秦策四 (Stratagems of Qin IV) — Chinese ink painting

Chapter 6 of 33 · Qin state

秦策四

Stratagems of Qin IV

View:

秦取楚漢中

Qin Takes Hanzhong from Chu

秦取楚漢中,再戰於藍田,大敗楚軍。韓、魏聞楚之困,乃南襲至鄧,楚王引歸。後三國謀攻楚,恐秦之救也,或說薛公:「可發使告楚曰:『今三國之兵且去楚,楚能應而共攻秦,雖藍田豈難得哉!況於楚之故地?』楚疑於秦之未必救己也,而今三國之辭去,則楚之應之也必勸,是楚與三國謀出秦兵矣。秦為知之,必不救也。三國疾攻楚,楚必走秦以急;秦愈不敢出,則是我離秦而攻楚也,兵必有功。」

薛公曰:「善。」遂發重使之楚,楚之應果勸。於是三國並力攻楚,楚果告急於秦,秦遂不敢出兵。大臣有功。

Qin seized Hanzhong from Chu and fought twice at Lantian, inflicting a major defeat on the Chu army. When Han and Wei heard of Chu's distress, they launched a southern raid as far as Deng, and the King of Chu withdrew homeward. Afterward, the three states plotted to attack Chu but feared Qin might come to Chu's rescue. Someone advised the Lord of Xue: "Send an envoy to tell Chu: 'The armies of the three states are about to withdraw from Chu. If Chu responds and joins us in attacking Qin, even Lantian could be retaken — let alone Chu's former territories!' Chu suspects that Qin may not actually rescue them, and now that the three states offer to leave, Chu will eagerly agree — which means Chu itself will be lured into a scheme to draw out Qin's forces. When Qin realizes this, it will certainly refuse to help. Then the three states attack Chu in full force. Chu will desperately appeal to Qin for aid, but Qin will be even less willing to commit troops. The result: we isolate Qin and attack Chu — and our campaign will succeed."

The Lord of Xue said: "Excellent." He dispatched a senior embassy to Chu, and Chu eagerly agreed. The three states then attacked Chu with combined forces. Chu duly appealed to Qin for help, and Qin refused to send troops. The ministers' stratagem succeeded.

Notes

1place

Hanzhong (漢中) refers to the Han River valley region, corresponding to modern Hanzhong, Shaanxi Province. It was a strategically vital corridor between Qin and Chu.

2place

Lantian (藍田) was located southeast of modern Xi'an, Shaanxi. This battle (c. 312 BC) was a major engagement in which Qin crushed Chu's counteroffensive into the Qin heartland.

3place

Deng (鄧) was in the region of modern Dengzhou, Henan — territory belonging to Chu at this time.

4person薛公Xuē Gōng

The Lord of Xue (薛公) is Tian Ying (田嬰), also known as Jingguo Jun (靖郭君), a powerful Qi minister enfeoffed at Xue. Some commentators identify this as his son Tian Wen (田文), Lord Mengchang (孟嘗君), depending on the dating of this episode.

5context

The stratagem is a textbook double-bluff: the three states pretend to want Chu as an ally against Qin, knowing that this pretense will prevent Qin from coming to Chu's rescue. Chu is being told exactly what it wants to hear — that it can recover its lost territory — precisely so it can be attacked without Qin interfering. The advisor is essentially using Chu's desperation as a tool to neutralize Qin's potential intervention.

薛公入魏而出齊女

The Lord of Xue Enters Wei and Sends Away the Qi Princess

薛公入魏而出齊女。韓春謂秦王曰:「何不取為妻,以齊、秦劫魏,則上黨,秦之有也。齊、秦合而立負芻,負芻立,其母在秦,則魏,秦之縣也已。呡欲以齊、秦劫魏而困薛公,佐欲定其弟,臣請為王因呡與佐也。魏懼而復之,負芻必以魏歿世事秦。齊女入魏而怨薛公,終以齊奉事王也。」

The Lord of Xue entered Wei and expelled the Qi princess. Han Chun said to the King of Qin: "Why not take the Qi princess as a wife? Then use Qi and Qin together to coerce Wei, and Shangdang will become Qin's possession. If Qi and Qin unite to install Fuchu on the throne — and his mother resides in Qin — then Wei will be no more than a county of Qin. Wen wishes to use Qi and Qin to coerce Wei and bring down the Lord of Xue. Zuo wishes to install his younger brother. Allow me to work through Wen and Zuo on Your Majesty's behalf. Wei will be frightened into compliance, and Fuchu will serve Qin with Wei for the rest of his life. The Qi princess, once reinstalled in Wei, will bear a grudge against the Lord of Xue and ultimately bring Qi into your service."

