your Majesty's head.

Moreover, if you meet at Qin's border and accept a chancellor from Qin, you are signaling that you have no Qi alliance — and Qin will certainly regard Your Majesty's strength as negligible. If you do have a Qi alliance, it would be better to appoint your own chancellor — Qi will be pleased. Then you meet Qin while possessing both Yong and a Qi alliance, and Qin will certainly take Your Majesty seriously."

Notes

1context

The chancellorship question is actually about sovereignty: who gets to appoint your chief minister determines who really controls your state. Accepting a Qin-appointed chancellor at a border summit would be, in modern terms, accepting a political commissar — nominally your subordinate but actually your supervisor. The advisor's solution (appoint your own chancellor and maintain a visible Qi alliance) is about preserving negotiating leverage through the appearance of alternatives.

芮宋欲絕秦趙之交

Rui Song Seeks to Sever the Qin-Zhao Alliance

芮宋欲絕秦、趙之交，故令魏氏收秦太后之養地秦王於秦。芮宋謂秦王曰：「魏委國於王，而王不受，故委國於趙也。李郝謂臣曰：『子言無秦，而養秦太后以地，是欺我也，故敝邑收之。』」秦王怒，遂絕趙也。

Rui Song wishes to sever the alliance between Qin and Zhao, so he has Wei reclaim the territory that had been given to support the Qin Dowager Queen, presenting it to the King of Qin. Rui Song says to the King of Qin: "Wei offered its state to Your Majesty, but Your Majesty would not accept — so Wei offered it to Zhao instead. Li Hao told me: 'You claimed to have no connection to Qin, yet you were supporting the Qin Dowager Queen with territory — this was deception. Therefore our humble city has reclaimed it.'"

The King of Qin is furious and severs ties with Zhao.

Notes

1context

Rui Song's gambit is a beautiful piece of diplomatic sabotage. He fabricates (or exaggerates) a chain of grievances to make Qin believe that Zhao has been dealing in bad faith. The King of Qin's anger is directed at Zhao, which is exactly what Rui Song wanted. The entire scheme depends on Qin not bothering to verify the story — a reasonable bet, given that Warring States intelligence was rudimentary and monarchs' tempers were not.

為魏謂楚王

Speaking to the King of Chu on Wei's Behalf

索攻魏於秦，秦必不聽王矣，是智困於秦，而交疏於魏也。楚、魏有怨，則秦重矣。故王不如順天下，遂伐齊，與魏便地，兵不傷，交不變，所欲必得矣。

If you seek Qin's help to attack Wei, Qin will certainly not comply — you will have been outwitted by Qin while alienating Wei. If Chu and Wei are at odds, then Qin gains in importance. Therefore Your Majesty would do better to go along with the general trend of All-Under-Heaven: proceed to attack Qi, exchange convenient territories with Wei, and keep your army unharmed and your alliances unchanged. Everything you desire will then be obtained.

Notes

1context

This fragment (the beginning is lost) is advice to the King of Chu. The core logic: asking Qin's permission to attack Wei is a losing play, because Qin benefits from Chu-Wei hostility. The alternative — attack Qi instead and trade territories amicably with Wei — keeps Chu's alliance network intact while still achieving expansion. It's realpolitik at its most lucid.

管鼻之令翟強與秦事

Guan Bi Orders Di Qiang to Deal with Qin

管鼻之令翟強與秦事，謂魏王曰：「鼻之與強，猶晉人之與楚人也。晉人見楚人之急，帶劍而緩之；楚人惡其緩而急之。令鼻之入秦之傳舍，舍不足以舍之。強之入，無蔽與秦者。強，王貴臣也，而秦若此其甚，安可？」

Guan Bi orders Di Qiang to handle Qin affairs. Someone says to the King of Wei: "The relationship between Guan Bi and Di Qiang is like that between men of Jin and men of Chu. The Jin man, seeing the Chu man's urgency, wears his sword casually and takes things slowly; the Chu man, resenting the slowness, becomes more urgent.

Now when Guan Bi enters Qin's guesthouse, the lodgings are insufficient to accommodate him. But when Di Qiang enters, no one blocks his way to Qin's court. Di Qiang is Your Majesty's valued minister, yet Qin treats him like this — how can this be acceptable?"

Notes

1context

The Jin/Chu metaphor describes a relationship of mutual provocation: one side's casualness irritates the other into overreaction. The complaint about Qin's differential treatment of the two envoys is standard court intrigue — using diplomatic protocol as evidence of a factional conspiracy. Who Qin gives better rooms to tells you who Qin has already bought.

