秦策一 (Stratagems of Qin, Part One) — Chinese ink painting

Chapter 3 of 33 · Qin state

秦策一

Stratagems of Qin, Part One

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衛鞅亡魏入秦

Wei Yang Flees Wei and Enters Qin

衛鞅亡魏入秦,孝公以為相,封之於商,號曰商君。商君治秦,法令至行,公平無私,罰不諱強大,賞不私親近,法及太子,黥劓其傅。期年之後,道不拾遺,民不妄取,兵革大強,諸侯畏懼。然刻深寡恩,特以強服之耳。孝公行之八年,疾且不起,欲傳商君,辭不受。孝公已死,惠王代後,蒞政有頃,商君告歸。人說惠王曰:「大臣太重者國危,左右太親者身危。今秦婦人嬰兒皆言商君之法,莫言大王之法。是商君反為主,大王更為臣也。且夫商君,固大王仇讎也,願大王圖之。」商君歸還,惠王車裂之,而秦人不憐。

Wei Yang fled Wei and entered Qin. Duke Xiao made him chancellor and enfeoffed him at Shang, whence he was called Lord Shang.

Lord Shang governed Qin: his laws were enforced to the letter, impartially and without favoritism. Punishments did not spare the powerful; rewards did not favor the well-connected. The law reached even the Crown Prince — his tutor was branded and had his nose cut off. After a year, people did not pick up lost goods on the road and the people did not steal. The army grew tremendously powerful, and the feudal lords trembled.

Yet he was harsh, exacting, and sparing of clemency — he compelled obedience through force alone.

Duke Xiao had been implementing his system for eight years when he fell gravely ill. He wished to pass the throne to Lord Shang, but Lord Shang declined. After Duke Xiao died, King Hui succeeded him. Shortly after taking power, Lord Shang asked leave to retire to his estate.

Someone said to King Hui: "When a minister is too powerful, the state is in danger. When those close to the ruler are too intimate, the ruler's person is in danger. Today every woman and child in Qin speaks of Lord Shang's laws — no one speaks of Your Majesty's laws. Lord Shang has become the true sovereign, and Your Majesty has become the subject. Moreover, Lord Shang has always been Your Majesty's personal enemy. We urge you to act."

When Lord Shang returned, King Hui had him torn apart by chariots. The people of Qin did not pity him.

Notes

1person商鞅Shāng Yāng

Wei Yang (衛鞅), later known as Lord Shang or Shang Yang (商鞅, c. 390–338 BC), was the architect of Qin's Legalist transformation. Originally from Wei, he served Duke Xiao of Qin (秦孝公, r. 361–338 BC) and implemented sweeping legal, agricultural, and military reforms that made Qin the dominant state.

2person秦孝公Qín Xiào Gōng

Duke Xiao of Qin (秦孝公, r. 361–338 BC) actively recruited talent from other states and gave Shang Yang the authority to remake Qin's institutions.

3person秦惠文王Qín Huìwén Wáng

King Hui of Qin (秦惠文王, r. 337–311 BC), also called King Huiwen. As Crown Prince he had personally suffered under Shang Yang's laws — the punishment of his tutor was directed at him. His revenge was long deferred but total.

4context

The final sentence — 'The people of Qin did not pity him' — is devastating. Shang Yang built the system that made Qin supreme, but his reforms were so impersonal and pitiless that no one mourned their author. He engineered his own irrelevance: a state governed entirely by law has no need to remember the lawgiver.

5translation

車裂 (chē liè) — 'chariot-tearing' — was an execution method in which the victim's limbs were tied to multiple chariots or oxen that were then driven apart. It was reserved for the most heinous crimes or the most dangerous political enemies.

蘇秦始將連橫說秦惠王

Su Qin First Proposes the East-West Alliance to King Hui of Qin

蘇秦始將連橫,說秦惠王曰:「大王之國,西有巴、蜀、漢中之利,北有胡貉、代馬之用,南有巫山、黔中之限,東有餚、函之固。田肥美,民殷富,戰車萬乘,奮擊百萬,沃野千里,蓄積饒多,地勢形便,此所謂天府,天下之雄國也。以大王之賢,士民之眾,車騎之用,兵法之教,可以並諸侯,吞天下,稱帝而治,願大王少留意,臣請奏其效。」

秦王曰:「寡人聞之,毛羽不豐滿者不可以高飛,文章不成者不可以誅罰,道德不厚者不可以使民,政教不順者不可以煩大臣。今先生儼然不遠千里而庭教之,願以異日。」蘇秦曰:「臣固疑大王不能用也。昔者神農伐補遂,黃帝伐涿鹿而禽蚩尤,堯伐驩兜,舜伐三苗,禹伐共工,湯伐有夏,文王伐崇,武王伐紂,齊桓任戰而伯天下。由此觀之,惡有不戰者乎?古者使車轂擊馳,言語相結,天下為一;約從連橫,兵革不藏;文士並飾,諸侯亂惑;萬端俱起,不可勝理;科條既備,民多偽態;書策稠濁,百姓不足;上下相愁,民無所聊;明言章理,兵甲愈起;辯言偉服,戰攻不息;繁稱文辭,天下不治;舌弊耳聾,不見成功;行義約信,天下不親。於是,乃廢文任武,厚養死士,綴甲厲兵,效勝於戰場。夫徒處而致利,安坐而廣地,雖古五帝、三王、五伯,明主賢君,常欲坐而致之,其勢不能,故以戰續之。寬則兩軍相攻,迫則杖戟相橦,然後可建大功。是故兵勝於外,義強於內;武立於上,民服於下。今欲並天下,凌萬乘,詘敵國,制海內,子元元,臣諸侯,非兵不可!今之嗣主,忽於至道,皆惛於教,亂於治,迷於言,惑於語,沈於辯,溺於辭。以此論之,王固不能行也。」

說秦王書十上而說不行。黑貂之裘弊,黃金百斤盡,資用乏絕,去秦而歸。羸縢履蹻,負書擔橐,形容枯槁,面目犁黑,狀有歸色。歸至家,妻不下紝,嫂不為炊,父母不與言。蘇秦喟歎曰:「妻不以我為夫,嫂不以我為叔,父母不以我為子,是皆秦之罪也。」乃夜發書,陳篋數十,得《太公陰符》之謀,伏而誦之,簡練以為揣摩。讀書欲睡,引錐自刺其股,血流至足。曰:「安有說人主不能出其金玉錦繡,取卿相之尊者乎?」期年揣摩成,曰:「此真可以說當世之君矣!」

於是乃摩燕烏集闕,見說趙王於華屋之下,抵掌而談。趙王大悅,封為武安君。受相印,革車百乘,錦繡千純,白璧百雙,黃金萬溢,以隨其後,約從散橫,以抑強秦。故蘇秦相於趙而關不通。當此之時,天下之大,萬民之眾,王侯之威,謀臣之權,皆欲決蘇秦之策。不費斗糧,未煩一兵,未張一士,未絕一弦,未折一矢,諸侯相親,賢於兄弟。夫賢人在而天下服,一人用而天下從。故曰:式於政,不式於勇;式於廊廟之內,不式於四境之外。當秦之隆,黃金萬溢為用,轉轂連騎,炫熿於道,山東之國,從風而服,使趙大重。且夫蘇秦特窮巷掘門、桑戶棬樞之士耳,伏軾撙銜,橫歷天下,廷說諸侯之王,杜左右之口,天下莫之能伉。

將說楚王路過洛陽,父母聞之,清宮除道,張樂設飲,郊迎三十里。妻側目而視,傾耳而聽;嫂蛇行匍伏,四拜自跪而謝。蘇秦曰:「嫂,何前倨而後卑也?」嫂曰:「以季子之位尊而多金。」蘇秦曰:「嗟乎!貧窮則父母不子,富貴則親戚畏懼。人生世上,勢位富貴,蓋可忽乎哉!」

Su Qin initially promoted the east-west alignment and addressed King Hui of Qin:

"Your Majesty's state has the riches of Ba, Shu, and Hanzhong to the west; the war horses and furs of the Hu and Mo peoples to the north; the barrier of Mount Wu and Qianzhong to the south; and the fortress of Yao and Hangu to the east. The fields are lush, the people prosperous, war chariots number ten thousand, crack troops a million, fertile plains stretch a thousand li, and stores are abundant. The terrain gives every advantage. This is what they call the Heavenly Storehouse — the mightiest state under heaven.