Notes

1person韓春Hán Chūn

Han Chun (韓春) was an advisor at the Qin court. Nothing else is known about him beyond this episode.

2place

Shangdang (上黨) was a highland region in modern southeastern Shanxi Province, a militarily critical area contested by Qin, Han, and Zhao.

3person負芻Fù Chú

Fuchu (負芻) was a Wei prince whose mother was in Qin — making him a potential puppet ruler if installed on the Wei throne.

4context

The scheme is baroque even by Warring States standards: marry a displaced princess, leverage two rival court factions, install a puppet king whose mother is your hostage, and convert an entire kingdom into a dependency. Han Chun is essentially proposing to turn Wei into Qin's wholly owned subsidiary through a combination of marriage politics and factional manipulation.

三國攻秦入函谷

Three States Attack Qin and Enter Hangu Pass

三國攻秦,入函谷。秦王謂樓緩曰:「三國之兵深矣,寡人欲割河東而講。」對曰:「割河東,大費也;免於國患,大利也。此父兄之任也。王何不召公子池而問焉?」

王召公子池而問焉,對曰:「講亦悔,不講亦悔。」王曰:「何也?」對曰:「王割河東而講,三國雖去,王必曰:『惜矣!三國且去,吾特以三城從之。』此講之悔也。王不講,三國入函谷,咸陽必危,王又曰:『惜矣!吾愛三城而不講。』此又不講之悔也。」王曰:「鈞吾悔也,寧亡三城而悔,無危咸陽而悔也。寡人決講矣。」卒使公子池以三城講於三國,之兵乃退。

Three states attacked Qin and penetrated Hangu Pass. The King of Qin said to Lou Huan: "The armies of the three states have advanced deep into our territory. I want to cede Hedong and sue for peace."

Lou Huan replied: "Ceding Hedong is a great sacrifice; escaping a national crisis is a great gain. This is a decision for the elders of your house. Why not summon Prince Chi and ask him?"

The king summoned Prince Chi and asked him. Prince Chi replied: "Whether you make peace or not, you will regret it."

The king asked: "Why?"

"If Your Majesty cedes Hedong and makes peace, once the three states have withdrawn, you will surely say: 'What a waste! They were about to leave anyway, and I gave them three cities for nothing.' That is the regret of making peace. If Your Majesty does not make peace and the three states push through Hangu Pass, Xianyang will be in peril, and you will say: 'What a waste! I clung to three cities and refused to make peace.' That is the regret of not making peace."

The king said: "Since I will regret it either way, I would rather lose three cities and regret it than endanger Xianyang and regret it. I am resolved to make peace." He dispatched Prince Chi to cede three cities to the three states, and their armies withdrew.

Notes

1place

Hangu Pass (函谷關) was the main eastern gateway to the Qin heartland, located in modern Lingbao, Henan. For enemy forces to penetrate it meant the Qin capital was directly threatened.

2person樓緩Lóu Huǎn

Lou Huan (樓緩) was a Qin minister who also appears in several other Zhanguoce episodes. He was known for his cautious counsel.

3place

Hedong (河東) refers to the territory east of the Yellow River's great bend, in modern southwestern Shanxi Province.

4person公子池Gōngzǐ Chí

Prince Chi (公子池) was a member of the Qin royal family. His analysis is notable for its even-handedness — he refuses to pretend there is a costless option.

5place

Xianyang (咸陽) was the capital of Qin, located northwest of modern Xi'an, Shaanxi Province.

6context

Prince Chi's framing is a miniature masterpiece of decision theory: when all options have costs, the question is not 'which path avoids regret?' but 'which regret can you live with?' The king's response shows he understood this perfectly. Lou Huan's deflection — 'ask your family' — is also worth noting: he avoids taking responsibility for a decision that will be second-guessed no matter what.

