韓策一 (Stratagems of Han I) — Chinese ink painting

Chapter 26 of 33 · Han state

韓策一

Stratagems of Han I

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三晉已破智氏

The Three Jin Have Destroyed the Zhi Clan

三晉已破智氏,將分其地。段貴謂韓王曰:「分地必取成皋。」韓王曰:「成皋,石溜之地也,寡人無所用之。」段貴曰:「不然,臣聞一里之厚,而動千里之權者,地利也。文人之眾,而破三軍者,不意也。王用臣言,則韓必取鄭矣。」王曰:「善。」果取成皋。至韓之取鄭也,果從成皋始。

After the Three Jin have destroyed the Zhi clan, they are about to divide its territory. Duan Gui says to the King of Han: "In dividing the land, you must take Chenggao."

The King of Han says: "Chenggao is nothing but rocky, eroded terrain. I have no use for it."

Duan Gui says: "Not so. I have heard that a position one li deep that commands leverage over a thousand li — that is strategic advantage. A smaller force that shatters three armies — that is the element of surprise. If Your Majesty follows my advice, Han will certainly take Zheng."

The king says: "Very well." He does take Chenggao. And when Han eventually conquers Zheng, the campaign does indeed begin from Chenggao.

Notes

1context

This passage is set at the founding moment of Han as an independent state. In 453 BC, the three great families of Jin — Han, Wei, and Zhao — destroyed the Zhi (智) clan and partitioned its territory, effectively splitting the state of Jin into three. This event marks the conventional beginning of the Warring States period.

2person段貴Duàn Guì

Duan Gui (段貴) is otherwise unknown. His advice proves prescient: he understands that in terrain warfare, an apparently worthless chokepoint can be worth more than rich farmland.

3place

Chenggao (成皋) is modern Xingyang, Henan — a narrow defile between mountains and the Yellow River that controls the east-west corridor into the Central Plain. It would remain one of the most fought-over chokepoints in Chinese military history, notably in the Chu-Han contention of 206–202 BC.

4place

Zheng (鄭) was a small state in modern central Henan. Han conquered it in 375 BC and moved its capital to the former Zheng capital (modern Xinzheng), which is why Han's capital is sometimes called 'Zheng' in these texts.

大成午從趙來

Dacheng Wu Returns from Zhao

大成午從趙來,謂申不害於韓曰:「子以韓重我於趙,請以趙重子於韓,是子有兩韓,而我有兩趙也。」

Dacheng Wu comes from Zhao and says to Shen Buhai in Han: "If you use Han's influence to raise my standing in Zhao, I will use Zhao's influence to raise your standing in Han. That way you will have two Han's worth of support, and I will have two Zhao's worth."

Notes

1person申不害Shēn Bùhài

Shen Buhai (申不害, d. 337 BC) was the chief minister of Marquis Zhao of Han and one of the founding theorists of the Legalist school, specializing in the art of 'techniques' (術, shu) — methods by which a ruler controls his bureaucracy. He served as chancellor for about fifteen years and is credited with making Han briefly formidable.

2context

This is a remarkably concise quid pro quo: a cross-border influence-trading scheme pitched in a single sentence. Dacheng Wu is proposing that each man pump up the other's reputation in the foreign court, creating a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. It is, in essence, a log-rolling agreement between lobbyists.

魏之圍邯鄲

When Wei Besieged Handan

魏之圍邯鄲也,申不害始合於韓王,然未知王之所欲也,恐言而未必中於王也。王聞申子曰:「吾誰與而可?」對曰:「此安危之要,國家之大事也。臣請深惟而苦思之。」乃微謂趙卓、韓鼂曰:「子皆國之辯士也,夫為人臣者,言可必用,盡忠而已矣。」二人各進議於王以事。申子微視王之所說以言於王,王大說之。

When Wei besieges Handan, Shen Buhai has just entered the service of the King of Han but does not yet know what the king wants. He is afraid that if he speaks, he may not hit the mark.

The king consults Shen Buhai: "Whom should I side with?"

Shen Buhai replies: "This is a matter of survival and ruin — a great affair of state. Allow me to think it through deeply and deliberate on it."

He then privately says to Zhao Zhuo and Han Chao: "You are both the state's finest debaters. For a minister, the whole point is to speak so that one's words are adopted — to exhaust one's loyalty, nothing more."

The two men each go before the king and present their arguments. Shen Buhai quietly observes which proposal pleases the king, then speaks to the king accordingly. The king is greatly pleased.

Notes

1context

Wei's siege of Handan (the Zhao capital) in 354–353 BC was one of the pivotal early Warring States conflicts. Han had to decide whether to intervene and on which side. The episode is set during this crisis.

2context

This is a textbook illustration of Shen Buhai's own theory of ministerial 'techniques' (術). Rather than risk giving the wrong answer, he uses two colleagues as test balloons, watches the king's reaction, and then delivers exactly what the king already wants to hear. It is sycophancy elevated to a political method — and the text presents it without any apparent irony, as though it were simply clever statecraft. The Zhanguoce often admires cunning more than it admires integrity.

申子請仕其從兄官

Shen Buhai Requests a Post for His Cousin

申子請仕其從兄官,昭侯不許也。申子有怨色。昭侯曰:「非所謂學於子者也。聽者之謁,而廢子之道乎?又亡其行子之術,而廢左之謁乎?子尚教寡人循功勞,視次弟。今有所求,此我將奚聽乎?」申子乃辟舍請罪,曰:「君真其人也!」

Shen Buhai requests that his cousin be given an official post. Marquis Zhao refuses. Shen Buhai shows resentment on his face.

Marquis Zhao says: "This is not what I learned from you. Should I grant your private request and thereby discard your own doctrine? Or should I follow your method and reject this request? You yourself taught me to promote officials based on merit and performance, and to follow the order of precedence. Now you come with a personal favor to ask — whom am I supposed to listen to?"

Shen Buhai withdraws from his residence and begs forgiveness, saying: "You are truly the right man for this!"

Notes

1person韓昭侯Hán Zhāo Hóu

Marquis Zhao of Han (韓昭侯, r. 358–333 BC) was Shen Buhai's patron and the ruler who implemented his Legalist reforms. This anecdote shows him at his best — using Shen Buhai's own philosophy to check Shen Buhai's own nepotism.

2context

The delicious irony here is hard to miss: the man who built an entire political philosophy around impersonal bureaucratic technique gets caught trying to slip his cousin into a government job. Marquis Zhao's response is essentially: 'I read your book.' Shen Buhai's reaction — calling the marquis 'truly the right man' — reads as genuine admiration rather than mere face-saving, which makes the whole episode oddly charming.