"With Your Majesty's wisdom, the multitude of your people, the strength of your cavalry, and the training of your armies, you could annex the feudal lords, swallow All-Under-Heaven, and reign as emperor. I beg Your Majesty to give this a moment's consideration, and I will demonstrate how it can be done."

The King of Qin replied: "I have heard it said: a bird whose feathers are not yet full cannot fly high; a text whose patterns are incomplete cannot be used to govern; one whose virtue is not deep cannot command the people; one whose policies are not sound cannot trouble his ministers. Now you have traveled a thousand li to lecture me at court. Let us discuss this another day."

Su Qin said: "I rather suspected Your Majesty would not act. In ancient times, Shennong attacked Busui, the Yellow Emperor attacked Zhuolu and captured Chiyou, Yao attacked Huandou, Shun attacked the Three Miao, Yu attacked Gonggong, Tang attacked the Xia, King Wen attacked Chong, King Wu attacked Zhou, and Duke Huan of Qi relied on war to become hegemon of All-Under-Heaven. Considering all this, when has there ever been a ruler who did not fight?

"In antiquity, chariot hubs clashed as diplomats raced between states, words were exchanged and alliances tied, and the world was briefly unified. North-south coalitions and east-west alignments arose; weapons were never put away. Scholars competed in rhetoric; the lords were bewildered. A myriad schemes sprang up beyond anyone's ability to manage. Regulations multiplied, but the people grew deceitful. Documents piled up, but the people had not enough. High and low worried alike, and the people had nothing to live for. The more clearly principles were articulated, the more armies arose. The more eloquent the speakers and imposing their dress, the more wars were fought. The more elaborate the formulations, the worse the disorder. Tongues wore out and ears went deaf, yet no results appeared. Righteousness was practiced and good faith pledged, yet the world grew no closer.

"At that point, rulers abandoned civil arts and relied on military force, lavished rewards on men willing to die, mended armor and sharpened weapons, and sought victory on the battlefield. To sit idle and gain profit, to remain at ease and expand territory — even the Five Emperors, Three Kings, and Five Hegemons, those wise rulers and worthy lords, always wished to achieve this from their seats, but circumstance would not permit it. So they continued through war.

"When there is space, two armies clash across fields. When the space is narrow, spear and halberd collide at close range. Only then can great deeds be accomplished. Thus: victory abroad, and justice strengthened at home; martial authority above, and the people submissive below.

"Now, to annex All-Under-Heaven, to overpower ten-thousand-chariot states, to subdue rival kingdoms, to master all within the seas, to nurture the black-haired people, to make vassals of the lords — this cannot be done without war! Yet today's successor-kings neglect the highest Way. They are muddled in their teaching, disordered in their governance, lost in their speech, confused by language, drowned in debate, and swamped by rhetoric. By this reasoning, Your Majesty has clearly decided not to act."

Su Qin submitted memorials to the King of Qin ten times, but his proposals were not adopted. His black sable coat wore out. His hundred catties of gold were spent. His resources utterly exhausted, he left Qin and went home.

In tattered leggings and straw sandals, shouldering his books and carrying his bags, haggard and gaunt, his face dark and weathered, he bore the unmistakable look of a man who has failed. When he arrived home, his wife did not stop her weaving, his sister-in-law did not cook for him, and his parents would not speak to him.

Su Qin sighed deeply: "My wife does not regard me as a husband, my sister-in-law does not regard me as a brother-in-law, my parents do not regard me as a son — all this is Qin's fault!"

That night he opened his books and spread out dozens of trunks until he found the Taigong's Secret Talisman. He bent over it, memorizing and reciting, selecting and distilling its principles for strategic analysis. When his reading made him drowsy, he took an awl and stabbed himself in the thigh. Blood ran down to his feet. He said: "How can there be a man who cannot persuade a ruler to part with gold, jade, and embroidered silks, or attain the dignity of minister and chancellor?"

After a year his study was complete. He said: "Now I truly can persuade the rulers of this age!"

Thereupon he went to the Wuji Gate of Yan, then presented himself to the King of Zhao beneath the ornate hall, and spoke with animated gestures. The King of Zhao was greatly pleased and made him Lord of Wu'an. He received the seal of chancellor, a hundred leather-covered chariots, a thousand bolts of embroidered silk, a hundred pairs of white jade discs, and ten thousand yi of gold — all following in his train. He forged the north-south coalition and dissolved the east-west alignment to check mighty Qin.

And so, while Su Qin served as chancellor in Zhao, the passes were closed to Qin. At that time, vast as All-Under-Heaven was, numerous as its people were, awesome as its kings and lords were, powerful as its strategists were — all wished to stake their fates on Su Qin's strategy. Without expending a bushel of grain, without mobilizing a single soldier, without stringing a single bow, without snapping a single arrow, the feudal lords became closer than brothers.

When a worthy man appears, the world submits. When one man is employed, the world follows. Hence it is said: master politics, not courage; master the court, not the frontier. At the height of Su Qin's power, ten thousand yi of gold were at his disposal; his wheeled carriages and mounted escorts dazzled the road. The states east of the mountains bowed before him like grass before the wind, and Zhao grew enormously important.

And yet Su Qin was nothing but a scholar from a narrow alley with a worn-out gate, a mulberry-wood door and a bent hinge — who rode in chariots, held the reins of power, traversed All-Under-Heaven horizontally, lectured the kings of the feudal lords in their own courts, and silenced their attendants. No one in the world could match him.

When he was on his way to persuade the King of Chu and passed through Luoyang, his parents heard of his coming. They swept the house and cleared the road, set out musicians and prepared a banquet, and went out thirty li to welcome him in the suburbs. His wife looked at him sidelong and listened intently. His sister-in-law crawled forward on her belly, bowed four times, knelt, and begged his forgiveness.

Su Qin said: "Sister-in-law, why so arrogant before and so humble now?"

She said: "Because your position is lofty and your gold is plentiful."

Su Qin sighed: "Alas! In poverty, even your parents disown you. In wealth and rank, even distant relatives are in awe. When a man lives in this world, can power, position, wealth, and rank ever be taken lightly?"

Notes

1person蘇秦Sū Qín

Su Qin (蘇秦, d. 284 BC) was the legendary architect of the north-south anti-Qin coalition (合縱). Ironically, his first pitch to King Hui of Qin was for the opposite policy — the east-west alignment (連橫). Only after Qin rejected him did he switch to the coalition strategy.