成陽君欲以韓魏聽秦

Lord Chengyang Wants Han and Wei to Submit to Qin

成陽君欲以韓、魏聽秦，魏王弗利。白圭謂魏王曰：「王不如陰侯人說成陽君曰：『君入秦，秦必留君，而以多割與韓矣。韓不聽，秦必留君，而伐韓矣。故君不如安行求質於秦。』成陽君必不入秦，秦、韓不敢合，則王重矣。」

Lord Chengyang wishes to have Han and Wei submit to Qin. The King of Wei finds this disadvantageous. Bai Gui says to the King of Wei: "Your Majesty should secretly have someone persuade Lord Chengyang by saying: 'If you enter Qin, Qin will surely detain you and demand heavy territorial concessions from Han. If Han refuses, Qin will detain you and attack Han. Therefore you would do better to stay put and demand hostages from Qin first.'

Lord Chengyang will certainly not enter Qin. If Qin and Han dare not unite, then Your Majesty's weight in the balance increases."

Notes

1person白圭Bái Guī

Bai Gui (白圭) again demonstrates his talent for indirect manipulation. Rather than opposing Lord Chengyang openly, he proposes feeding Lord Chengyang a plausible fear — that Qin will detain him as a hostage — which will cause Lord Chengyang to sabotage his own mission. The beauty of the scheme is that Lord Chengyang thinks he's acting in his own interest.

秦拔寧邑

Qin Captures Ningyi

秦拔寧邑，魏王令之謂秦王曰：「王歸寧邑，吾請先天下構。」魏冉曰：「王無聽。魏王見天下之不足恃也，故欲先構。夫亡寧者，宜割二寧以求構；夫得寧者，安能歸寧乎?」

Qin captures Ningyi. The King of Wei sends a message to the King of Qin: "If you return Ningyi, I will be the first in All-Under-Heaven to make peace with you."

Wei Ran says: "Your Majesty should not listen. The King of Wei sees that All-Under-Heaven cannot be relied upon, so he wants to be first to make peace. The one who lost Ningyi ought to cede two Nings to sue for peace; the one who gained Ningyi — why would he return it?"

Notes

1context

Wei Ran's logic is brutally simple and unanswerable: the winner doesn't give back the prize, the loser pays more to stop the bleeding. The King of Wei's proposal — 'return what you took and I'll be your friend' — is the kind of offer that only sounds reasonable if you forget who has the leverage. Wei Ran, being Wei Ran, does not forget.

秦罷邯鄲

Qin Withdraws from Handan

秦罷邯鄲，攻魏，取寧邑，吳慶恐魏王之構於秦也，謂魏王曰：「秦之攻王也，王知其故乎？天下皆曰王近也。王不近秦，秦之所去。皆曰王弱也。王不弱二周，秦人去邯鄲，過二周而攻王者，以王為易制也。王亦知弱之召攻乎？」

Qin withdraws from Handan and attacks Wei, taking Ningyi. Wu Qing fears the King of Wei will make peace with Qin, and says to the King of Wei: "Does Your Majesty know why Qin attacks you? Everyone says it is because you are nearby. But Your Majesty is no closer to Qin than others. Everyone says it is because you are weak. But Your Majesty is not weaker than the Two Zhous. Qin withdrew from Handan, bypassed the Two Zhous, and attacked Your Majesty because it considers you easy to control. Does Your Majesty understand that weakness invites attack?"

Notes

1person吳慶Wú Qìng

Wu Qing (吳慶) is otherwise unknown. His argument is designed to stiffen the King of Wei's spine: Qin attacks you not because of proximity or weakness per se, but because it perceives you as compliant. Making peace would confirm that perception and invite further aggression.

2context

The observation that Qin bypassed the Two Zhous (the weakest entities in the system) to attack Wei is analytically sharp. Qin didn't attack the weakest — it attacked the most profitable. The Two Zhous were too small to bother with. Wei was big enough to yield significant territory but compliant enough not to fight hard. The lesson: being moderately weak is more dangerous than being completely insignificant.

魏王欲攻邯鄲

The King of Wei Wishes to Attack Handan

魏王欲攻邯鄲，季梁聞之，中道而反，衣焦不申，頭塵不去，往見王曰：「今者臣來，見人於大行。方北面而持其駕，告臣曰：『我欲之楚。』臣曰：『君之楚，將奚為北面?』曰：『吾馬良。』臣曰：『馬雖良，此非楚之路也。』曰：『吾用多。』臣曰：『用雖多，此非楚之路也。』曰：『吾御者善。』此數者愈善，而離楚愈遠耳!」今王動欲成霸王，舉欲信於天下。恃王國之大，兵之精銳，而攻邯鄲，以廣地尊名，王之動愈數，而離王愈遠耳。猶至楚而北行也。

The King of Wei wishes to attack Handan. Ji Liang hears of this and turns back midway through his journey, his clothes scorched and unsmoothed, the dust on his head unshaken, and goes to see the King:

"Just now on my way here, I met a man on the main road. He was facing north and holding his reins. He told me: 'I am going to Chu.' I said: 'If you are going to Chu, why are you facing north?' He said: 'My horses are fine.' I said: 'Fine though your horses may be, this is not the road to Chu.' He said: 'I have plenty of money.' I said: 'Plenty though your money may be, this is not the road to Chu.' He said: 'My charioteer is skilled.' The better each of these things is, the farther from Chu he will end up!"