蘇秦為楚合從說韓王

Su Qin Persuades the King of Han to Join the North-South Coalition on Behalf of Chu

蘇秦為楚合從說韓王曰:「韓北有鞏、洛、成皋之固,西有宜陽之常阪之塞,東有宛、穰、洧水,南有陘山,地方千里,帶甲數十萬。天下之強弓勁弩,皆自韓出。谿子、少府時力、距來,皆射六百步之外。韓卒超足而射,百發不暇止,遠者達胸,近者掩心。韓卒之劍戟,皆出於冥山、棠谿、墨陽、合伯膊。鄧師、宛馮、龍淵、大阿,皆陸斷馬牛,水擊鵠雁,當敵即斬堅。甲、盾、鞮、鍪、鐵幕,革抉、㕭芮,無不畢具。以韓卒之勇,被堅甲,跖勁弩,帶利劍,一人當百,不足言也。夫以韓之勁,與大王之賢,乃欲西面事秦,稱東藩,築帝宮,受冠帶,祠春秋,交臂而服焉。夫羞社稷而為天下笑,無過此者矣。是故願大王之熟計之也。大王事秦,秦必求宜陽、成皋。今茲效之,明年又益求割地。與之,即無地以給之;不與,則棄前功而後更受其禍。且夫大王之地有盡,而秦之求無已。夫以有盡之地,而逆無已之求,此所謂市怨而買禍者也,不戰而地已削矣。臣聞鄙語曰:『寧為雞口,無為牛後。』今大王西面交臂而臣事秦,何以異於牛後乎?夫大王之賢,挾強韓之兵,而有牛後之名,臣竊為大王羞之。」

韓王忿然作色,攘臂按劍,仰天太息曰:「寡人雖死,必不能事秦。今主君以楚王之教詔之,敬奉社稷以從。」

Su Qin, on behalf of Chu, persuades the King of Han to join the north-south coalition. He says:

"Han has the fortifications of Gong, Luo, and Chenggao to the north; the passes of Yiyang and Changban to the west; Wan, Rang, and the Wei River to the east; and Mount Xing to the south. Its territory extends a thousand li, and it has hundreds of thousands of armored troops.

All the strongest bows and most powerful crossbows in All-Under-Heaven come from Han. The Xiezi, the Shaofu Shili, and the Julai models all shoot over six hundred paces. Han soldiers fire while leaping, loosing arrow after arrow without pause — at long range the shafts strike the chest, at close range they pierce the heart.

Han soldiers' swords and halberds all come from Mount Ming, Tangxi, Moyang, and Hebo. The Dengshi, Wanfeng, Longyuan, and Da'e blades can cleave horses and oxen on land and strike down swans and geese on water; in battle they cut through any armor.

Shields, helmets, iron curtains, leather thumb-guards, arm-pieces — Han has them all in full supply. With Han soldiers' courage, clad in strong armor, wielding powerful crossbows, bearing sharp swords, one man is worth a hundred — and even that understates it.

Yet with Han's might and Your Majesty's wisdom, you intend to face west and serve Qin, call yourself Qin's eastern vassal, build a palace for Qin's emperor, accept Qin's cap and sash, offer sacrifices in spring and autumn on Qin's behalf, and fold your arms in submission. To bring such shame upon the state and become the laughingstock of All-Under-Heaven — nothing could be worse.

I urge Your Majesty to consider this carefully. If you serve Qin, Qin will demand Yiyang and Chenggao. Yield them this year, and next year Qin will demand still more territory. Give it, and you will run out of land to give; refuse, and you will have sacrificed your earlier concessions for nothing and face even worse consequences.

Your Majesty's territory has a limit; Qin's demands have none. To meet limitless demands with limited territory — this is what is called 'buying enmity and purchasing disaster.' Your land will be carved away without a single battle being fought.

I have heard a common saying: 'Better to be the beak of a chicken than the rear end of an ox.' If Your Majesty faces west, folds his arms, and serves Qin as a subject, how is that different from being the rear end of an ox? With Your Majesty's virtue and the strength of Han's army, to bear the name 'rear end of an ox' — I am privately ashamed on Your Majesty's behalf."

The King of Han flushes with anger, bares his arm, grips his sword, looks up to heaven, and sighs deeply: "Even if I die, I will never serve Qin. Since you have come with Chu's king's instructions, I respectfully pledge the state to the coalition."

Notes

1person蘇秦Sū Qín

Su Qin (蘇秦, d. 284 BC) was the great itinerant strategist who promoted the north-south coalition (合縱, hezong) — the alliance of the six states against Qin. His rival Zhang Yi championed the opposite strategy. Whether Su Qin actually delivered all the speeches attributed to him is doubtful; the Zhanguoce likely compiles material from multiple rhetoricians under his name.

2context

This speech is a greatest-hits compilation of Han's military brand identity: famous crossbows, legendary blades, elite soldiers. Su Qin is flattering Han lavishly before delivering the real pitch. The underlying logic is sound, though — Han's strategic dilemma (finite land, infinite Qin appetite) was genuinely insoluble through appeasement.

3context

The proverb 'Better to be the beak of a chicken than the rear end of an ox' (寧為雞口,無為牛後) became one of the most famous lines from the Zhanguoce. The chicken-beak is a small independent state's leader; the ox-rear is a great power's subordinate. The imagery is deliberately vulgar — which is what makes it effective rhetoric.

4place

The famous sword-producing sites — Mount Ming (冥山), Tangxi (棠谿), Moyang (墨陽) — and the blade names — Longyuan (龍淵, 'Dragon Abyss'), Da'e (大阿) — are all associated with the legendary swordsmiths of the Chu-Han border region. Han inherited these metallurgical traditions when it absorbed parts of this territory.

張儀為秦連橫說韓王

Zhang Yi Persuades the King of Han to Join the East-West Alignment on Behalf of Qin

張儀為秦連橫說韓王曰:「韓地險惡,山居,五穀所生,非麥而豆;民之所食,大抵豆飯藿羹;一歲不收,民不厭糟糠;不滿九百里,無二歲之所食。料大王之卒,悉之不過三十萬,而廝徒負養,在其中矣,為除守徼亭障塞,見卒不過二十萬而已矣。秦帶甲百餘萬,車千乘,騎萬匹,虎挚之士,跿跔科頭,貫頤奮戟者,至不可勝計也。秦馬之良,戎兵之眾,探前趹後,蹄間三尋者,不可稱數也。山東之卒,被甲冒胄以會戰,秦人捐甲徒裎以趨敵,左挈人頭,右挾生虜。夫秦卒之與山東之卒也,猶孟賁之與怯夫也,以重力相壓,猶烏獲之與嬰兒也。夫戰孟賁、烏獲之士,以攻不服之弱國,無以異於墮千鈞之重,集於鳥卵之上,必無幸矣。諸侯不料兵之弱,食之寡,而聽從人之甘言好辭,比周以相飾也,皆言曰:『聽吾計則可以強霸天下。』夫不顧社稷之長利,而聽須臾之說,誖誤人主者,無過於此者矣。大王不事秦,秦下甲據宜陽,斷絕韓之上地;東取成皋、宜陽,則鴻臺之宮,桑林之苑,非王之有已。夫塞成皋,絕上地,則王之國分矣。先事秦則安矣,不事秦則危矣。夫造禍而求福,計淺而願深,逆秦而順楚,雖欲無亡,不可得也。故為大王計,莫如事秦。秦之所欲,莫如弱楚。而能弱楚者莫如韓。非以韓能強於楚也,其地勢然也。今王西面而事秦以攻楚,為敝邑,秦王必喜。夫攻楚而私其地,轉禍而說秦,計無便於此者也。是故秦王使使臣獻書大王御史,須以決事。」

韓王曰:「客幸而教之,請比郡縣,築帝宮,祠春秋,稱東藩,效宜陽。」

Zhang Yi, on behalf of Qin, persuades the King of Han to join the east-west alignment. He says:

"Han's terrain is rugged and barren, a land of mountains. Its crops are not wheat but beans; its people subsist on bean-rice and bean-leaf broth. One bad harvest and the people cannot fill themselves even on chaff and husks. The territory does not extend nine hundred li and holds no more than two years' food supply.