2place

Ba (巴) and Shu (蜀) correspond to modern Sichuan and eastern Chongqing. Hanzhong (漢中) is in modern southern Shaanxi. These regions gave Qin its agricultural and strategic depth.

3place

Yao (餚) refers to the Yao Mountains (崤山) in modern Mianchi County, Henan. Together with Hangu Pass they formed Qin's eastern defensive barrier.

4context

The Taigong's Secret Talisman (太公陰符) was a text attributed to Jiang Ziya (Taigong Wang), the strategist who helped King Wu of Zhou overthrow the Shang dynasty. Whether Su Qin actually studied such a text is uncertain, but the narrative establishes the lineage: Su Qin's power derives from ancient strategic wisdom, not mere cleverness.

5context

The awl-in-the-thigh episode (引錐自刺其股) became one of the most famous anecdotes in Chinese culture, paired with Sun Jing's practice of tying his hair to a ceiling beam to stay awake — together they form the idiom 懸梁刺股 ('hanging from the beam, stabbing the thigh'), meaning to study with extreme dedication. Su Qin's story is essentially the Warring States version of a rags-to-riches narrative, complete with the humiliation of family rejection and the vindication of returning in glory.

6person趙肅侯Zhào Sù Hóu

The King of Zhao who appointed Su Qin was King Su of Zhao (趙肅侯, r. 349–326 BC), though some scholars place this event later under King Wuling.

7context

The sister-in-law's blunt final answer — 'Because your position is lofty and your gold is plentiful' — is the emotional climax of the whole narrative. Su Qin wants her to be ashamed; instead she states the transactional reality of family relationships without apology. His closing lament about wealth and status rings slightly hollow given that he spent his entire career pursuing exactly those things.

8place

Wu'an (武安) was a city in modern Wu'an, Hebei. Being enfeoffed as Lord of Wu'an was a signal honor.

秦惠王謂寒泉子

King Hui of Qin Addresses Hanquan Zi

秦惠王謂寒泉子曰:「蘇秦欺寡人,欲以一人之智,反覆山東之君,從以欺秦。趙固負其眾,故先使蘇秦以幣帛約乎諸侯。諸侯不可一,猶連雞之不能俱止於棲之明矣。寡人忿然,含怒日久,吾欲使武安子起往喻意焉。」寒泉子曰:「不可。夫攻城墮邑,請使武安子。善我國家使諸侯,請使客卿張儀。」秦惠王曰:「受命。」

King Hui of Qin said to Hanquan Zi:

"Su Qin has deceived me. He tried to use one man's cleverness to turn the lords east of the mountains against Qin, forming a coalition to cheat us. Zhao relied on its large population and sent Su Qin ahead with gifts to bind the feudal lords in alliance. But uniting the lords is as impossible as tying chickens together and expecting them all to roost at once — that is obvious.

"I have seethed with rage over this for a long time. I want to send the Lord of Wu'an to go and make our position clear."

Hanquan Zi said: "That will not do. For besieging cities and razing towns, send the Lord of Wu'an. For managing our state's diplomacy with the feudal lords, send the visiting minister Zhang Yi."

King Hui said: "I accept your counsel."

Notes

1person寒泉子Hánquán Zǐ

Hanquan Zi (寒泉子) was a Qin advisor, otherwise poorly attested. His name may be a courtesy name or a philosophical sobriquet.

2person張儀Zhāng Yí

Zhang Yi (張儀, d. 309 BC) was the great proponent of the east-west pro-Qin alignment (連橫), and Su Qin's principal rival. Originally from Wei, he served Qin as chief diplomat and was legendarily persuasive.

3context

Hanquan Zi's distinction — generals for fighting, diplomats for diplomacy — seems obvious, but Qin's instinct was to solve every problem with force. The 'tied chickens' metaphor for the coalition is memorable and became a standard criticism of 合縱: the states are too suspicious of each other to act as one.

泠向謂秦王

Ling Xiang Addresses the King of Qin

泠向謂秦王曰:「向欲以齊事王,使攻宋也。宋破,晉國危,安邑王之有也。燕、趙惡齊、秦之合,必割地以交於王矣。齊必重於王,則向之攻宋也,且以恐齊而重王。王何惡向之攻宋乎?向以王之明為先知之,故不言。」

Ling Xiang said to the King of Qin:

"I wished to use Qi to serve Your Majesty's interests by having Qi attack Song. Once Song falls, Wei is endangered, and Anyi becomes yours. Yan and Zhao, alarmed by a Qi-Qin alliance, will cede territory to buy your goodwill. Qi will then depend heavily on you.

"So my encouraging the attack on Song was actually to intimidate Qi while strengthening Your Majesty. Why does Your Majesty disapprove of my promoting the attack on Song? I assumed that with Your Majesty's insight, you would have understood this from the start — which is why I did not explain."

Notes

1person泠向Líng Xiàng

Ling Xiang (泠向) was a strategist serving Qin, otherwise obscure.

2place

Anyi (安邑) was the old capital of Wei, in modern Xia County, Shanxi.

3context

Ling Xiang's final sentence is a classic face-saving maneuver: 'I didn't explain because I assumed you already understood.' In reality, he is being called to account for a policy that looked like it served Qi more than Qin, and this is his retroactive justification.

司馬錯與張儀爭論於秦惠王前

Sima Cuo and Zhang Yi Debate Before King Hui of Qin

司馬錯與張儀爭論於秦惠王前。司馬錯欲伐蜀,張儀曰:「不如伐韓。」王曰:「請聞其說。」對曰:「親魏善楚,下兵三川,塞轘轅、緱氏之口,當屯留之道,魏絕南陽,楚臨南鄭,秦攻新城、宜陽,以臨二周之郊,誅周主之罪,侵楚、魏之地。周自知不救,九鼎寶器必出。據九鼎,按圖籍,挾天子以令天下,天下莫敢不聽,此王業也。今夫蜀,西辟之國,而戎狄之長也,弊兵勞眾不足以成名,得其地不足以為利。臣聞:『爭名者於朝,爭利者於市。』今三川、周室,天下之市朝也。而王不爭焉,顧爭於戎狄,去王業遠矣。」

司馬錯曰:「不然,臣聞之,欲富國者,務廣其地;欲強兵者,務富其民;欲王者,務博其德。三資者備,而王隨之矣。今王之地小民貧,故臣願從事於易。夫蜀,西辟之國也,而戎狄之長,而有桀、紂之亂。以秦攻之,譬如使豺狼逐群羊也。取其地,足以廣國也;得其財,足以富民;繕兵不傷眾,而彼已服矣。故拔一國,而天下不以為暴;利盡西海,諸侯不以為貪。是我一舉而名實兩附,而又有禁暴正亂之名。今攻韓劫天子,劫天子,惡名也,而未必利也,又有不義之名,而攻天下之所不欲,危!臣請謁其故:周,天下之宗室也;齊,韓、周之與國也。周自知失九鼎,韓自知亡三川,則必將二國並力合謀,以因於齊、趙,而求解乎楚、魏。以鼎與楚,以地與魏,王不能禁。此臣所謂危,不如伐蜀之完也。」惠王曰:「善!寡人聽子。」卒起兵伐蜀,十月取之,遂定蜀。蜀主更號為侯,而使陳莊相蜀。蜀既屬,秦益強富厚,輕諸侯。

Sima Cuo and Zhang Yi debated before King Hui of Qin. Sima Cuo wanted to attack Shu. Zhang Yi said: "Better to attack Han."