"Now Your Majesty's every move is aimed at achieving hegemony, and your every action seeks to establish trust throughout All-Under-Heaven. Yet you rely on your kingdom's size and your army's strength to attack Handan, hoping to expand your territory and elevate your name. The more frequently Your Majesty acts this way, the farther you will be from true kingship. It is exactly like going to Chu by heading north."

Notes

1person季梁Jì Liáng

Ji Liang (季梁) was a Wei minister whose parable of the man driving north to reach Chu (南轅北轍, nán yuán běi zhé — 'south shaft, north rut') became one of the most famous idioms in the Chinese language. It means pursuing a goal by means that achieve the opposite. His urgency — arriving with his clothes still singed and dusty — is meant to signal that this is too important for protocol.

2context

The parable is devastatingly apt. The King of Wei wants to become hegemon (a position requiring other states' voluntary deference) by attacking Handan (an act that will unite every state against him). His resources — large kingdom, strong army — are genuinely good, which makes the error more dangerous, not less. As Ji Liang notes: the better your horses, the faster you arrive at the wrong destination. This is perhaps the clearest articulation in all of Chinese political philosophy of the distinction between means and ends.

3place邯鄲Hán Dān

Handan (邯鄲) was the capital of Zhao. Wei's attack on Handan (354 BC) led to the famous Battle of Guiling, where Qi's general Sun Bin defeated Wei by attacking Wei's undefended capital instead of relieving Handan directly — the strategy known as 'besiege Wei to rescue Zhao' (圍魏救趙).

周肖謂宮他

Zhou Xiao Addresses Gong Ta

周肖謂宮他曰：「子為肖謂齊王曰，肖願為外臣。令齊資我於魏。」宮他曰：「不可，是示齊輕也。夫齊不以無魏者以害有魏者，故公不如示有魏。公曰：『王之所求於魏者，臣請以魏聽。』齊必資公矣，是公有齊，以齊有魏也。」

Zhou Xiao says to Gong Ta: "Please tell the King of Qi on my behalf that I wish to be his external vassal, and ask Qi to support me in Wei."

Gong Ta says: "That won't do — it shows Qi that you are without standing. Qi will not harm someone who has Wei's backing in order to help someone who does not. You should instead present yourself as having Wei's backing. Say to Qi: 'Whatever Your Majesty requires from Wei, I can deliver Wei's compliance.' Qi will certainly support you then — and you will possess Qi's backing, which you can use to secure Wei's backing."

Notes

1context

Gong Ta's advice is essentially 'fake it till you make it,' elevated to statecraft. Present yourself to Qi as someone Wei already backs; Qi will then support you because you seem useful; with Qi's support, you actually become useful to Wei. The circularity is the point — power in the Warring States was largely a matter of perceived connections, and the perception could precede the reality.

周冣善齊

Zhou Zui Is Close to Qi

周冣善齊，翟強善楚。二子者，欲傷張儀於魏。張子聞之，因使其人為見者嗇夫聞見者，因無敢傷張子。

Zhou Zui is close to Qi; Di Qiang is close to Chu. The two of them wish to harm Zhang Yi in Wei. Zhang Yi hears of this and has his own agents serve as the gatekeepers who report on visitors. With the gatekeepers under his control, no one dares move against Zhang Yi.

Notes

1person張儀Zhāng Yí

Zhang Yi (張儀, d. 309 BC) was the great advocate of the east-west pro-Qin alignment (連橫) and one of the most famous strategists of the Warring States. His counter-move here — controlling the intelligence apparatus rather than confronting his enemies directly — is characteristic of his style: why fight when you can blind your opponents?

周冣入齊

Zhou Zui Enters Qi

周冣入齊，秦王怒，令姚賈讓魏王。魏王為之謂秦王曰：「魏之所以為王通天下者，以周冣也。今周冣遁寡人入齊，齊無通於天下矣。敝邑之事王，亦無齊累矣。大國欲急兵，則趣趙而已。」

Zhou Zui enters Qi, and the King of Qin is furious. He sends Yao Jia to reprimand the King of Wei. The King of Wei responds with a message to the King of Qin: "The reason Wei was able to keep All-Under-Heaven's channels open for Your Majesty was Zhou Zui. Now Zhou Zui has fled me and entered Qi — Qi will have no open channels to All-Under-Heaven. Our humble state's service to Your Majesty will likewise be free of any Qi entanglement. If the great state wishes to press its military advantage, it need only advance against Zhao."