I estimate that if Your Majesty mobilizes every last soldier, it comes to no more than three hundred thousand — and that includes the cooks, porters, and supply carriers. Subtract the garrison troops for your frontier posts and border walls, and the field army is no more than two hundred thousand.

Qin has over a million armored troops, a thousand war chariots, ten thousand cavalry horses. Its fierce warriors — bareheaded, bare-chested, biting through their chin-straps to seize their halberds — are beyond counting. Qin's horses are so fine, its war-beasts so numerous, that those with three fathoms between their hoof-strikes cannot be tallied.

When the soldiers east of the mountains go to battle, they wear armor and helmets. Qin's men throw off their armor and charge naked at the enemy, a severed head in the left hand and a live prisoner under the right arm. Qin's soldiers compared to eastern soldiers are like Meng Ben against a coward; in sheer weight of force, like Wu Huo against an infant.

To send warriors like Meng Ben and Wu Huo against weak, recalcitrant states is no different from dropping a thousand-jun weight onto a bird's egg — there will be no survivors.

The feudal lords do not reckon the weakness of their armies or the scarcity of their food. Instead they listen to the sweet words and fine rhetoric of the coalition advocates, who band together to put a nice face on things, all saying: 'Follow my plan and you can dominate All-Under-Heaven.' To ignore the long-term interests of the state and heed momentary persuasion — there is no greater way to mislead a ruler.

If Your Majesty does not serve Qin, Qin will send its armored troops to seize Yiyang and cut off Han's upper territories. Moving east to take Chenggao and Yiyang, the Hong Terrace palace and the Sanglin park will no longer be yours. Block Chenggao and sever the upper territories, and your state is split in two.

Serve Qin first and you will be safe; refuse to serve Qin and you face ruin. To court disaster while hoping for good fortune, to plan shallowly while wishing deeply, to defy Qin and follow Chu — even if you wished to avoid destruction, you could not.

Therefore, my counsel for Your Majesty is: nothing is better than serving Qin. What Qin most desires is to weaken Chu. And no state can weaken Chu better than Han — not because Han is stronger than Chu, but because of its geographic position. If Your Majesty faces west, serves Qin, and attacks Chu on Qin's behalf, the King of Qin will certainly be pleased. Attack Chu and keep its territory for yourself while deflecting disaster onto others and pleasing Qin — no plan is more advantageous.

Therefore, the King of Qin has sent me, his envoy, to present this letter to Your Majesty's scribes. We await your decision."

The King of Han says: "You have graciously instructed me. I request to be ranked as a commandery, to build an imperial palace, to offer sacrifices in spring and autumn, to be called Qin's eastern vassal, and to present Yiyang as tribute."

Notes

1person張儀Zhāng Yí

Zhang Yi (張儀, d. 309 BC) was the great rival of Su Qin and the champion of the east-west alignment (連橫, lianheng) — alliance with Qin rather than against it. Where Su Qin flattered Han's military prowess, Zhang Yi methodically demolishes it. The juxtaposition of these two speeches — one right after the other in the text — is devastating.

2context

Zhang Yi's speech is the anti-Su Qin. Where Su Qin praised Han's legendary crossbows and swords, Zhang Yi talks about bean porridge and chaff. Where Su Qin counted 'hundreds of thousands' of armored troops, Zhang Yi does the arithmetic and finds only two hundred thousand field troops once you subtract the cooks and border guards. It is a masterclass in deflation — and it works.

3person孟賁/烏獲Mèng Bēn / Wū Huò

Meng Ben (孟賁) and Wu Huo (烏獲) were legendary strongmen of antiquity, used as stock comparisons for overwhelming physical force. Zhang Yi's rhetoric compares Qin's army to Meng Ben fighting a coward and Wu Huo wrestling an infant — not subtle, but effective.

4context

The King of Han's capitulation is total and immediate — a stark contrast to his sword-gripping defiance in the previous section. The Zhanguoce places these two speeches back-to-back without comment, letting the reader draw the obvious conclusion: Han is so weak that its king will pledge himself to whichever persuader walked in last. This is the fundamental Han problem that makes it the simulation's hardest position.

5translation

千鈞 (thousand jun): a jun was a unit of weight equal to about 30 jin (roughly 15 kg). A 'thousand jun' thus represents roughly 15,000 kg — a conventional hyperbole for crushing force.

宣王謂摎留

King Xuan Consults Jiu Liu

宣王謂摎留曰:「吾欲兩用公仲、公叔,其可乎?」對曰:「不可。晉用六卿而國分,簡公用田成、監止而簡公弑,魏兩用犀受、張儀而西河之外亡。今王兩用之,其多力者內樹其黨,其寡力者籍外權。群臣或內樹其黨以擅其主,或外為交以裂其地,則王之國必危矣。」

King Xuan says to Jiu Liu: "I wish to employ both Gongzhong and Gongshu simultaneously. Is that acceptable?"

Jiu Liu replies: "It is not. Jin employed six chief ministers and the state was partitioned. Duke Jian of Qi employed both Tian Cheng and Jian Zhi and was assassinated. Wei employed both Xi Shou and Zhang Yi and lost everything west of the Yellow River.

If Your Majesty employs both men, the one with greater influence will build a faction inside the court, and the weaker one will seek leverage from foreign powers. If your ministers are building internal factions to dominate their ruler, or forging external alliances to carve up your territory, then Your Majesty's state will certainly be in danger."

Notes

1person韓宣王Hán Xuān Wáng

King Xuan of Han (韓宣王, also known as 韓宣惠王, r. 332–312 BC) succeeded Marquis Zhao. Gongzhong (公仲) and Gongshu (公叔) were powerful nobles who competed for influence at his court — a recurring theme in the Han chapters.

2context

Jiu Liu's argument is a concise theory of competitive factionalism: dual centers of power inevitably lead to one side building a domestic power base while the other seeks foreign backers, and both paths lead to ruin. Every historical example he cites ended in partition, assassination, or territorial loss. The advice is sound, but Han's kings rarely managed to follow it.

張儀謂齊王

Zhang Yi Addresses the King of Qi

張儀謂齊王曰:「王不如資韓朋,與之逐張儀於魏。魏因相犀首,因以齊、魏廢韓朋,而相公叔以伐秦。公仲聞之,必不入於齊。據公於魏,是公無患。」

Zhang Yi says to the King of Qi: "Your Majesty would do well to back Han Peng and help him drive Zhang Yi out of Wei. Wei will then appoint Xishou as its chancellor. Then use the combined influence of Qi and Wei to remove Han Peng and install Gongshu as chancellor, and have him attack Qin. When Gongzhong hears of this, he will certainly not go to Qi. This secures your position in Wei, and you will face no threat."