The king said: "Let me hear the arguments."

Zhang Yi replied: "Befriend Wei, cultivate Chu, send troops into Sanchuan, seal the passes at Huanyuan and Goushi, block the road at Tunliu. Wei will be cut off from Nanyang, Chu will face us at Nanzheng. Qin attacks Xincheng and Yiyang, advances to the outskirts of the two Zhous, punishes the Zhou king for his offenses, and seizes Chu and Wei's territory. Zhou, knowing it cannot be saved, will surrender the Nine Cauldrons and its treasures. Holding the Nine Cauldrons, controlling the maps and records, using the Son of Heaven to command All-Under-Heaven — none will dare disobey. This is the path to kingship.

"Now Shu is a remote western country, chieftain of barbarian peoples. Exhausting troops and wearying the people there will not bring fame; gaining its territory will not bring profit. As the saying goes: 'Those who compete for fame do so at court; those who compete for profit do so at the marketplace.' Sanchuan and the Zhou court are the marketplace and court of All-Under-Heaven. If the king does not compete there but instead competes among barbarians, he is far from the path to kingship."

Sima Cuo said: "Not so. I have heard that one who would enrich a state must expand its territory; one who would strengthen an army must enrich its people; one who would become king must broaden his virtue. When all three resources are in place, kingship follows naturally.

"Now Your Majesty's territory is small and your people poor. I therefore recommend starting with what is easy. Shu is a remote western country, chieftain of barbarian peoples, and currently afflicted by tyranny as bad as Jie or Zhou. For Qin to attack it would be like sending wolves after a flock of sheep. Taking its territory is enough to expand the state; seizing its wealth is enough to enrich the people. We can refurbish our army without suffering casualties, for the enemy will already have submitted.

"Thus we conquer a state without the world considering it violent; we take all the profit to the western sea without the lords considering it greedy. In one stroke we gain both substance and reputation, along with the name of suppressing tyranny and restoring order.

"Attacking Han, by contrast, means coercing the Son of Heaven. Coercing the Son of Heaven is a terrible name to bear, and it may not even succeed. We would earn the name of injustice while attacking what no one in the world wants us to attack — dangerous!

"Let me explain why: Zhou is the ancestral house of All-Under-Heaven. Qi is the ally of both Han and Zhou. If Zhou knows it will lose the Nine Cauldrons, and Han knows it will lose Sanchuan, the two states will combine their strength and conspire together, appeal to Qi and Zhao for help, and seek relief from Chu and Wei. They will offer the cauldrons to Chu and territory to Wei, and Your Majesty will be unable to prevent it. This is what I call dangerous. Better to attack Shu — the safer course."

King Hui said: "Excellent! I accept your counsel." He raised an army and attacked Shu, conquering it in ten months and pacifying the region. The ruler of Shu was demoted to the rank of marquis, and Chen Zhuang was appointed chancellor of Shu. Once Shu was incorporated, Qin grew enormously wealthy and powerful, and looked down on the feudal lords.

Notes

1person司馬錯Sīmǎ Cuò

Sima Cuo (司馬錯) was a Qin general, great-grandfather of the historian Sima Qian. His advocacy for conquering Shu proved to be one of the pivotal strategic decisions of the Warring States period.

2place

Shu (蜀) corresponds to the Chengdu Plain of modern Sichuan. It was an ancient kingdom with its own culture and writing system.

3context

This debate is one of the great strategic arguments in Chinese history, and Sima Cuo won it decisively. Zhang Yi's plan was flashier — seize the Son of Heaven, command All-Under-Heaven — but Sima Cuo's was sounder. Shu provided Qin with the agricultural base (the Chengdu Plain, later irrigated by Li Bing's Dujiangyan) and strategic depth that made its eventual unification of China possible. Zhang Yi was thinking about reputation; Sima Cuo was thinking about calories.

4place

Huanyuan (轘轅) and Goushi (緱氏) were mountain passes south of Luoyang controlling access to the central plains.

5person陳莊Chén Zhuāng

Chen Zhuang (陳莊) was appointed to govern Shu on Qin's behalf after the conquest in 316 BC.

6translation

挾天子以令天下 ('use the Son of Heaven to command All-Under-Heaven') — this phrase, famously associated with Cao Cao a century and a half later, already appears here as Zhang Yi's proposed strategy. It means controlling the nominal sovereign to issue orders in his name.