Notes

1context

The King of Wei's response is a deft piece of spin: he turns the loss of Zhou Zui (which angered Qin) into a positive by arguing that it actually simplifies the diplomatic landscape. No more Qi complications, no more divided loyalties — and please direct your armies at Zhao instead of us. It's the diplomatic equivalent of 'I meant to do that.'

秦魏為與國

Qin and Wei as Allied States

秦、魏為與國。齊、楚約而欲攻魏，魏使人求救於秦，冠蓋相望，秦救不出。

魏人有唐且者，年九十餘，謂魏王曰：「老臣請出西說秦，令兵先臣出，可乎?」魏王曰：「敬諾。」遂約車而遣之。

唐且見秦王，秦王曰：「丈人芒然乃遠至此，甚苦矣。魏來求救數矣，寡人知魏之急矣。」唐且對曰：「大王已知魏之急而救不至者，是大王籌策之臣無任矣。且夫魏一萬乘之國，稱東藩，受冠帶，祠春秋者，以為秦之強足以為與也。今齊、楚之兵已在魏郊矣，大王之救不至，魏急則且割地而約齊、楚，王雖欲救之，豈有及哉?是亡一萬乘之魏，而強二敵之齊、楚也。竊以為大王籌策之臣無任矣。」

秦王喟然愁悟，遽發兵，日夜赴魏，齊、楚聞之，乃引兵而去。魏氏復全，唐且之說也。

Qin and Wei are allied states. Qi and Chu form a pact and prepare to attack Wei. Wei sends emissaries to beg Qin for rescue — the carriages and caps of envoys stretch in an unbroken line — but Qin's rescue does not come.

A Wei man named Tang Ju, over ninety years old, says to the King of Wei: "This old minister requests permission to go west and persuade Qin. Let the troops march before me — will that do?"

The King of Wei says: "Respectfully agreed." He arranges a carriage and dispatches him.

Tang Ju meets the King of Qin. The King of Qin says: "Sir, you have come so far in your great age — it must have been very hard. Wei has come begging for rescue many times already. I know well how desperate Wei is."

Tang Ju replies: "Your Majesty knows of Wei's desperation yet sends no rescue — this means Your Majesty's strategic advisors are derelict in their duties. Wei is a state of ten thousand chariots. It declared itself your eastern vassal, accepted your investiture, and performs seasonal sacrifices on your behalf — because it believed Qin's strength was sufficient to rely upon. Now the armies of Qi and Chu are already at Wei's gates. If Your Majesty's rescue does not come, Wei in its desperation will cede territory to Qi and Chu to buy a treaty. Even if Your Majesty then wished to rescue Wei, would there be anything left to rescue? You will have lost a ten-thousand-chariot state of Wei and strengthened two enemies, Qi and Chu. I humbly submit that Your Majesty's strategic advisors are derelict in their duties."

The King of Qin sighs with anxious realization and immediately dispatches troops, marching day and night toward Wei. When Qi and Chu hear of this, they withdraw their armies. Wei is preserved — through Tang Ju's persuasion.

Notes

1person唐且Táng Jū

Tang Ju (唐且) was a Wei diplomat who appears in multiple Zhanguoce episodes, always as an elderly man of extraordinary rhetorical skill. His age (over ninety) is itself a rhetorical weapon — when a nonagenarian drags himself across the continent to tell you you're being foolish, the moral force is considerable.

2context

Tang Ju's argument is a masterpiece of reframing. He doesn't beg — begging is what the previous envoys did, and it failed. Instead, he tells the King of Qin that failing to rescue Wei is a mistake that reflects badly on Qin's own advisors. The subtext: you're not doing Wei a favor by rescuing it — you're preventing your own strategic disaster. By blaming Qin's counselors rather than the King himself, Tang Ju gives the King a face-saving way to reverse his policy: 'My advisors failed me; I shall act immediately.'

3translation

冠蓋相望 (guān gài xiāng wàng) — 'caps and carriage covers within sight of each other' — is a standard idiom for an unbroken stream of envoys. The image is of so many carriages on the road that each can see the one ahead. It emphasizes both Wei's desperation and Qin's indifference.

信陵君殺晉鄙

Lord Xinling Kills Jin Bi

信陵君殺晉鄙，救邯鄲，破秦人，存趙國，趙王自郊迎。唐且謂信陵君曰：「臣聞之曰，事有不可知者，有不可不知者；有不可忘者，有不可不忘者。」信陵君曰：「何謂也?」對曰：「人之憎我也，不可不知也；吾憎人也，不可得而知也。人之有德於我也，不可忘也；吾有德於人也，不可不忘也。今君殺晉鄙，救邯鄲，破秦人，存趙國，此大德也。今趙王自郊迎，卒然見趙王，臣願君之忘之也。」信陵君曰：「無忌謹受教。」

Lord Xinling kills Jin Bi, rescues Handan, defeats the Qin army, and preserves the state of Zhao. The King of Zhao comes personally to the suburbs to greet him. Tang Ju says to Lord Xinling: "I have heard it said: there are things that must not remain unknown, and things that must not be known; things that must not be forgotten, and things that must not be remembered."