秦昭王謂左右

King Zhao of Qin Addresses His Attendants

秦昭王謂左右曰:「今日韓、魏,孰與始強?」對曰:「弗如也。」王曰:「今之如耳、魏齊,孰與孟嘗、芒卯之賢?」對曰:「弗如也。」王曰:「以孟嘗、芒卯之賢,帥強韓、魏之兵以伐秦,猶無奈寡人何也!今以無能之如耳、魏齊,帥弱韓、魏以攻秦,其無奈寡人何,亦明矣!」左右皆曰:「甚然。」

中期推琴對曰:「王之料天下過矣。昔者六晉之時,智氏最強,滅破范、中行,帥韓、魏以圍趙襄子於晉陽。決晉水以灌晉陽,城不沉者三板耳。智伯出行水,韓康子御,魏桓子驂乘。智伯曰:『始吾不知水之可亡人之國也,乃今知之。汾水利以灌安邑,絳水利以灌平陽。』魏桓子肘韓康子,康子履魏桓子,躡其踵。肘足接於車上,而智氏分矣。身死國亡,為天下笑。今秦之強,不能過智伯;韓、魏雖弱,尚賢在晉陽之下也。此乃方其用肘足時也,願王之勿易也。」

King Zhao of Qin said to his attendants: "Are Han and Wei today as strong as they once were?" They replied: "They are not."

The king said: "Are Ru Er and Wei Qi as capable as Lord Mengchang and Mang Mao were?" They replied: "They are not."

The king said: "With the capable Lord Mengchang and Mang Mao leading strong Han and Wei armies to attack Qin, they still could not prevail against me. Now with the incompetent Ru Er and Wei Qi leading weakened Han and Wei against Qin, it is perfectly clear they cannot prevail either." All the attendants said: "Quite so."

Zhongqi pushed aside his zither and said: "Your Majesty's assessment of All-Under-Heaven is mistaken. In the old days of the six Jin houses, the Zhi clan was the strongest. They destroyed the Fan and Zhonghang clans and led Han and Wei to besiege Zhao Xiangzi at Jinyang. They diverted the Jin River to flood the city, and only three courses of wall remained above water. Zhibo went out to inspect the flood, with the Lord of Han driving the chariot and the Lord of Wei riding beside him. Zhibo said: 'I never knew that water could destroy a state — now I understand. The Fen River could be used to flood Anyi, and the Jiang River to flood Pingyang.' The Lord of Wei nudged the Lord of Han with his elbow; the Lord of Han stepped on the Lord of Wei's foot. Elbow and foot touched in the chariot, and the Zhi clan was doomed — their lord killed, their state destroyed, a laughingstock to All-Under-Heaven. Today Qin's strength does not exceed Zhibo's, and Han and Wei, though weakened, are still more capable than they were beneath the walls of Jinyang. This is precisely the moment when elbows and feet are being exchanged. I beg Your Majesty not to take this lightly."

Notes

1person秦昭王Qín Zhāo Wáng

King Zhao of Qin (秦昭王, r. 306–251 BC), also known as King Zhaoxiang, was one of the most powerful Qin rulers, presiding over Qin's decisive expansion.

2person孟嘗君 / 芒卯Mèngcháng Jūn / Máng Mǎo

Lord Mengchang (孟嘗君) was Tian Wen (田文, d. 279 BC), one of the Four Lords of the Warring States. Mang Mao (芒卯) was a Wei general active in the early 3rd century BC.

3person如耳 / 魏齊Rú Ěr / Wèi Qí

Ru Er (如耳) and Wei Qi (魏齊) were later, less distinguished Han and Wei statesmen — the king's point being that the current leadership is mediocre.

4person中期Zhōngqī

Zhongqi (中期) was apparently a musician or minor official at the Qin court who dared to contradict the king. The gesture of pushing aside his zither signals that he is setting aside entertainment for serious counsel.

5context

The story of Zhibo and the partition of Jin (453 BC) is one of the foundational parables of Warring States political thought. Zhibo's fatal mistake was boasting — in front of the very people he was threatening — about how flood warfare could destroy their capitals. The nudge of an elbow and the press of a foot constituted an entire conspiracy. Zhongqi's point: overwhelming power invites its own destruction when it breeds complacency. The king's yes-men are doing exactly what Zhibo's yes-men did.

6place

Jinyang (晉陽) was near modern Taiyuan, Shanxi. Anyi (安邑) was the Wei capital, near modern Yuncheng, Shanxi. Pingyang (平陽) was the Han seat, near modern Linfen, Shanxi.