張儀說秦王

Zhang Yi Addresses the King of Qin

張儀說秦王曰:「臣聞之,弗知而言為不智,知而不言為不忠。為人臣不忠當死,言不審亦當死。雖然,臣願悉言所聞,大王裁其罪。臣聞天下陰燕陽魏,連荊固齊,收餘韓成從,將西南以與秦為難。臣竊笑之。世有三亡,而天下得之,其此之謂乎!臣聞之曰:『以亂攻治者亡,以邪攻正者亡,以逆攻順者亡。』今天下之府庫不盈,囷倉空虛,悉其士民,張軍數千百萬,白刃在前,斧質在後,而皆去走,不能死。罪其百姓不能死也?其上不能殺也。言賞則不與,言罰則不行,賞罰不行,故民不死也。今秦出號令而行賞罰,不攻無攻相事也。出其父母懷衽之中,生未嘗見寇也,聞戰頓足徒裼,犯白刃,蹈煨炭,斷死於前者比是也。夫斷死與斷生也不同,而民為之者,是貴奮也。一可以勝十,十可以勝百,百可以勝千,千可以勝萬,萬可以勝天下矣。今秦地形,斷長續短,方數千里,名師數百萬,秦之號令賞罰,地形利害,天下莫如也。以此與天下,天下不足兼而有也。是知秦戰未嘗不勝,攻未嘗不取,所當未嘗不破也。開地數千里,此甚大功也。然而甲兵頓,士民病,蓄積索,田疇荒,囷倉虛,四鄰諸侯不服,霸王之名不成,此無異故,謀臣皆不盡其忠也。臣敢言往昔。昔者齊南破荊,中破宋,西服秦,北破燕,中使韓、魏之君,地廣而兵強,戰勝攻取,詔令天下,濟清河濁,足以為限,長城鉅防,足以為塞。齊五戰之國也。一戰不勝而無齊。故由此觀之,夫戰者萬乘之存亡也。且臣聞之曰:『削株掘根,無與禍鄰,禍乃不存。』秦與荊人戰,大破荊,襲郢,取洞庭、五都、江南。荊王亡奔走,東伏於陳。當是之時,隨荊以兵,則荊可舉。舉荊,則其民足貪也,地足利也。東以強齊、燕,中陵三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也,四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為,引軍而退,與荊人和。令荊人收亡國,聚散民,立社稷,置宗廟,令帥天下西面以與秦為難,此固已無霸王之道一矣。天下有比志而軍華下,大王以詐破之,兵至梁郭下,圍梁數旬,則梁可拔。拔梁,則魏可舉。舉魏則荊、趙之志絕。荊、趙之志絕,則趙危。趙危而荊孤。東以強齊、燕,中陵三晉。然則是一舉而霸王之名可成也,四鄰諸侯可朝也。而謀臣不為,引軍而退,與魏氏和,令魏氏收亡國,聚散民,立社稷,置宗廟,此固已無霸王之道二矣。前者穰侯之治秦也,用一國之兵,而欲以成兩國之功。是故兵終身暴露於外,士民疲病於內,霸王之名不成,此固已無霸王之道三矣。趙氏,中央之國也,雜民之所居也。其民輕而難用,號令不治,賞罰不信,地形不便,上非能盡其民力。彼固亡國之形也,而不憂民萌。悉其士民,軍於長平之下,以爭韓之上黨。大王以詐破之,拔武安。當是時,趙氏上下不相親也,貴賤不相信也。然則是邯鄲不守。拔邯鄲,管河間,引軍而去,西攻修武,踰羊腸,降代、上黨。代三十六縣,上黨十七縣,不用一領甲,不苦一民,皆秦之有也。代、上黨不戰而已為秦矣,東陽、河外不戰而已反為齊矣,中呼池以北不戰而已為燕矣。然則是舉趙則韓必亡,韓亡則荊、魏不能獨立。荊、魏不能獨立,則是一舉而壞韓,蠹魏,拔荊,以東弱齊、燕,決白馬之口,以流魏氏。一舉而三晉亡,從者敗。大王拱手以須,天下遍隨而伏,霸王之名可成也。而謀臣不為,引軍而退,與趙氏為和。以大王之明,秦兵之強,霸王之業,地尊不可得,乃取欺於亡國,是謀臣之拙也。且夫趙當亡不亡,秦當霸不霸,天下固量秦之謀臣一矣。乃復悉卒以攻邯鄲,不能拔也,棄甲兵怒,戰慄而卻,天下固量秦力二矣。軍乃引退,並於李下,大王又並軍而致與戰,非能厚勝之也,又交罷卻,天下固量秦力三矣。內者量吾謀臣,外者極吾兵力。由是觀之,臣以天下之從,豈其難矣。內者吾甲兵頓,士民病,蓄積索,田疇荒,囷倉虛;外者天下比志甚固。願大王有以慮之也。且臣聞之,戰戰慄慄,日慎一日。苟慎其道,天下可有也。何以知其然也?昔者紂為天子,帥天下將甲百萬,左飲於淇谷,右飲於洹水,淇水竭而洹水不流,以與周武為難。武王將素甲三千領,戰一日,破紂之國,禽其身,據其地,而有其民,天下莫不傷。智伯帥三國之眾,以攻趙襄主於晉陽,決水灌之,三年,城且拔矣。襄主錯龜,數策占兆,以視利害,何國可降,而使張孟談。於是潛行而出,反智伯之約,得兩國之眾,以攻智伯之國,禽其身,以成襄子之功。今秦地斷長續短,方數千里,名師數百萬,秦國號令賞罰,地形利害,天下莫如也。以此與天下,天下可兼而有也。臣昧死望見大王,言所以舉破天下之從,舉趙亡韓,臣荊、魏,親齊、燕,以成霸王之名,朝四鄰諸侯之道。大王試聽其說,一舉而天下之從不破,趙不舉,韓不亡,荊、魏不臣,齊、燕不親,霸王之名不成,四鄰諸侯不朝,大王斬臣以徇於國,以主為謀不忠者。」秦王曰:「寡人聞之遲,請奏其效。」卒用張儀,而蘇秦之從遂散。

Zhang Yi addressed the King of Qin:

"I have heard that to speak without understanding is unwise, and to understand but not speak is disloyal. A disloyal minister deserves death, and imprudent speech also deserves death. Even so, I wish to say all that I know, and let Your Majesty judge my offense.

"I hear that the states are secretly aligning Yan and openly courting Wei, linking Chu and binding Qi, gathering what remains of Han to form a coalition, and preparing to march southwest against Qin. I cannot help but laugh at this.

"There are three paths to destruction, and the world is walking all of them: those who send disorder against order perish; those who send crookedness against straightness perish; those who send defiance against compliance perish.

"Now the other states' treasuries are not full, their granaries are empty. They mobilize their entire populations and field armies of millions, with blades ahead and executioners behind — yet their soldiers all flee and cannot die for their rulers. Is the fault the people's, that they cannot die? No — it is their leaders', who cannot make them. Rewards are promised but not given; punishments are announced but not enforced. When rewards and punishments are not enforced, the people will not die for you.

"Now Qin issues orders and enforces rewards and punishments without fail. Qin's people emerge from their parents' arms never having seen an enemy, yet when they hear of battle they stamp their feet, bare their chests, charge naked blades, and tread on hot coals — those who choose death in the front ranks stand shoulder to shoulder. Choosing death and choosing life are not the same, yet the people do it because they prize the chance to fight.

"One can defeat ten; ten can defeat a hundred; a hundred can defeat a thousand; a thousand can defeat ten thousand; ten thousand can defeat All-Under-Heaven.

"Now Qin's territory, trimmed and squared, extends thousands of li. Its elite troops number millions. Qin's system of orders, rewards, and punishments, its terrain advantages — nothing in the world compares. With these, All-Under-Heaven is not too much to conquer and possess. Qin has never fought without winning, never attacked without taking, never confronted an enemy without breaking it. It has opened up thousands of li of territory — these are enormous achievements.

"Yet the armor is battered, the soldiers are weary, stores are exhausted, fields lie fallow, granaries are empty. The neighboring lords do not submit. The name of hegemon-king is not achieved. There is only one reason: your advisors have not been fully loyal.

"Let me speak of the past. When Qin fought Chu, smashed its forces, stormed Ying, and took Dongting, the Five Capitals, and the lands south of the Yangtze — the King of Chu fled east and hid at Chen. At that moment, had Qin pursued with its army, Chu could have been swallowed whole. To swallow Chu meant gaining its population and its territory — using that strength against Qi and Yan in the east and dominating the Three Jin in the center. One stroke, and the name of hegemon-king could have been achieved; all neighboring lords would have paid court. But the advisors did not pursue it. They withdrew the army and made peace with Chu. They let Chu reassemble its lost state, gather its scattered people, restore its altars and ancestral temples — and then lead All-Under-Heaven west to oppose Qin. This was the first time the path to hegemony was lost.

"When the states united and camped at Hua, Your Majesty defeated them by stratagem. The army reached the walls of Daliang and besieged it for weeks — Daliang could have been taken. Taking Daliang meant conquering Wei. Conquering Wei would have broken Chu and Zhao's resolve. With Chu and Zhao's resolve broken, Zhao would have been in peril, and Chu isolated. In the east you could have dominated Qi and Yan; in the center you could have controlled the Three Jin. One stroke for hegemony. But the advisors withdrew the army and made peace with Wei. This was the second time.

"Earlier, when the Marquis of Rang governed Qin, he used one state's troops trying to achieve two states' objectives. The army was permanently exposed abroad while the people were exhausted at home. The name of hegemon-king was not achieved. This was the third time.

"Zhao is a central state with a mixed population — its people are capricious and hard to control, its orders unenforceable, its rewards and punishments unreliable, its terrain unfavorable. The leadership cannot fully mobilize its people. It bears every mark of a doomed state, yet neglects its people's welfare. Zhao committed its entire population to camp at Changping to contest Han's Shangdang. Your Majesty defeated them by stratagem and took Wu'an.