Lord Xinling says: "What do you mean?"

"When others resent me, I must know it. When I resent others, I must not let it be known. When others have shown me kindness, I must not forget it. When I have shown others kindness, I must not remember it. Now you have killed Jin Bi, rescued Handan, defeated Qin, and preserved Zhao — this is a great kindness. Today the King of Zhao comes personally to greet you. When you meet the King of Zhao, I urge you: forget what you have done."

Lord Xinling says: "Wuji respectfully accepts your instruction."

Notes

1person信陵君Xìn Líng Jūn

Lord Xinling (信陵君), personal name Wei Wuji (魏無忌), saved Zhao by stealing his own king's military tally and killing the Wei general Jin Bi (晉鄙) to take command of the army. It was an act of extraordinary courage and insubordination — and it made him unable to return to Wei for years.

2context

Tang Ju's four-part maxim is one of the most admired passages in the Zhanguoce, and it contains genuinely profound advice about the psychology of gratitude. A benefactor who remembers his own generosity creates a creditor-debtor dynamic that poisons the relationship. By telling Lord Xinling to 'forget' his great service to Zhao, Tang Ju is ensuring that the King of Zhao never has to feel the weight of an unpayable debt — which, in the Warring States, was the surest way to turn a grateful ally into a resentful enemy.

3person晉鄙Jìn Bǐ

Jin Bi (晉鄙) was the Wei general whom Lord Xinling killed in order to seize command of the Wei army and redirect it to save Zhao. The killing was necessary but treasonous, and it haunted Lord Xinling's reputation for the rest of his life.

魏攻管而不下

Wei Attacks Guan but Cannot Take It

魏攻管而不下。安陵人縮高，其子為管守。信陵君使人謂安陵君曰：「君其遣縮高，吾將仕之以五大夫，使為持節尉。」安陵君曰：「安陵，小國也，不能必使其民。使者自往，請使道使者至縮高之所，覆信陵君之命。」縮高曰：「君之幸高也，將使高攻管也。夫以父攻子守，人大笑也。是臣而下，是倍主也。父教子倍，亦非君之所喜也。敢再拜辭。」

使者以報信陵君，信陵君大怒，遣大使之安陵曰：「安陵之地，亦猶魏也。今吾攻管而不下，則秦兵及我，社稷必危矣。願君之生束縮高而致之。若君弗致也，無忌將發十萬之師，以造安陵之城。」安陵君曰：「吾先君成侯，受詔襄王以守此地也，手受大府之憲。憲之上篇曰：『子弒父，臣弒君，有常不赦。國雖大赦，降城亡子不得與焉。』今縮高謹解大位，以全父子之義，而君曰『必生致之』，是使我負襄王詔而廢大府之憲也，雖死，終不敢行。」

縮高聞之曰：「信陵君為人，悍而自用也。此辭反，必為國禍。吾已全己，無為人臣之義矣，豈可使吾君有魏患也。」乃之使者之舍，刎頸而死。

信陵君聞縮高死，素服縞素辟舍，使使者謝安陵君曰：「無忌，小人也，困於思慮，失言於君，敢再拜釋罪。」

Wei attacks Guan but cannot take it. There is a man of Anling named Suo Gao whose son is defending Guan. Lord Xinling sends a message to the Lord of Anling: "Please dispatch Suo Gao — I will appoint him to the rank of Fifth Grand Master and make him a bearer of the command tally."

The Lord of Anling says: "Anling is a small state and cannot compel its people. Let the messenger go directly — I will have the messenger escorted to Suo Gao's residence to convey Lord Xinling's orders."

Suo Gao says: "My lord honors me by wishing me to attack Guan. But for a father to attack what his son defends — people would laugh at this. If the son surrenders, that is betraying his lord. For a father to teach his son betrayal — that is surely not what my lord would wish. I respectfully decline."

The messenger reports back to Lord Xinling. Lord Xinling is furious and sends a high envoy to Anling: "Anling's territory is subject to Wei. I am attacking Guan and cannot take it — if Qin's armies reach us, the state will be in mortal danger. I ask that you bind Suo Gao alive and deliver him to me. If you do not, Wuji will dispatch an army of a hundred thousand to the walls of Anling."

The Lord of Anling says: "My predecessor, Lord Cheng, received orders from King Xiang to guard this territory. He personally received the constitution from the great treasury. The constitution's first chapter states: 'A son who kills his father, a minister who kills his lord — these are crimes that are never pardoned. Even under a general amnesty, those who surrender cities or desert may not be included.' Now Suo Gao has respectfully resigned his commission to preserve the bond between father and son, and you say I must deliver him alive — this would make me betray King Xiang's edict and violate the constitution of the great treasury. I would rather die than carry out such an order."