楚魏戰於陘山

Chu and Wei Battle at Xing Mountain

楚、魏戰於陘山。魏許秦以上洛,以絕秦於楚。魏戰勝,楚敗於南陽。秦責賂於魏,魏不與。營淺謂秦王曰:「王何不謂楚王曰,魏許寡人以地,今戰勝,魏王倍寡人也。王何不與寡人遇。魏畏秦、楚之合,必與秦地矣。是魏勝楚而亡地於秦也;是王以魏地德寡人,秦之楚者多資矣。魏弱,若不出地,則王攻其南,寡人絕其西,魏必危。」秦王曰:「善。」以是告楚。楚王揚言與秦遇,魏王聞之恐,效上洛於秦。

Chu and Wei fought at Xing Mountain. Wei had promised Shangluo to Qin in exchange for Qin cutting off support to Chu. Wei won the battle, and Chu was defeated at Nanyang. Qin then demanded the promised territory from Wei, but Wei refused.

Ying Qian said to the King of Qin: "Why not tell the King of Chu: 'Wei promised me territory, but now that it has won, the King of Wei has reneged on me. Why don't you and I arrange a summit?' Wei, fearing a Qin-Chu alliance, will certainly hand over the land. The result: Wei wins the battle against Chu but loses territory to Qin. And you, Majesty, will have earned Qin's gratitude using Wei's land — a rich endowment for the Qin-Chu relationship. If Wei remains stubborn and refuses to hand over the land, then you attack from the south while I cut them off from the west, and Wei will be in mortal danger."

The King of Qin said: "Excellent." He conveyed this proposal to Chu. The King of Chu announced publicly that he would hold a summit with Qin. When the King of Wei heard this, he was terrified and promptly handed Shangluo over to Qin.

Notes

1place

Xing Mountain (陘山) was in the border region between Chu and Wei, likely near modern Xinyang area, Henan.

2place

Shangluo (上洛) was in the region of modern Shangluo, Shaanxi Province, on the upper Luo River.

3person營淺Yíng Qiǎn

Ying Qian (營淺) was a Qin advisor. The name appears only in this passage.

4context

A neat little extortion: Wei wins the war but loses the peace. Qin's trick is to threaten a rapprochement with the very state Wei just defeated. The mere rumor of a Qin-Chu summit is enough to panic Wei into paying up. The territory Qin extracts was promised before the war but only collected after it — meaning Qin profited from a battle it never fought.

楚使者景鯉在秦

The Chu Envoy Jing Li in Qin

楚使者景鯉在秦,從秦王與魏王遇於境。楚怒秦合,周最為楚王曰:「魏請無與楚遇而合於秦,是以鯉與之遇也。弊邑之於與遇善之,故齊不合也。」楚王因不罪景鯉而德周、秦。

The Chu envoy Jing Li was in Qin and accompanied the King of Qin to a summit with the King of Wei at the border. Chu was angered that Qin had aligned with Wei. Zhou Zui said to the King of Chu on Qin's behalf: "Wei asked that Chu be excluded from the summit and wanted to ally solely with Qin. It was precisely for this reason that Jing Li was included — our humble city made sure the meeting went smoothly for Chu. That is why Qi did not join the alliance."

The King of Chu therefore did not punish Jing Li and was grateful to Zhou and Qin.

Notes

1person景鯉Jǐng Lǐ

Jing Li (景鯉) was a Chu diplomat from the Jing clan, one of Chu's great aristocratic families.

2person周最Zhōu Zuì

Zhou Zui (周最) was a member of the Zhou royal house active in interstate diplomacy during the mid-Warring States period.

3context

The spin here is remarkable: Jing Li's attendance at a Qin-Wei summit — which would normally look like Chu's envoy being complicit in an anti-Chu alignment — is reframed as Qin doing Chu a favor by keeping Chu in the loop. Zhou Zui is essentially gaslighting the King of Chu into gratitude.

楚王使景鯉如秦

The King of Chu Sends Jing Li to Qin

楚王使景鯉如秦。客謂秦王曰:「景鯉,楚王所甚愛,王不如留之以市地。楚王聽,則不用兵而得地;楚王不聽,則殺景鯉,更不與不如景鯉留,是便計也。」秦王乃留景鯉。

景鯉使人說秦王曰:「臣見王之權輕天下,而地不可得也。臣來使也,聞齊、魏皆且割地以事秦。所以然者,以秦與楚為昆弟國。今大王留臣,是示天下無楚也,齊、魏有何重於孤國也。楚知秦之孤,不與地,而外結交諸侯以圖,則社稷必危,不如出臣。」秦王乃出之。

The King of Chu sent Jing Li to Qin. An advisor said to the King of Qin: "Jing Li is greatly favored by the King of Chu. Why not detain him and use him as leverage to extract territory? If the King of Chu agrees, you gain land without using troops. If he refuses, kill Jing Li and replace him with someone more pliable — either way, detaining him is the advantageous move." The King of Qin therefore detained Jing Li.