Notes

1person犀首(公孫衍)Xī Shǒu (Gōngsūn Yǎn)

Xishou (犀首) is the title or nickname of Gongsun Yan (公孫衍), a prominent strategist who competed with Zhang Yi. The name literally means 'Rhinoceros Head' — possibly a military title.

2context

The irony of Zhang Yi advising the King of Qi on how to 'drive Zhang Yi out of Wei' is the kind of hall-of-mirrors maneuvering that makes the Zhanguoce so disorienting. Zhang Yi may be engineering his own apparent expulsion as part of a larger scheme, or the text may be conflating different episodes. Either way, the passage illustrates how Han's internal factional struggles (Gongzhong vs. Gongshu) were routinely exploited by outside powers.

楚昭獻相韓

Chu's Zhao Xian Serves as Chancellor of Han

楚昭獻相韓。秦且攻韓,韓廢昭獻。昭獻令人謂公叔曰:「不如貴昭獻以固楚,秦必曰楚、韓合矣。」

Chu's Zhao Xian serves as chancellor of Han. When Qin prepares to attack Han, Han dismisses Zhao Xian. Zhao Xian sends someone to tell Gongshu: "It would be better to keep Zhao Xian in an honored position to solidify the alliance with Chu. Qin will surely conclude that Chu and Han are united."

Notes

1context

A neat little piece of deterrence theory: keep the Chu-aligned chancellor in place as a signal to Qin that Han has powerful friends, even if the actual alliance is hollow. The passage is so brief it reads like a telegram — which may be all that survived of the original anecdote.

秦攻陘

Qin Attacks Xing

秦攻陘,韓使人馳南陽之地。秦已馳,又攻陘,韓因割南陽之地。秦受地,又攻陘。陳軫謂秦王曰:「國形不便故馳,交不親故割。今割矣交不親,馳矣而兵不止,臣恐山東之無以馳割事王者矣。且王求百金於三川而不可得,求千金於韓,一旦而具。今王攻寒庶,是絕上交而固私府也,竊為王弗取也。」

Qin attacks Xing. Han sends an envoy offering to cede the territory of Nanyang. After Qin has accepted the offer, Qin attacks Xing again. Han then formally cedes Nanyang. Qin takes the land and attacks Xing yet again.

Chen Zhen says to the King of Qin: "Han offered territory because its strategic position was disadvantageous; it ceded land because the alliance was not yet firm. Now it has ceded land but the alliance is no firmer, and offered territory but the attacks have not stopped. I fear that the states east of the mountains will have nothing left to offer or cede in Your Majesty's service.

Moreover, when you seek a hundred pieces of gold from the Three Rivers region you cannot obtain them, but when you demand a thousand from Han, it is delivered overnight. If Your Majesty attacks poor, obscure targets, you are cutting off your best tributary relationship to fill your private treasury. I humbly advise against this."

Notes

1person陳軫Chén Zhěn

Chen Zhen (陳軫) was a strategist who served various states, including Qin and Chu. Here he is advising the King of Qin — unusually — to stop squeezing Han, on the pragmatic grounds that a tributary is worth more alive than dead.

2context

This passage crystallizes Han's doom loop: Qin attacks, Han cedes territory to buy peace, Qin pockets the concession and attacks again. Chen Zhen's argument — don't kill the goose that lays golden eggs — is the only thing that temporarily saves Han. The fact that Han's best hope depends on a Qin advisor explaining basic asset management to the Qin king tells you everything about Han's strategic position.

3place

Nanyang (南陽) here refers to the region south of the mountains in what is now southwestern Henan, an important agricultural and strategic zone. The Three Rivers (三川) region refers to the area around Luoyang where the Luo, Yi, and Yellow rivers converge.

五國約而攻秦

Five States Agree to Attack Qin

五國約而攻秦,楚王為從長,不能傷秦,兵不算而留於成皋。魏順謂市丘君曰:「五國罷,必攻市丘,以償兵費。君資臣,臣要求為君止天下之攻市丘。」市丘君曰:「善。」因遣之。

Five states agree to attack Qin, with the King of Chu as coalition leader. They fail to inflict any damage on Qin. The army, having accomplished nothing, remains encamped at Chenggao.

Wei Shun says to the Lord of Shiqiu: "When the five states withdraw, they will certainly attack Shiqiu to recoup their campaign expenses. Fund me, and I will negotiate to prevent All-Under-Heaven from attacking Shiqiu."

The Lord of Shiqiu says: "Very well." He dispatches him.

Notes

1context

A bleakly comic episode: five states ally to attack Qin, accomplish absolutely nothing, and then — as Wei Shun correctly predicts — look for some smaller target to loot just to cover expenses. Shiqiu, a minor Han dependency, is about to become that target. The coalition-warfare model of the Warring States in miniature: grand alliances dissolve into petty predation.

鄭強載八百金入秦

Zheng Qiang Brings Eight Hundred Gold to Qin

鄭強載八百金入秦,請以伐韓。泠向謂鄭強曰:「公以八百金請伐人之與國,秦必不聽公。公不如令秦王疑公叔。」鄭強曰:「何如?」曰:「公叔之攻楚也,以幾瑟之存焉,故言先楚也。今已令楚王奉幾瑟以車百乘居陽翟,令昭獻轉而與之處,旬有餘,彼已決。而幾瑟,公叔之讎也;而昭獻,公叔之人也。秦王聞之,必疑公叔為楚也。」

Zheng Qiang brings eight hundred pieces of gold into Qin to request that Qin attack Han. Leng Xiang says to Zheng Qiang: "If you offer eight hundred gold to have Qin attack its own ally, Qin will certainly refuse. You would do better to make the King of Qin suspect Gongshu."

Zheng Qiang asks: "How?"

Leng Xiang says: "Gongshu's attack on Chu was motivated by Ji Se's presence there, which is why he argued for striking Chu first. Now the King of Chu has already sent Ji Se with a hundred chariots to reside at Yangdi, and Zhao Xian has gone to stay with him — it has been over ten days, and the matter is settled. Ji Se is Gongshu's enemy, but Zhao Xian is Gongshu's man. When the King of Qin hears about this, he will surely suspect that Gongshu is secretly working for Chu."

Notes

1context

The scheme is elegant in its indirection: rather than paying Qin to attack Han (which Qin won't do for a mere eight hundred gold), engineer a disinformation campaign that makes Qin distrust Han's chancellor. Once Qin suspects Gongshu is secretly aligned with Chu, Qin's own paranoia does the rest. The eight hundred gold would be better spent on espionage than bribery.

2person幾瑟Jī Sè

Ji Se (幾瑟) was a Han prince and rival claimant to the throne. His factional struggle with Gongshu runs through multiple sections of the Han chapters.

3place

Yangdi (陽翟) was Han's capital (modern Yuzhou, Henan) before the move to Xinzheng.