Suo Gao hears of this and says: "Lord Xinling is by nature fierce and willful. When this refusal is reported back, it will surely bring disaster upon our state. I have already preserved my own integrity, and I have fulfilled my duty as a minister — but I cannot allow my lord to suffer Wei's wrath on my account." He goes to the messenger's lodgings and cuts his own throat.

When Lord Xinling hears that Suo Gao has died, he dons plain mourning garments, withdraws from his residence, and sends a messenger to apologize to the Lord of Anling: "Wuji is a petty man. Trapped by my own anxieties, I spoke wrongly to you, my lord. I respectfully beg your pardon."

Notes

1person縮高Suō Gāo

Suo Gao (縮高) is an otherwise unknown figure whose moral dilemma — ordered to attack a city defended by his own son — represents one of the Zhanguoce's rare explorations of genuine ethical conflict rather than mere strategic maneuvering. His suicide resolves the impossible situation: he preserves his integrity, protects his lord from Lord Xinling's wrath, and avoids making war on his son.

2person安陵君Ān Líng Jūn

The Lord of Anling (安陵君) rules a tiny Wei vassal state. His refusal to surrender Suo Gao — citing constitutional law against a vastly more powerful lord — is one of the Zhanguoce's most stirring defenses of principle. He essentially tells Lord Xinling: I'd rather have my city destroyed than break the law my predecessor swore to uphold.

3context

This episode is notable for showing Lord Xinling in an unflattering light — bullying a tiny vassal state and threatening annihilation — before his genuine remorse at Suo Gao's death redeems him. The Zhanguoce rarely lets its heroes remain uncomplicated, and Lord Xinling's willingness to acknowledge his own fault ('Wuji is a petty man') is presented as a mark of true nobility.

魏王與龍陽君共船而釣

The King of Wei and Lord Longyang Go Fishing

魏王與龍陽君共船而釣，龍陽君得十餘魚而涕下。王曰：「有所不安乎?如是，何不相告也?」對曰：「臣無敢不安也。」王曰：「然則何為涕出?」曰：「臣為王之所得魚也。」王曰：「何謂也?」對曰：「臣之始得魚也，臣甚喜，後得又益大，今臣直欲棄臣前之所得矣。今以臣兇惡，而得為王拂枕席。今臣爵至人君，走人於庭，辟人於途。四海之內，美人亦甚多矣，聞臣之得幸於王也，必褰裳而趨王。臣亦猶曩臣之前所得魚也，臣亦將棄矣，臣安能無涕出乎?」魏王曰：「誤！有是心也，何不相告也?」於是布令於四境之內曰：「有敢言美人者族。」

The King of Wei and Lord Longyang share a boat and fish together. Lord Longyang catches more than ten fish and begins to weep. The King says: "Is something troubling you? If so, why not tell me?"

"I would not dare claim anything troubles me."

"Then why the tears?"

"I weep because of the fish Your Majesty has caught."

"What do you mean?"

"When I first caught a fish, I was delighted. But each one I caught afterward was bigger, and now I simply want to throw away the ones I caught earlier. Consider: I am ill-favored and ugly, yet I have been fortunate enough to serve at Your Majesty's pillow and mat. My rank has risen to that of a lord — people clear the courtyard when I pass and give way on the road. Yet within the four seas, beauties are very numerous indeed. When they hear that I have won Your Majesty's favor, they will surely lift their skirts and hasten to Your Majesty's side. I am like the earlier, smaller fish — I too will be cast aside. How can I not weep?"

The King of Wei says: "How wrong of me! If you harbored such fears, why did you not tell me?" He then issues a decree throughout the realm: "Anyone who dares present a beauty to the court shall be executed along with his entire clan."

Notes

1person龍陽君Lóng Yáng Jūn

Lord Longyang (龍陽君) was a male favorite of the King of Wei, and his name became a classical Chinese euphemism for male homosexual love (龍陽之好, 'the love of Longyang'). His fishing-boat tears are either a genuine expression of insecurity or one of the most effective emotional manipulations in the Zhanguoce — possibly both.

2context

The fish metaphor is elegant: each new catch makes the previous one disposable. Lord Longyang is saying: I know how desire works, and it works against the incumbent. The King's response — banning the presentation of beauties on pain of clan extermination — is either touchingly devoted or alarmingly disproportionate, or perhaps the Zhanguoce sees no contradiction between the two. Worth noting that this is exactly the kind of decree that court favorites in every era have sought: not just the ruler's love, but the structural elimination of competition.

3translation

拂枕席 (fú zhěn xí) — 'to smooth the pillow and mat' — is a classical euphemism for intimate service to the ruler. The phrase is neutral in the original; the Zhanguoce treats Lord Longyang's role without moral judgment.