Jing Li sent someone to address the King of Qin: "I observe that Your Majesty's leverage over All-Under-Heaven is diminishing, and the territory you seek cannot be obtained this way. When I came as envoy, Qi and Wei were both preparing to cede land to serve Qin. The reason was that they saw Qin and Chu as brother states. Now that Your Majesty detains me, you show All-Under-Heaven that Chu means nothing to you. Why would Qi and Wei defer to an isolated state? When Chu realizes Qin stands alone, it will refuse to give territory and instead form alliances with the other lords to plot against you — and then the state will be in danger. Better to release me."

The King of Qin released him.

Notes

1person景鯉Jǐng Lǐ

Jing Li (景鯉) appears again here; see section 6. The Chu king's affection for him made him simultaneously valuable as a hostage and dangerous to harm.

2context

Jing Li's counter-argument is elegant: the value of the Qin-Chu alliance lies not in what Chu gives Qin directly, but in how it intimidates third parties into submission. Detaining Chu's envoy destroys the illusion of Qin-Chu solidarity, which is worth more than any hostage. The advisor who recommended detention was thinking one move ahead; Jing Li was thinking three.

3translation

昆弟國 ('brother states') denotes states bound by marriage alliance or treaty into a relationship of nominal equality, here translated as 'brother states' rather than 'allied states' to preserve the familial metaphor.

秦王欲見頓弱

The King of Qin Wishes to See Dun Ruo

秦王欲見頓弱,頓弱曰:「臣之義不參拜,王能使臣無拜,即可矣。不,即不見也。」秦王許之。於是頓子曰:「天下有其實而無其名者,有無其實而有其名者,有無其名又無其實者。王知之乎?」王曰:「弗知。」頓子曰:「有其實而無其名者,商人是也。無把銚推耨之勢,而有積粟之實,此有其實而無其名者也。無其實而有其名者,農夫是也。解凍而耕,暴背而耨,無積粟之實,此無其實而有其名者也。無其名又無其實者,王乃是也。已立為萬乘,無孝之名;以千里養,無孝之實。」秦王悖然而怒。

頓弱曰:「山東戰國有六,威不掩於山東,而掩於母,臣竊為大王不取也。」秦王曰:「山東之建國可兼與?」頓子曰:「韓,天下之咽喉;魏,天下之胸腹。王資臣萬金而遊,聯之韓、魏,入其社稷之臣於秦,即韓、魏從。韓、魏從,而天下可圖也。」秦王曰:「寡人之國貧,恐不能給也。」頓子曰:「天下未嘗無事也,非從即橫也。橫成,則秦帝;從成,即楚王。秦帝,即以天下恭養;楚王,即王雖有萬金,弗得私也。」秦王曰:「善。」乃資萬金,使東遊韓、魏,入其將相。北遊於燕、趙,而殺李牧。齊王入朝,四國必從,頓子之說也。

The King of Qin wished to see Dun Ruo. Dun Ruo said: "It is my principle not to bow repeatedly. If the king will exempt me from bowing, I will come. Otherwise, I will not." The King of Qin agreed.

Dun Ruo then said: "In this world, there are those who have the substance but not the name; those who have the name but not the substance; and those who have neither name nor substance. Does Your Majesty know which is which?"

The king said: "I do not."

Dun Ruo said: "Those who have substance without the name — these are merchants. They never grip the plow or push the hoe, yet they have granaries full of grain. This is substance without the name. Those who have the name without substance — these are farmers. They break the frozen earth to plow and burn their backs under the sun weeding, yet their granaries are empty. This is the name without the substance. Those who have neither name nor substance — that is Your Majesty. You have been established as ruler of ten thousand chariots, yet you have no reputation for filial piety. You are sustained by a domain of a thousand li, yet you show no filial devotion in practice."

The King of Qin flushed with anger.

Dun Ruo continued: "There are six warring states east of the mountains. Your Majesty's authority does not overawe those six states, but it is exercised against your own mother — I venture that this is not worth emulating. "

The King of Qin asked: "Can the eastern states be annexed?"

Dun Ruo replied: "Han is the throat of All-Under-Heaven; Wei is its chest and belly. Fund me with ten thousand in gold and send me traveling. I will win over Han and Wei and bring their key ministers into Qin's fold. Once Han and Wei submit, All-Under-Heaven can be taken."

The king said: "My state is poor. I fear I cannot afford it."