鄭強之走張儀於秦

Zheng Qiang Drives Zhang Yi from Qin

鄭強之走張儀於秦,曰儀之使者,必之楚矣。故謂大宰曰:「公留儀之使者,強請西圖儀於秦。」故因而請秦王曰:「張儀使人致上庸之地,故使使臣再拜謁秦王。」秦王怒,張儀走。

Zheng Qiang plots to drive Zhang Yi from Qin. He says that Zhang Yi's envoy will surely go to Chu. So he tells the Grand Steward: "Detain Zhang Yi's envoy. I will go west and move against Zhang Yi in Qin."

He then petitions the King of Qin, saying: "Zhang Yi has sent someone to hand over the territory of Shangyong. His envoy has come to bow twice and pay respects to the King of Qin."

The King of Qin is furious. Zhang Yi flees.

Notes

1context

The scheme works by fabricating evidence that Zhang Yi is secretly negotiating territorial concessions behind the king's back. By detaining Zhang Yi's actual envoy (so he cannot deny the charges) and then presenting a false story to the Qin king, Zheng Qiang creates an information vacuum that fills itself with suspicion. Zhang Yi, unable to defend himself in time, has to run.

2place

Shangyong (上庸) was a strategically important region in the upper Han River valley (modern northwestern Hubei), contested between Qin, Chu, and Han.

宜陽之役

The Campaign of Yiyang

宜陽之役,楊達謂公孫顯曰:「請為公以五萬攻西周,得之,是以九鼎印甘茂也。不然,秦攻西周,天下惡之,其救韓必疾,則茂事敗矣。」

During the campaign of Yiyang, Yang Da says to Gongsun Xian: "Allow me to lead fifty thousand troops against West Zhou on your behalf. If we take it, the Nine Cauldrons will seal Gan Mao's achievement. If not, then Qin's attack on West Zhou will earn the hatred of All-Under-Heaven, and the states will rush to rescue Han — and Gan Mao's enterprise will collapse."

Notes

1person甘茂Gān Mào

Gan Mao (甘茂) was a Qin general who led the siege of Yiyang around 308–307 BC. The siege was prolonged and politically contentious — Gan Mao had to fight both the enemy and his own court rivals to keep the campaign going.

2context

The Yiyang campaign was a defining moment for Han's survival. Yiyang was a heavily fortified Han city, and its fall would open Han's heartland to Qin. Multiple sections in the Han chapters revolve around this siege, reflecting its strategic centrality.

秦圍宜陽

Qin Besieges Yiyang

秦圍宜陽,游騰謂公仲曰:「公何不與趙藺、離石、祁,以質許地,則樓緩必敗矣。收韓、趙之兵以臨魏,樓鼻必敗矣。韓為一,魏必倍秦,甘茂必敗矣。以成陽資翟強於齊,楚必敗之。須秦必敗,秦失魏,宜陽必不拔矣。」

Qin besieges Yiyang. You Teng says to Gongzhong: "Why not offer Zhao the cities of Lin, Lishi, and Qi as a pledge for promised territory? Then Lou Huan will surely fail. Combine Han and Zhao's forces to threaten Wei, and Lou Bi will surely fail. If Han is unified, Wei will certainly betray Qin, and Gan Mao will surely fail. Use Chengyang to support Di Qiang's position in Qi, and Chu will surely be defeated.

Wait for Qin's inevitable failure. Once Qin loses Wei's support, Yiyang will certainly not fall."

Notes

1context

You Teng's plan is an elaborate chain of contingent moves — give territory to Zhao to get troops, use those troops to flip Wei, use Wei's defection to doom the Qin siege. It's the kind of multi-step diplomatic Rube Goldberg device that the Zhanguoce loves to present. Whether it was ever actually attempted is another question.

公仲以宜陽之故仇甘茂

Gongzhong's Feud with Gan Mao over Yiyang

公仲以宜陽之故仇甘茂。其後,秦歸武遂於韓,已而,秦王固疑甘茂之以武遂解於公仲也。杜赫為公仲謂秦王曰:「明也願因茂以事王。」秦王大怒於甘茂,故樗里疾大說杜聊。

Gongzhong holds a grudge against Gan Mao because of Yiyang. Later, Qin returns Wusui to Han. But the King of Qin already suspects that Gan Mao used Wusui to reconcile with Gongzhong.

Du He, speaking on Gongzhong's behalf, tells the King of Qin: "Gongzhong Ming wishes to serve Your Majesty through Gan Mao." The King of Qin is furious at Gan Mao, and so Chuli Ji is greatly pleased with Du Liao.

Notes

1context

Du He's statement is carefully crafted to sound like a loyal gesture while actually deepening the King of Qin's suspicion that Gan Mao has been making private deals with Han. By saying Gongzhong wants to 'serve the king through Gan Mao,' Du He implies that Gan Mao has been acting as a broker between Han and Qin on his own authority — exactly the kind of independent diplomacy that makes rulers paranoid.

2person樗里疾Chūlǐ Jí

Chuli Ji (樗里疾, also known as Lord Yan) was a Qin royal kinsman and rival of Gan Mao. He would naturally welcome any development that undermined Gan Mao's position at court.

秦韓戰於濁澤

Qin and Han Fight at Zhuoze

秦、韓戰於濁澤,韓氏急。公仲明謂韓王曰:「與國不可恃。今秦之心欲伐楚,王不如因張儀為和於秦,賂之以一名都,與之伐楚。此以一易二之計也。」韓王曰:「善。」乃儆公仲之行,將西講於秦。

楚王聞之大恐,召陳軫而告之。陳軫曰:「秦欲伐我久矣,今又得韓之名都一而具甲,秦、韓並兵南鄉,此秦所以廟祠而求也。今已得之矣,楚國必伐矣。王聽臣,為之儆四境之內選師,言救韓,令戰車滿道路;發信臣,多其車,重其幣,使信王之救己也。縱韓為不能聽我,韓必德王也,必不為雁行以來。是秦、韓不和,兵雖至,楚國不大病矣。為能聽我絕和於秦,秦必大怒,以厚怨於韓。韓得楚救,必輕秦。輕秦,其應秦必不敬。是我困秦、韓之兵,而免楚國之患也。」

楚王大說,乃儆四境之內選師,言救韓,發信臣,多其車,重其幣。謂韓王曰:「弊邑雖小,已悉起之矣。願大國遂肆意於秦,弊邑將以楚殉韓。」

韓王大說,乃止公仲。公仲曰:「不可,夫以實告我者,秦也;以虛名救我者,楚也。恃楚之虛名,輕絕強秦之敵,必為天下笑矣。且楚、韓非兄弟之國也,又非素約而謀伐秦矣。秦欲伐楚,楚因以起師言救韓,此必陳軫之謀也。且王已使人報於秦矣,今弗行,是欺秦也。夫輕強秦之禍,而信楚之謀臣,王必悔之矣。」韓王弗聽,遂絕和於秦。秦果大怒,興師與韓氏戰於岸門,楚救不至,韓氏大敗。

韓氏之兵非削弱也,民非蒙愚也,兵為秦禽,智為楚笑,過聽於陳軫,失計於韓明也。

Qin and Han fight at Zhuoze, and Han is in dire straits. Gongzhong Ming says to the King of Han: "Allied states cannot be relied upon. Qin's real desire is to attack Chu. Your Majesty would do well to use Zhang Yi to make peace with Qin, bribe them with one major city, and join them in attacking Chu. This is a plan to trade one for two."