秦攻魏急

Qin Presses Its Attack on Wei

秦攻魏急。或謂魏王曰：「棄之不如用之之易也，死之不如棄之之易也。能棄之弗能用之，能死之弗能棄之，此人之大過也。今王亡地數百里，亡城數十，而國患不解，是王棄之，非用之也。今秦之強也，天下無敵，而魏之弱也甚，而王以是質秦，王又能死而弗能棄之，此重過也。今王能用臣之計，虧地不足以傷國，卑體不足以苦身，解患而怨報。

秦自四境之內，執法以下至於長輓者，故畢曰：『與嫪氏乎?與呂氏乎?』雖至於門閭之下，廊廟之上，猶之如是也。今王割地以賂秦，以為嫪毐功；卑體以尊秦，以因嫪毐。王以國贊嫪毐，以嫪毐勝矣。王以國贊嫪氏，太后之德王也，深於骨髓，王之交最為天下上矣。秦、魏百相交也，百相欺也。今由嫪氏善秦而交為天下上，天下孰不棄呂氏而從嫪氏?天下必合呂氏而從嫪氏，則王之怨報矣。」

Qin presses its attack on Wei. Someone says to the King of Wei: "To discard something is not as easy as putting it to use; to die for something is not as easy as discarding it. One who can discard but cannot use, one who can die but cannot discard — these are humanity's great errors. Now Your Majesty has lost hundreds of li of territory and dozens of cities, yet the state's troubles remain unresolved. This means you are discarding your assets, not using them. Qin's strength is unmatched in All-Under-Heaven, while Wei's weakness is extreme — and yet you confront Qin on these terms. You are willing to die but unable to cut your losses. This is a compounded error.

"If Your Majesty can follow my plan, the territory lost will not be enough to harm the state, the humiliation endured will not be enough to injure your person, and your troubles will be resolved while your grievances are avenged.

"Within Qin's four borders, from law-enforcement officials down to common carters, everyone asks the same question: 'Are you with the Lao faction or the Lu faction?' This is true from the lowest village gate to the highest court hall. Now if Your Majesty cedes territory to bribe Qin, attribute it as Lao Ai's achievement. Humble yourself to honor Qin, and channel it through Lao Ai. Use your state's resources to bolster Lao Ai, and Lao Ai will prevail. If Your Majesty supports the Lao faction with national resources, the Dowager Queen's gratitude toward you will be bone-deep, and your diplomatic position will be the most favored in All-Under-Heaven.

"Qin and Wei have a hundred times allied and a hundred times deceived each other. Now if you cultivate Qin through the Lao faction and achieve the most favored relationship in All-Under-Heaven, who would not abandon the Lu faction and follow the Lao faction? When All-Under-Heaven rallies against the Lu faction and supports the Lao faction, then Your Majesty's grievances will be avenged."

Notes

1person嫪毐Lào Ǎi

Lao Ai (嫪毐, d. 238 BC) was the notorious lover of the Qin Dowager Queen (Queen Dowager Zhao, mother of Qin Shi Huang). He amassed enormous power before his failed coup in 238 BC. The speaker proposes that Wei exploit the Lao-Lu factional split to gain leverage inside Qin — essentially backing a faction in Qin's internal power struggle.

2person呂不韋Lǚ Bù Wéi

The Lu faction refers to Lu Buwei (呂不韋), Qin's chancellor. The Lao-Lu rivalry was the defining internal conflict of Qin in the 240s-230s BC, and the speaker proposes exploiting it by backing Lao Ai — which, given that Lao Ai's coup failed spectacularly and everyone associated with him was executed, would have been catastrophically bad advice.

3context

This is one of the most cynical stratagems in the entire Zhanguoce: a weak state intervening in a great power's factional politics by backing the faction connected to the queen's bedroom. The plan has a certain wild logic — if the Lao faction wins, Wei has a patron at the heart of Qin — but it's essentially a bet on a palace paramour against a merchant-chancellor, with national survival as the stake. That this advice is recorded without comment on how badly it would have turned out is either the Zhanguoce's deadpan humor or evidence that the text was compiled before the outcome was known.