"At that moment, Zhao's upper and lower ranks were estranged, the noble and base did not trust each other. Handan should not have held. Had you taken Handan, controlled Hejian, then marched west to take Xiuwu, crossed the Yangchang Pass, and accepted the surrender of Dai and Shangdang — Dai's thirty-six counties and Shangdang's seventeen counties, without deploying a single suit of armor, without troubling a single citizen, would all have been Qin's. Dai and Shangdang would have fallen to Qin without a fight. Dongyang and the lands beyond the river would have reverted to Qi without a fight. Huichi and everything north would have gone to Yan without a fight.

"Taking Zhao would have meant Han's destruction. With Han gone, Chu and Wei could not stand alone. In one stroke: destroy Han, cripple Wei, uproot Chu, weaken Qi and Yan in the east, breach the White Horse Ford to flood Wei's lands. One stroke and the Three Jin are finished, the coalition is defeated. Your Majesty could have folded his arms and waited while the world submitted — the name of hegemon-king would have been achieved.

"But the advisors did not do it. They withdrew and made peace with Zhao. With Your Majesty's brilliance and Qin's military strength, the hegemonic enterprise, the honored territory — none of it could be obtained. Instead Qin was cheated by a state that should have perished. This is the incompetence of your advisors.

"Moreover, when Zhao should have perished but did not, and Qin should have become hegemon but did not — the world took the measure of Qin's advisors once. When Qin then threw all its troops at Handan and could not take it, abandoned its armor in fury, and retreated trembling — the world took the measure of Qin's strength twice. When the army withdrew and rallied at Li, and Your Majesty concentrated forces for another battle but could not win a decisive victory, and both sides withdrew exhausted — the world took the measure of Qin's strength a third time.

"Internally they gauge our advisors; externally they test our military power. By this reasoning, I believe the coalition may not be so difficult to form after all. Internally our armor is battered, our people are sick, our stores exhausted, our fields fallow, our granaries empty. Externally the world's resolve is firmly united. I beg Your Majesty to think on this.

"Yet I have also heard: trembling with care, more cautious each day. If one is cautious about the Way, All-Under-Heaven can be possessed. How do I know this? King Zhou of Shang was Son of Heaven, commanding a million armored troops. His army drank the Qi Valley dry on one side and stopped the Huan River's flow on the other — and with that force he opposed King Wu of Zhou. King Wu led three thousand men in plain armor. In one day's battle he destroyed Zhou's state, captured his person, seized his territory, and took his people. The world was shaken.

"Zhi Bo led the combined armies of three states to attack Lord Xiang of Zhao at Jinyang, diverted rivers to flood the city, and after three years the walls were about to fall. Lord Xiang consulted his tortoise shells, cast his divination stalks, read the omens to determine which state to approach — and sent Zhang Mengtian. Zhang went out in secret, reversed Zhi Bo's alliance, won over two states' armies, and attacked Zhi Bo, capturing him and establishing Lord Xiang's glory.

"Now Qin's territory extends thousands of li, its elite troops number millions, and its system of commands, rewards, and punishments, its terrain advantages, are unmatched in the world. With these, All-Under-Heaven can be conquered and possessed.

"I risk death to present myself before Your Majesty. I will explain how to shatter the world's coalition, conquer Zhao, destroy Han, vassalize Chu and Wei, befriend Qi and Yan, achieve the name of hegemon-king, and make all neighboring lords pay court.

"If Your Majesty will try my proposals and in one stroke the coalition is not broken, Zhao is not taken, Han does not fall, Chu and Wei do not submit, Qi and Yan do not befriend us, and the name of hegemon-king is not achieved — then let Your Majesty behead me and parade my corpse through the state as a warning to all who scheme disloyally for their sovereign."

The King of Qin said: "I have heard of this too late. Let us put your plans into effect."

In the end Zhang Yi was employed, and Su Qin's coalition dissolved.

Notes

1person張儀Zhāng Yí

This speech is attributed to Zhang Yi but contains anachronisms — it references events (Changping, 260 BC; the fall of Ying, 278 BC) that occurred decades after Zhang Yi's death (309 BC). The speech was likely composed or heavily reworked by later editors and attributed to Zhang Yi as the emblematic advocate of the east-west alignment.

2person魏冉Wèi Rǎn

The Marquis of Rang (穰侯) is Wei Ran (魏冉, d. 265 BC), maternal uncle of King Zhaoxiang of Qin. He held enormous power as chancellor but was criticized for pursuing personal territorial aggrandizement (his fief at Tao) at the expense of Qin's strategic interests.

3place

Ying (郢) was the Chu capital, located near modern Jiangling, Hubei. Bai Qi sacked it in 278 BC, one of the most devastating defeats in Chu history.

4place

Changping (長平) is in modern Gaoping, Shanxi. The Battle of Changping (260 BC) saw Bai Qi annihilate a Zhao army of reportedly 400,000.

5context

The speech is a remarkable piece of retrospective strategic criticism — essentially a catalogue of Qin's missed opportunities over several decades. The recurring pattern ('the advisors withdrew and made peace') amounts to a devastating indictment of half-measures. Whether or not Zhang Yi actually gave this speech, its argument is sound: Qin repeatedly won battles but failed to exploit victories, allowing defeated states to recover and rearm.

6place

The White Horse Ford (白馬之口) was a crossing point on the Yellow River in modern Hua County, Henan. The proposal to breach it and flood Wei's lands reflects the era's willingness to use hydraulic warfare.

7person智伯Zhì Bó

Zhi Bo (智伯, d. 453 BC) was the head of the Zhi clan who nearly conquered all of Jin. His siege of Jinyang (modern Taiyuan, Shanxi) and its dramatic reversal through the diplomacy of Zhang Mengtian (張孟談) is one of the foundational stories of Warring States strategy.

張儀欲假秦兵以救魏

Zhang Yi Wants to Borrow Qin's Troops to Rescue Wei

張儀欲假秦兵以救魏。左成謂甘茂曰:「子不予之。魏不反秦兵,張子不反秦。魏若反秦兵,張子得志於魏,不敢反於秦矣。張子不去秦,張子必高子。」

Zhang Yi wanted to borrow Qin's troops to rescue Wei. Zuo Cheng said to Gan Mao:

"Do not give them to him. If Wei does not return Qin's troops, Zhang Yi will not return to Qin. If Wei does return the troops, Zhang Yi will have established himself in Wei and will not dare come back to Qin either. If Zhang Yi does not leave Qin, he will certainly be promoted above you."

Notes

1person甘茂Gān Mào

Gan Mao (甘茂) was a Qin chancellor from Xiaqiu (下蔡, modern Fengyang, Anhui). He is best known for the siege of Yiyang. Here he is warned against helping a rival strengthen his position.

2person左成Zuǒ Chéng

Zuo Cheng (左成) was an advisor to Gan Mao, otherwise unknown.

3context

Zuo Cheng's logic is a beautiful miniature of court paranoia: every outcome of lending Zhang Yi the troops is bad for Gan Mao. Zhang Yi either leaves permanently (taking the army), establishes himself elsewhere (no longer a rival but no longer useful), or stays and climbs over Gan Mao. The only winning move is not to play.

張儀之殘樗里疾

Zhang Yi's Scheme Against Chuli Ji

張儀之殘樗里疾也,重而使之楚。因令楚王為之請相於秦。張子謂秦王曰:「重樗里疾而使之者,將以為國交也。今身在楚,楚王因為請相於秦。臣聞其言曰:『王欲窮儀於秦乎?臣請助王。』楚王以為然,故為請相也。今王誠聽之,彼必以國事楚王。」秦王大怒,樗里疾出走。

Zhang Yi schemed to destroy Chuli Ji. He praised Chuli Ji highly and had him sent as envoy to Chu, then arranged for the King of Chu to request that Qin appoint Chuli Ji as chancellor.