The King of Han says: "Very well." He orders Gongzhong to prepare for the journey west to negotiate with Qin.

The King of Chu hears of this and is greatly alarmed. He summons Chen Zhen and tells him. Chen Zhen says: "Qin has wanted to attack us for a long time. Now it has obtained one of Han's major cities and a fully armed ally. Qin and Han marching south together — this is what Qin has been praying for in its ancestral temples. Now they have it. Chu will certainly be attacked.

"If Your Majesty listens to me: mobilize the army within our four borders and announce that you are going to rescue Han. Fill the roads with war chariots. Send trusted envoys with many carriages and rich gifts, so that Han believes Your Majesty is truly coming to save them.

"Even if Han cannot bring itself to follow us, it will be grateful and will certainly not march against us in formation alongside Qin. If Qin and Han are not united, then even if their forces arrive, Chu will not be seriously harmed.

"If Han does listen to us and breaks off its peace with Qin, Qin will be furious and bitterly resentful toward Han. Having received Chu's rescue, Han will take Qin lightly. Taking Qin lightly, it will respond to Qin disrespectfully. Thus we will have pinned down the forces of both Qin and Han while freeing Chu from danger."

The King of Chu is greatly pleased. He mobilizes the army, announces he will rescue Han, sends trusted envoys with many carriages and rich gifts, and tells the King of Han: "Our humble city is small, but we have called up every last soldier. We beg Your Majesty to stand firm against Qin — our humble city will sacrifice Chu for Han's sake."

The King of Han is greatly pleased and halts Gongzhong's mission. Gongzhong says: "This is a mistake. What Qin has told us is real; what Chu offers is an empty promise. To rely on Chu's empty promise and rashly break off relations with mighty Qin — we will become the laughingstock of All-Under-Heaven.

"Chu and Han are not brother states, nor have they ever had a standing agreement to attack Qin together. Qin wants to attack Chu, and Chu raises an army claiming to rescue Han — this is surely a scheme of Chen Zhen's.

"Moreover, Your Majesty has already sent word to Qin. To reverse course now is to deceive Qin. To take lightly the wrath of mighty Qin and trust in Chu's strategist — Your Majesty will regret it."

The King of Han does not listen and breaks off the peace with Qin. Qin is indeed furious, raises an army, and fights Han at Anmen. Chu's rescue does not come. Han is badly defeated.

Han's army was not weak, and its people were not stupid. Its soldiers were captured by Qin and its strategy mocked by Chu — because it heeded Chen Zhen's words and rejected Gongzhong Ming's counsel.

Notes

1context

This is one of the Zhanguoce's most celebrated episodes and a masterclass in strategic deception. Chen Zhen's plan is breathtakingly cynical: he never intends to rescue Han. The entire rescue mobilization is theater — 'fill the roads with war chariots,' send lavish gifts — designed to trick Han into burning its bridges with Qin. Once Han has antagonized Qin, Chu quietly stays home and lets Han take the beating. The narrator's concluding verdict makes the moral explicit, which is unusual for the Zhanguoce.

2context

Gongzhong Ming sees through the deception completely. His analysis is correct on every point: Chu's offer is empty, the scheme bears Chen Zhen's fingerprints, and breaking with Qin will be catastrophic. But the King of Han, seduced by Chu's extravagant promises, ignores his most competent advisor. This is the essential Han tragedy: the right counsel exists but is not followed.

3place

Zhuoze (濁澤) and Anmen (岸門) are battlefields in the Han-Qin border region, both in modern Henan.

顏率見公仲

Yan Shuai Calls on Gongzhong

顏率見公仲,公仲不見。顏率謂公仲之謁者曰:「公仲必以率為陽也,故不見率也。公仲好內,率曰好士;仲嗇於財,率曰散施;公仲無行,率曰好義。自今以來,率且正言之而已矣。」公仲之謁者以告公仲,公仲遽起而見之。

Yan Shuai calls on Gongzhong, but Gongzhong refuses to see him. Yan Shuai says to Gongzhong's gatekeeper: "Gongzhong must think I am a flatterer — that is why he refuses to see me. Gongzhong is lecherous, but I have been saying he loves talented men. He is stingy with money, but I have been saying he is generous. He has no integrity, but I have been saying he loves righteousness. From now on, I will simply tell the truth."

The gatekeeper reports this to Gongzhong. Gongzhong leaps up and receives him at once.

Notes

1context

A perfect little comedy in four sentences. Yan Shuai's threat is entirely credible because his flattery inventory doubles as a devastatingly accurate character assassination — he has just told the gatekeeper (and through the gatekeeper, Gongzhong) exactly what Gongzhong's real vices are while ostensibly lamenting his own past dishonesty. Gongzhong's panicked rush to the door tells you he understood the implied threat perfectly.

韓公仲謂向壽

Han's Gongzhong Addresses Xiang Shou

韓公仲謂向壽曰:「禽困覆車。公破韓,辱公仲,公仲收國復事秦,自以為必可以封。今公與楚解口,中封小令尹以桂陽。秦、楚合,復攻韓,韓必亡。公仲躬率其私徒以鬭於秦,願公之熟計之也。」向壽曰:「吾合秦、楚,非以當韓也,子為我謁之。」

公仲曰:「秦、韓之交可合也。」對曰:「甘茂許公仲以武遂,反宜陽之民,今公徒令收之,甚難。」向子曰:「然則奈何?武遂終不可得已。」對曰:「公何不以秦為韓求潁川於楚,此乃韓之寄地也。公求而得之,是令行於楚而以其地德韓也。公求而弗得,是韓、楚之怨不解,而交走秦也。秦、楚爭強,而公過楚以攻韓,此利於秦。」向子曰:「奈何?」對曰:「此善事也。甘茂欲以魏取齊,公孫郝欲以韓取齊,今公取宜陽以為功,收楚、韓以安之,而誅齊、魏之罪,是以公孫郝、甘茂之無事也。」

Han's Gongzhong says to Xiang Shou: "A cornered beast will overturn a cart. You have crushed Han and humiliated Gongzhong. Gongzhong reassembled the state and resumed serving Qin, believing he would certainly be rewarded with a fief. Now you have made peace with Chu and received the title of Minor Chief Minister along with Guiyang as your fief. If Qin and Chu unite and attack Han again, Han will certainly be destroyed. Gongzhong will personally lead his private retainers to fight Qin to the death. I urge you to think carefully."

Xiang Shou says: "My alliance with Chu is not aimed at Han. Speak to Gongzhong on my behalf."

Gongzhong says: "The Qin-Han relationship can be restored."

The reply comes: "Gan Mao promised Gongzhong the city of Wusui and the return of Yiyang's population. Now you simply order their recovery — that is very difficult."

Xiang Shou says: "Then what? Is Wusui truly beyond reach?"