秦王使人謂安陵君

The King of Qin Sends a Message to the Lord of Anling

秦王使人謂安陵君曰：「寡人慾以五百里之地易安陵，安陵君其許寡人。」安陵君曰：「大王加惠，以大易小，甚善。雖然，受地於先生，願終守之，弗敢易。」秦王不說。安陵君因使唐且使於秦。秦王謂唐且曰：「寡人以五百里之地易安陵，安陵君不聽寡人，何也?且秦滅韓亡魏，而君以五十里之地存者，以君為長者，故不錯意也。今吾以十倍之地請廣於君，而君逆寡人者，輕寡人與?」唐且對曰：「否，非若是也。安陵君受地於先生而守之，雖千里不敢易也，豈直五百里哉?」秦王怫然怒，謂唐且曰：「公亦嘗聞天子之怒乎?」唐且對曰：「臣未嘗聞也。」秦王曰：「天子之怒，伏屍百萬，流血千里。」唐且曰：「大王嘗聞布衣之怒乎?」秦王曰：「布衣之怒，亦免冠徒跣，以頭搶地爾。」唐且曰：「此庸夫之怒也，非士之怒也。夫專諸之刺王僚也，彗星襲月；聶政之刺韓傀也，白虹貫日；要離之刺慶忌也，蒼鷹擊於殿上。此三子者，皆布衣之士也，懷怒未發，休祲降於天，與臣而將四矣。若士必怒，伏屍二人，流血五步，天下縞素，今日是也。」挺劍而起。秦王色撓，長跪而謝之曰：「先生坐，何至於此!寡人諭矣。夫韓、魏滅亡，而安陵以五十里之地存者，徒以有先生也。」

The King of Qin sends a message to the Lord of Anling: "I wish to exchange five hundred li of territory for Anling. I trust the Lord of Anling will agree."

The Lord of Anling says: "Your Majesty does us great kindness in offering to exchange large for small — most generous. However, I received this land from my predecessor and wish to guard it to the end. I dare not make the exchange."

The King of Qin is displeased. The Lord of Anling therefore sends Tang Ju as envoy to Qin.

The King of Qin says to Tang Ju: "I offered five hundred li of territory in exchange for Anling, and the Lord of Anling refuses me. Why? Moreover, Qin has destroyed Han and annihilated Wei, and yet your lord survives with his fifty li of territory — because I regarded him as an elder and chose not to trouble him. Now I offer ten times his territory to expand his domain, and he defies me — does he take me lightly?"

Tang Ju replies: "No, it is not like that. The Lord of Anling received this land from his predecessor and guards it. Even a thousand li he would not dare exchange — how much less five hundred?"

The King of Qin flushes with fury and says to Tang Ju: "Have you ever heard of the wrath of the Son of Heaven?"

Tang Ju replies: "I have never heard of it."

The King of Qin says: "When the Son of Heaven is wrathful, a million corpses fall and blood flows for a thousand li."

Tang Ju says: "Has Your Majesty ever heard of the wrath of a common man?"

The King of Qin says: "When a common man is wrathful, he throws off his cap, kicks off his sandals, and beats his head against the ground — nothing more."

Tang Ju says: "That is the wrath of a mediocre man, not the wrath of a true warrior. When Zhuan Zhu assassinated King Liao, a comet struck the moon. When Nie Zheng assassinated Han Gui, a white rainbow pierced the sun. When Yao Li assassinated Qing Ji, a grey falcon swooped upon the palace hall. These three men were all commoners — but before their rage was unleashed, Heaven sent down omens. With me, it will be four. When a true warrior is wrathful, two corpses fall and blood flows for five paces, and All-Under-Heaven wears white mourning. Today is that day."

He draws his sword and rises.

The King of Qin's expression crumbles. He kneels upright and apologizes: "Sir, please be seated — how has it come to this! I understand now. Han and Wei have been destroyed, yet Anling survives with its fifty li of territory — solely because it has you, sir."

Notes

1person唐且Táng Jū

Tang Ju (唐且) appears here in what may be the single most dramatic scene in the Zhanguoce. Whether the encounter actually happened is debatable — it has the feel of historical fiction — but as a literary set piece, it is unmatched. The 90-year-old diplomat draws a sword on the most powerful man in the world and wins.

2person專諸/聶政/要離Zhuān Zhū / Niè Zhèng / Yào Lí

Zhuan Zhu (專諸), Nie Zheng (聶政), and Yao Li (要離) were the three most famous assassins of the Spring and Autumn period. Tang Ju invokes them not merely as historical examples but as a category to which he belongs: men whose rage reshapes heaven and earth. 'With me, it will be four' is one of the great lines in Chinese literature.

3translation

天下縞素 (tiān xià gǎo sù) — 'All-Under-Heaven wears white mourning' — is Tang Ju's counter to the King of Qin's 'million corpses.' Your wrath kills masses at a distance; mine kills one man at close range, and the whole world mourns. It's a reframe of power itself: the assassin's blade is more consequential than the emperor's army, because it can reach the emperor.

4context

The historical plausibility of this episode is low — the King of Qin (i.e., the future Qin Shi Huang) had extensive personal security and it's unlikely a foreign envoy could draw a sword in his presence. But the Zhanguoce is not primarily interested in what happened; it's interested in what makes a good argument. And Tang Ju's argument — that individual courage can check imperial power — is perhaps the most subversive idea in the entire text.

Edition & Source

Text: 《戰國策》 Zhanguoce
Edition: 中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
Commentary: 鮑彪 (Bao Biao) Song dynasty commentary