Zhang Yi said to the King of Qin: "The reason Chuli Ji was given such an important mission was to conduct state diplomacy. But now that he is in Chu, the King of Chu is requesting that he be made chancellor of Qin. I have heard Chuli Ji say: 'Does the king wish to corner Zhang Yi in Qin? I will help.' The King of Chu agreed, and that is why he made the request for the chancellorship. If Your Majesty grants it, Chuli Ji will serve Chu's interests using our state."

The King of Qin was furious, and Chuli Ji fled.

Notes

1context

This is a textbook frame job. Zhang Yi creates the suspicious circumstances (Chuli Ji in Chu, Chu requesting his promotion), then provides the incriminating interpretation. The beauty of the scheme is that Chuli Ji's innocence is unfalsifiable — the more he protests, the guiltier he looks. Zhang Yi fabricated the damning quote out of whole cloth.

張儀欲以漢中與楚

Zhang Yi Proposes Giving Hanzhong to Chu

張儀欲以漢中與楚,請秦王曰:「有漢中,蠹。種樹不處者,人必害之;家有不宜之財,則傷本。漢中南邊為楚利,此國累也。」甘茂謂王曰:「地大者,固多憂乎!天下有變,王割漢中以為和楚,楚必畔天下而與王。王今以漢中與楚,即天下有變,王何以市楚也?」王乃止。

Zhang Yi wanted to give Hanzhong to Chu. He addressed the King of Qin:

"Possessing Hanzhong is a canker. A tree planted where it does not belong will be damaged by others. Wealth that does not properly belong to a household harms its foundations. Hanzhong's southern border profits Chu — it is a burden on the state."

Gan Mao said to the king: "Is territory always a source of worry just because it is large? If the world changes, Your Majesty could cede Hanzhong to make peace with Chu — and Chu would certainly abandon the other states and side with you. But if you give Hanzhong away now, then when the world changes, what will you have left to buy Chu's loyalty?"

The king dropped the proposal.

Notes

1place

Hanzhong (漢中) is the valley of the upper Han River in modern southern Shaanxi. Qin took it from Chu and it served as a critical link between Qin proper and its territories in Shu (Sichuan).

2context

Gan Mao's counter-argument is simple but lethal: strategic assets are most valuable as bargaining chips precisely when you have not yet spent them. Zhang Yi wants to cash in Hanzhong for goodwill now; Gan Mao points out that holding it in reserve gives Qin permanent leverage. This is options theory avant la lettre.

楚攻魏張儀謂秦王

Chu Attacks Wei; Zhang Yi Addresses the King of Qin

楚攻魏。張儀謂秦王曰:「不如與魏以勁之。魏戰勝,復聽於秦,必入西河之外;不勝,魏不能守,王必取之。」王用儀言,取皮氏卒萬人,車百乘,以與魏。犀首戰勝威王,魏兵罷弊,恐畏秦,果獻西河之外。

Chu attacked Wei. Zhang Yi said to the King of Qin:

"Better to support Wei and strengthen it. If Wei wins, it will return to obedience to Qin and will certainly cede its territory beyond the West River. If it does not win, Wei will be too weak to defend itself, and Your Majesty will simply take what you want."

The king followed Zhang Yi's advice: he took ten thousand soldiers from Pishi and a hundred chariots and gave them to Wei. Xishou defeated King Wei of Chu. Wei's forces were exhausted, and fearing Qin, Wei duly ceded its territory beyond the West River.

Notes

1person公孫衍Gōngsūn Yǎn

Xishou (犀首, 'Rhinoceros Head') was the sobriquet of Gongsun Yan (公孫衍), a major Wei general and diplomat who later promoted the north-south coalition. Here he fights for Wei with Qin's support.

2place

The West River (西河) refers to the Yellow River's western bank region in modern western Shanxi / eastern Shaanxi. Pishi (皮氏) was a Qin city in this area.

3context

Zhang Yi's scheme is a win-win — for Qin. If Wei wins, it is so depleted that it pays Qin protection money in territory. If Wei loses, Qin takes what it wants anyway. The 'support' was really an investment with guaranteed returns, and Wei was the one being played.

田莘之為陳軫說秦惠王

Tian Xinzhi Speaks to King Hui of Qin on Chen Zhen's Behalf

田莘之為陳軫說秦惠王曰:「臣恐王之如郭君。夫晉獻公欲伐郭,而憚舟之僑存。荀息曰:『《周書》有言,美女破舌。』乃遺之女樂,以亂其政。舟之僑諫而不聽,遂去。因而伐郭,遂破之。又欲伐虞,而憚宮之奇存,荀息曰:『《周書》有言,美男破老。』乃遺之美男,教之惡宮之奇。宮之奇以諫而不聽,遂亡。因而伐虞,遂取之。今秦自以為強,能害王者之國者,楚也。楚知橫君之善用兵,與陳軫之智,故驕張儀以五國。來,必惡是二人。願王勿聽也。」張儀果來辭,因言軫也,王怒而不聽。

Tian Xinzhi spoke to King Hui of Qin on behalf of Chen Zhen:

"I fear Your Majesty will end up like the lord of Guo. Duke Xian of Jin wanted to attack Guo but was wary because the advisor Zhou Zhiqiao was still there. Xun Xi said: 'The Zhou Documents say: Beautiful women break sharp tongues.' So he sent gifts of female musicians to corrupt Guo's government. Zhou Zhiqiao remonstrated but was not heeded, and left. Jin then attacked Guo and destroyed it.

"Next Jin wanted to attack Yu but was wary because the advisor Gong Zhiqi was there. Xun Xi said: 'The Zhou Documents say: Beautiful men corrupt the old.' So he sent beautiful young men to Yu's lord and instructed them to turn him against Gong Zhiqi. Gong Zhiqi remonstrated but was not heeded, and fled. Jin then attacked Yu and took it.

"Now Qin considers itself strong, and the state capable of harming Qin is Chu. Chu knows that the Lord of the Coalition is skilled at war and that Chen Zhen is wise, so Chu has used the five states to flatter Zhang Yi. When Zhang Yi comes, he will certainly slander these two men. I urge Your Majesty not to listen."

Zhang Yi did indeed come and speak against Chen Zhen. But the king was angry and did not listen.

Notes

1person陳軫Chén Zhěn

Chen Zhen (陳軫) was a diplomat who served both Qin and Chu at various points, famous for his wit and strategic acumen. He appears throughout the Qin and Chu chapters.

2person田莘之Tián Xīnzhī

Tian Xinzhi (田莘之) was an advocate for Chen Zhen, otherwise unknown.

3context

The Guo-Yu destruction stories (from the Zuozhuan, 655 BC) were standard cautionary tales: a ruler who dismisses his wise advisor in favor of flattery gets destroyed. Tian Xinzhi is inoculating the king against Zhang Yi's inevitable slander by framing it in advance as a known enemy tactic.

4person晉獻公Jìn Xiàn Gōng

Duke Xian of Jin (晉獻公, r. 676–651 BC) destroyed both Guo and Yu in 655 BC, famously recovering the jade and horses he had given Yu as gifts — the origin of the expression 'borrowing a road to destroy Guo' (假途滅虢).