The reply: "Why not have Qin demand Yingchuan from Chu on Han's behalf? This is territory Han has deposited with Chu. If you obtain it, your authority extends over Chu and you earn Han's gratitude. If you fail, then the enmity between Han and Chu remains unresolved, and both will rush to serve Qin. If Qin and Chu compete for dominance while you pressure Chu on behalf of Han — this benefits Qin."

Xiang Shou says: "How should this be done?"

The reply: "This is straightforward. Gan Mao wants to use Wei to gain Qi. Gongsun Hao wants to use Han to gain Qi. Now if you take credit for Yiyang, rally Chu and Han to stability, and punish Qi and Wei — you render both Gongsun Hao and Gan Mao irrelevant."

Notes

1person向壽Xiàng Shòu

Xiang Shou (向壽) was a Qin minister who brokered the Qin-Chu rapprochement. Gongzhong's threat — that a cornered Han will fight with suicidal desperation — invokes the proverb about a trapped animal overturning a hunter's cart.

2context

The strategic logic here is dense but the core move is clever: demand territory from Chu on Han's behalf, so that success earns Qin gratitude from Han, and failure deepens the Han-Chu rift and drives both toward Qin. It is a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose proposition, and it also happens to undercut Xiang Shou's rivals at the Qin court.

或謂公仲曰聽者聽國

Someone Tells Gongzhong: 'Those Who Listen, Listen to the State'

或謂公仲曰:「聽者聽國,非必聽實也。故先生聽諺言於市,願公之聽臣言也。公求中立於秦,而弗能得也,善公孫郝以難甘茂,劫齊兵以止魏,楚、趙皆公之讎也。臣恐國之以此為患也,願公之復求中立於秦也。」

公仲曰:「奈何?」對曰:「秦王以公孫郝為黨於公而弗之聽,甘茂不善於公而弗為公言,公何不因行願以與秦王語?行願之為秦王臣也忠,臣請為公謂秦王曰:『齊、魏合與離,於秦孰利?齊、魏別與合,於秦孰強?』秦王必曰:『齊、魏離,則秦重;合,則秦輕。齊、魏別,則秦強;合,則秦弱。』臣即曰:『今王聽公孫郝以韓、秦之兵合齊而攻魏,魏不敢戰,歸地而合於齊,是秦輕也,臣以公孫郝為不忠。今王聽甘茂,以韓、秦之兵據魏而攻齊,齊不敢戰,不求割地而合於魏,是秦輕也,臣以甘茂為不忠。故王不如令韓中立以攻齊,齊王言救魏以勁之,齊、魏不能相聽,久必兵交。王欲,則信公孫郝於齊,為韓取南陽以歸,此惠王之願也。王欲,則信甘茂於魏,以韓、秦之兵據魏以隙齊,此武王之願也。臣以為令韓以中立以勁齊,最秦之大急也。公孫郝黨於齊而不肯言,甘茂薄而不敢謁也,此二人,王之大患也。願王之熟計之也。』」

Someone says to Gongzhong: "Those who listen should listen to what benefits the state, not necessarily to what is literally true. Even a wise man listens to proverbs in the marketplace. I hope you will hear my words.

"You sought neutral status from Qin and could not obtain it. You cultivated Gongsun Hao to obstruct Gan Mao, seized Qi's troops to stop Wei — but Chu and Zhao are both your enemies. I fear the state will suffer from this. I urge you to seek neutral status from Qin once more."

Gongzhong says: "How?"

The advisor replies: "The King of Qin considers Gongsun Hao your partisan and does not listen to him. Gan Mao is on bad terms with you and will not speak on your behalf. Why not use Xing Yuan to communicate with the King of Qin? Xing Yuan is a loyal minister of the Qin king.

"Allow me to say to the King of Qin on your behalf: 'Is it more advantageous for Qin that Qi and Wei be united or separated? Is Qin stronger when Qi and Wei are divided or combined?'

The King of Qin will certainly say: 'When Qi and Wei are divided, Qin's weight increases; when united, it decreases. When Qi and Wei are separated, Qin is strong; when combined, Qin is weak.'

Then I will say: 'If Your Majesty listens to Gongsun Hao and uses Han and Qin's troops to join Qi in attacking Wei, Wei will not dare fight, will cede territory and unite with Qi — and Qin's weight decreases. I consider Gongsun Hao disloyal.

'If Your Majesty listens to Gan Mao and uses Han and Qin's troops to hold Wei while attacking Qi, Qi will not dare fight, will seek no territory but unite with Wei — and Qin's weight decreases. I consider Gan Mao disloyal.

'Therefore, Your Majesty should order Han to remain neutral and pressure Qi. The King of Qi will claim to rescue Wei to strengthen it, but Qi and Wei cannot cooperate — eventually they will fight each other.

'If Your Majesty wishes, trust Gongsun Hao's position in Qi and recover Nanyang for Han — this was King Hui's wish. If Your Majesty wishes, trust Gan Mao's position in Wei and use Han-Qin forces to drive a wedge between Wei and Qi — this was King Wu's wish.

'I believe that ordering Han to remain neutral to pressure Qi is Qin's most urgent priority. Gongsun Hao is partial to Qi and will not say this; Gan Mao has too little influence and dares not present it. These two men are Your Majesty's greatest problems. I urge Your Majesty to consider carefully.'"

Notes

1context

This is an extraordinarily convoluted piece of strategic reasoning, but the core argument is actually quite sharp: both Gongsun Hao and Gan Mao's preferred strategies (ally with Qi against Wei, or vice versa) inevitably result in the target state capitulating and joining the other — which always makes Qin relatively weaker. The better play is to keep Han neutral, let Qi and Wei exhaust each other, and then pick up the pieces. The advisor is essentially proposing a balance-of-power strategy to replace Qin's usual brute-force approach.

韓公仲相

Gongzhong Serves as Han's Chancellor

韓公仲相。齊、楚之交善。秦、魏遇,且以善齊而絕齊於楚。王使景鯉之秦,鯉與於秦、魏之遇。楚王怒景鯉,恐齊以楚遇為有陰於秦、魏也,且罪景鯉。

謂楚王曰:「臣賀鯉之與於遇也。秦、魏之遇也,將以合齊、秦而絕齊於楚也。今鯉與於遇,齊無以信魏之合己於秦而攻於楚也,齊又畏楚之有陰於秦、魏也,必重楚。故鯉之與於遇,王之大資也。今鯉不與於遇,魏之絕齊於楚明矣。齊、楚信之,必輕王,故王不如無罪景鯉,以示齊於有秦、魏,齊必重楚,而且疑秦、魏於齊。」王曰:「諾。」因不罪而益其列。

Gongzhong serves as chancellor of Han. The relationship between Qi and Chu is good. Qin and Wei hold a summit, intending to court Qi and separate it from Chu. The King of Chu sends Jing Li to Qin. Jing Li participates in the Qin-Wei summit. The King of Chu is angry at Jing Li, fearing that Qi will interpret Chu's presence at the summit as evidence of a secret understanding with Qin and Wei, and prepares to punish Jing Li.

Someone tells the King of Chu: "I congratulate Jing Li on participating in the summit. The purpose of the Qin-Wei meeting was to unite Qi with Qin and sever Qi from Chu. Now that Jing Li participated, Qi has no reason to believe Wei is allying it with Qin against Chu. Moreover, Qi will fear that Chu has a secret understanding with Qin and Wei, and will therefore value Chu more highly.

Jing Li's participation at the summit is Your Majesty's greatest asset. Had Jing Li not participated, Wei's intention to separate Qi from Chu would have been obvious. Once Qi and Chu believe it, they will take Your Majesty lightly.

Therefore, do not punish Jing Li. Use his presence to signal to Qi that you have ties with Qin and Wei. Qi will value Chu more, and will also become suspicious of Qin and Wei's relationship with Qi."

The king says: "Agreed." He does not punish Jing Li and even promotes him.

Notes

1context

A case study in how diplomatic signals can be reinterpreted. What looked like a blunder (a Chu envoy showing up at an anti-Chu summit) gets reframed as a deliberate display of Chu's multi-directional diplomacy. The advisor's insight is that in a world of imperfect information, ambiguity is an asset — let everyone suspect you have options. This passage appears in the Han chapter probably because it affects the larger Qin-Chu-Han triangle.

王曰向也子曰天下無道

The King Says: 'Earlier You Said All-Under-Heaven Lacks the Way'

王曰:「向也子曰『天下無道。』今也子曰『乃且攻奄』者,何也?」對曰:「今謂馬多力則有矣,若曰勝千鈞則不然者,何也?夫千鈞,非馬之任也。今謂楚強大則有矣,若夫越趙、魏而鬭於燕,則豈楚之任也哉?且非楚之任,而楚為之,是弊楚也。強楚、弊楚,其於王孰便也?」

The king says: "Earlier you said 'All-Under-Heaven lacks the Way.' Now you say 'We should attack Yan.' Why the contradiction?"

The reply: "If someone says a horse has great strength — yes, that is so. But if they say the horse can carry a thousand jun — that is not so. Why? Because a thousand jun is not within a horse's capacity.

Similarly, if someone says Chu is powerful — yes, that is so. But can Chu leap over Zhao and Wei to fight Yan? That is surely not within Chu's capacity. If something is beyond Chu's capacity and Chu does it anyway, it exhausts Chu. A strong Chu or an exhausted Chu — which is more convenient for Your Majesty?"

Notes

1context

The horse metaphor is elegant: a horse is strong, but even a strong horse has limits. Chu overextending itself to attack distant Yan would be a gift to Han (and to whoever the 'king' is here — probably the King of Han). The advisor is arguing that Chu's adventurism is good for Han precisely because it will exhaust Chu.

或謂魏王王儆四疆之內

Someone Tells the King of Wei to Mobilize Within His Borders

或謂魏王:「王儆四疆之內,其從於王者,十一日之內,陂不具者死。王因取其游之舟上擊之。臣為王之楚,王胥臣反,乃行。」春申君聞之,謂使者曰:「子為我反,無見王矣。十日之內,數萬之眾,今涉魏境。」秦使聞之,以告秦王。秦王謂魏王曰:「大國有意,必來以是而足矣。」

Someone tells the King of Wei: "Mobilize within your four borders. All who follow your orders — within eleven days, anyone whose dikes are not completed shall be executed. Then seize their pleasure boats to strike from the river. I will go to Chu on Your Majesty's behalf. Wait for my return before marching."

The Lord of Chunshen hears of this and tells the envoy: "Go back for me. Do not see the king. Within ten days, tens of thousands of troops will be crossing into Wei's territory."

A Qin envoy hears of this and reports it to the King of Qin. The King of Qin tells the King of Wei: "If the great state has such intentions, this demonstration alone is sufficient."

Notes

1person春申君Chūnshēn Jūn

The Lord of Chunshen (春申君, d. 238 BC) was one of the 'Four Lords' of the Warring States — Chu's most prominent noble patron. His rapid mobilization threat shows Chu's ability to project force into the Central Plain.

觀鞅謂春申

Guan Yang Addresses the Lord of Chunshen

觀鞅謂春申曰:「人皆以楚為強,而君用之弱,其於鞅也不然。先君者,二十餘年未嘗見攻。今秦欲逾兵於澠隘之塞,不使;假道兩周倍韓以攻楚,不可。今則不然,魏且旦暮亡矣,不能愛其許、鄢陵與梧,割以予秦去百六十里。臣之所見者,秦、楚鬭之日也已。」

Guan Yang says to the Lord of Chunshen: "Everyone considers Chu strong, yet under your leadership it grows weak. In my view, this need not be so. Under the former ruler, Chu was not attacked for over twenty years. Qin wanted to march through the narrow pass of Mianchi but could not; it tried to borrow passage through the two Zhou states and cross Han's territory to attack Chu, but that too was impossible.

Now things are different. Wei is on the verge of collapse any day now. Unable to hold Xu, Yanling, and Wu, it cedes them to Qin — one hundred and sixty li closer. What I foresee is the day when Qin and Chu must fight."

Notes

1context

Guan Yang's analysis is chilling in its clarity: as the buffer states between Qin and Chu collapse, the geographic barriers that kept Chu safe are disappearing. Wei's territorial concessions bring Qin's front line 160 li closer to Chu. The protective geography that made Chu invulnerable for twenty years is being eaten away, and a direct Qin-Chu confrontation is now inevitable. This is essentially a prediction of the fall of Chu — which did happen, in 223 BC.

公仲數不信於諸侯

Gongzhong Has Repeatedly Broken Faith with the Feudal Lords

公仲數不信於諸侯,諸侯錮之。南委國於楚,楚王弗聽。蘇代為楚王曰:「不若聽而備於其反也。明之反也,常仗趙而畔楚,仗齊而畔秦。今四國錮之,而無所入矣,亦臣患之。此方其為尾生之時也。」

Gongzhong has repeatedly broken faith with the feudal lords, and they have all cut him off. He entrusts the state southward to Chu, but the King of Chu refuses to listen.

Su Dai tells the King of Chu: "You would do better to accept his submission while preparing for his betrayal. In the past, Gongzhong Ming relied on Zhao to betray Chu, and relied on Qi to betray Qin. Now all four states have shut him out and he has nowhere to turn — even I worry about him. This is his 'Wei Sheng moment' — the one time he actually has to keep his word."

Notes

1person蘇代Sū Dài

Su Dai (蘇代) was Su Qin's younger brother, also an itinerant strategist. He appears frequently in the later Zhanguoce chapters.

2context

Wei Sheng (尾生) was a legendary figure who promised to meet a woman under a bridge. When she did not come and the water rose, he clung to the bridge pillar and drowned rather than break his word. Su Dai's argument is darkly witty: Gongzhong, the most untrustworthy man in the Warring States, has finally been boxed in to the point where he has to be reliable — because nobody else will have him. It is trustworthiness born of desperation rather than virtue.

Edition & Source

Text
《戰國策》 Zhanguoce
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
Commentary
鮑彪 (Bao Biao) Song dynasty commentary