張儀又惡陳軫於秦王

Zhang Yi Again Slanders Chen Zhen to the King of Qin

張儀又惡陳軫於秦王曰:「軫馳楚、秦之間,今楚不加善秦而善軫,然則是軫自為而不為國也。且軫欲去秦而之楚,王何不聽乎?」王謂陳軫曰:「吾聞子欲去秦而之楚,信乎?」陳軫曰:「然。」王曰:「儀之言果信也。」曰:「非獨儀知之也,行道之人皆知之。曰孝己愛其親,天下欲以為子;子胥忠乎其君,天下欲以為臣。賣僕妾售乎閭巷者,良僕妾也;出婦嫁於鄉曲者,良婦也。吾不忠於君,楚亦何以軫為忠乎?忠且見棄,吾不之楚,何適乎?」秦王曰:「善。」乃止之。

Zhang Yi again slandered Chen Zhen to the King of Qin:

"Chen Zhen runs back and forth between Chu and Qin. Now Chu does not treat Qin any better, but it does treat Chen Zhen well — which means he is serving himself, not the state. Moreover, he wants to leave Qin for Chu. Why does Your Majesty not let him go?"

The king said to Chen Zhen: "I hear you want to leave Qin for Chu. Is this true?"

Chen Zhen said: "It is."

The king said: "Then Zhang Yi's words are indeed reliable."

Chen Zhen replied: "It is not only Zhang Yi who knows this — everyone on the road knows it. They say: Xiaoji loved his parents, and all the world wished to have him for a son. Wu Zixu was loyal to his lord, and all the world wished to have him for a minister. Servants and maids who sell well in the neighborhood are good servants and maids. A divorced woman who remarries in her own village is a good woman.

"If I were not loyal to you, why would Chu want me? If loyalty itself is to be cast aside, and I do not go to Chu, where else would I go?"

The King of Qin said: "Well said." And he retained him.

Notes

1person伍子胥Wǔ Zǐxū

Xiaoji (孝己) was a legendary filial son from the Shang dynasty. Wu Zixu (伍子胥, d. 484 BC) was the famous minister of Wu who helped it defeat Chu, later forced to commit suicide by King Fuchai.

2context

Chen Zhen's response is one of the sharpest retorts in the Zhanguoce. Zhang Yi's accusation — 'he wants to go to Chu' — is true, and Chen Zhen admits it freely. But he reframes the desire to leave as proof of his value: Chu wants him precisely because he has been a loyal minister. The logic is airtight and slightly maddening.

陳軫去楚之秦

Chen Zhen Leaves Chu for Qin

陳軫去楚之秦。張儀謂秦王曰:「陳軫為王臣,常以國情輸楚。儀不能與從事,願王逐之。即復之楚,願王殺之。」王曰:「軫安敢之楚也。」王召陳軫告之曰:「吾聽子言,子欲何之?請為子約車。」對曰:「臣願之楚。」王曰:「儀以子為之楚,吾又自知子之楚。子非楚,且安之也!」軫曰:「臣出,必故之楚,以順王與儀之策,而明臣之楚與不也。楚人有兩妻者,人挑其長者,詈之;挑其少者,少者許之。居無幾何,有兩妻者死。客謂挑者曰:『汝取長者乎?少者乎?』曰:『取長者。』客曰:『長者詈汝,少者和汝,汝何為取長者?』曰:『居彼人之所,則欲其許我也。今為我妻,則欲其為我詈人也。』今楚王明主也,而昭陽賢相也。軫為人臣,而常以國輸楚王,王必不留臣,昭陽將不與臣從事矣。以此明臣之楚與不。」軫出,張儀入,問王曰:「陳軫果安之?」王曰:「夫軫天下之辯士也,孰視寡人曰:『軫必之楚。』寡人遂無奈何也。寡人因問曰:『子必之楚也,則儀之言果信矣!』軫曰:『非獨儀之言也,行道之人皆知之。昔者子胥忠其君,天下皆欲以為臣;孝己愛其親,天下皆欲以為子。故賣僕妾不出里巷而取者,良僕妾也;出婦嫁於鄉里者,善婦也。臣不忠於王,楚何以軫為?忠尚見棄,軫不之楚,而何之乎?』王以為然,遂善待之。」

Chen Zhen left Chu and came to Qin. Zhang Yi said to the King of Qin:

"Chen Zhen has been Your Majesty's minister, yet he constantly leaks state secrets to Chu. I cannot work alongside him. I beg Your Majesty to expel him. If he returns to Chu, I beg Your Majesty to have him killed."

The king said: "Surely Chen Zhen would not dare go to Chu."

He summoned Chen Zhen and said: "I will grant your wishes — where do you want to go? I will prepare a carriage for you."

Chen Zhen replied: "I wish to go to Chu."

The king said: "Zhang Yi says you will go to Chu. I too know perfectly well you will go to Chu. Where else would you go, if not Chu?"

Chen Zhen said: "When I leave, I will deliberately go to Chu, following Your Majesty's and Zhang Yi's prediction — and thereby prove whether or not I am truly Chu's man.

"There was a man from Chu who had two wives. Someone flirted with the older one, and she cursed him. He flirted with the younger one, and she consented. Before long, the husband died. A friend asked the flirt: 'Which will you marry — the older or the younger?' He said: 'The older one.' 'But the older one cursed you, and the younger one welcomed you — why choose the older?' He said: 'When I was at her husband's house, I wanted her to say yes. But now, as my own wife, I want her to curse other men.'

"Now the King of Chu is a wise ruler and Zhao Yang is a worthy chancellor. If Chen Zhen were truly a minister who leaked state secrets to the King of Chu, the king would certainly not keep me, and Zhao Yang would refuse to work with me. This will prove whether or not I am Chu's man."

After Chen Zhen left, Zhang Yi entered and asked the king: "Where is Chen Zhen going?"

The king said: "That man is the most brilliant debater in the world. He looked me straight in the eye and said: 'I am certainly going to Chu.' I was helpless. I asked: 'If you are going to Chu, then Zhang Yi's words are confirmed!' He said: 'It is not only Zhang Yi who says this — everyone on the road knows it. In ancient times, Wu Zixu was loyal to his lord, and all the world wished to have him for a minister. Xiaoji loved his parents, and all the world wished to have him for a son. Servants who sell well without leaving the neighborhood are good servants. A divorced woman who remarries locally is a good woman. If I were not loyal to Your Majesty, why would Chu want me? If loyalty itself is to be cast aside, and I do not go to Chu, where else would I go?' I found his argument compelling and treated him well."

Notes

1person昭陽Zhāo Yáng

Zhao Yang (昭陽) was chancellor of Chu during King Huai's reign (r. 328–299 BC).

2context

The two-wives parable is vintage Chen Zhen: earthy, funny, and logically devastating. A woman who resists advances is the one you want as a wife; a minister who resists foreign overtures is the one you want in your government. By the same logic, if Chu is a wise state, it will reject a known traitor. Chen Zhen is betting — correctly — that the king's suspicion will not survive contact with this reasoning.

3textual

This section largely repeats the Wu Zixu / Xiaoji argument from the previous section but embeds it in a different narrative frame where the king retells Chen Zhen's words to Zhang Yi. The two sections likely derive from variant manuscript traditions of the same underlying anecdote.

Edition & Source

Text
《戰國策》 Zhanguoce
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
Commentary
鮑彪 (Bao Biao) Song dynasty commentary