Dun Ruo said: "All-Under-Heaven is never at rest — it is always either forming a north-south coalition or an east-west alignment. If the east-west alignment succeeds, Qin becomes emperor. If the north-south coalition succeeds, Chu becomes king. If Qin becomes emperor, All-Under-Heaven will reverently support you. If Chu becomes king, then even if Your Majesty has ten thousand in gold, you will not be able to keep it."

The king said: "Excellent." He funded Dun Ruo with ten thousand in gold and sent him east to infiltrate the courts of Han and Wei and suborn their generals and ministers. He traveled north to Yan and Zhao, and engineered the killing of Li Mu. The King of Qi came to court, and the four states submitted — all from Dun Ruo's counsel.

Notes

1person頓弱Dùn Ruò

Dun Ruo (頓弱) was an itinerant strategist who served the King of Qin — likely King Zheng (秦王政, r. 246–221 BC), who later became Qin Shihuang. The reference to his mother and the killing of Li Mu both point to the late Warring States period.

2context

The reference to the king's mistreatment of his mother alludes to the scandal involving Queen Dowager Zhao and her lover Lao Ai (嫪毐). After Lao Ai's rebellion in 238 BC, King Zheng exiled his mother — an act widely seen as unfilial. Dun Ruo is essentially opening with: 'You're famous for bullying your mom but not for conquering your enemies, and that's the wrong ratio.'

3person李牧Lǐ Mù

Li Mu (李牧, d. 229 BC) was one of the greatest Zhao generals, famed for his defense of the northern frontier against the Xiongnu and for defeating Qin forces. Qin eventually had him killed through bribery and court intrigue — the classic fate of a competent general in a state with corruptible ministers.

4translation

萬乘 ('ten thousand chariots') is the standard measure of a great power's military capacity and, by extension, a metonym for the ruler of such a state.

頃襄王二十年

In the Twentieth Year of King Qingxiang

頃襄王二十年,秦白起拔楚西陵,或拔鄢、郢、夷陵,燒先王之墓。王徙東北,保於陳城。楚遂削弱,為秦所輕。於是白起又將兵來伐。楚人有黃歇者,遊學博聞,襄王以為辯,故使於秦。說昭王曰:「天下莫強於秦、楚,今聞大王欲伐楚,此猶兩虎相鬥而駑犬受其弊,不如善楚。臣請言其說。臣聞之:『物至而反,冬夏是也。致至而危,累棋是也。』今大國之地半天下,有二垂,此從生民以來,萬乘之地未嘗有也。先帝文王、莊王、王之身,三世而不接地於齊,以絕從親之要。今王三使盛橋守事於韓,成橋以北入燕。是王不用甲,不伸威,而出百里之地,王可謂能矣。王又舉甲兵而攻魏,杜大梁之門,舉河內,拔燕、酸棗、虛、桃人,楚、燕之兵雲翔不敢校,王之功亦多矣。王申息眾二年,然後復之,又取蒲、衍、首垣,以臨仁、平丘、小黃、濟陽嬰城,而魏氏服矣。王又割濮、磨之北屬之燕,斷齊、秦之要,絕楚、魏之脊。天下五合、六聚而不敢救也,王之威亦憚矣。王若能持功守威,省攻伐之心而肥仁義之誡,使無復後患,三王不足四,五伯不足六也。

「王若負人徒之眾,材兵甲之強,壹毀魏氏之威,而欲以力臣天下之主,臣恐有後患。《詩》云:『靡不有初,鮮克有終。』《易》曰:『狐濡其尾。』此言始之易,終之難也。何以知其然也?智氏見伐趙之利,而不知榆次之禍也;吳見伐齊之便,而不知乾隧之敗也。此二國者,非無大功也,設利於前,而易患於後也。吳之信越也,從而伐齊,既勝齊人於艾陵,還為越王禽於三江之浦。智氏信韓、魏,從而伐趙,攻晉陽之城,勝有日矣,韓、魏反之,殺智伯瑤於鑿台之上。今王妒楚之不毀也,而忘毀楚之強魏也。臣為大王慮而不取。《詩》云:『大武遠宅不涉。』從此觀之,楚國,援也;鄰國,敵也。《詩》云:『他人有心,予忖度之。躍躍毚兔,遇犬獲之。』今王中道而信韓、魏之善王也,此正吳信越也。臣聞,敵不可易,時不可失。臣恐韓、魏之卑辭慮患,而實欺大國也。此何也?王既無重世之德於韓、魏,而有累世之怨矣。韓、魏父子兄弟接踵而死於秦者,百世矣。本國殘,社稷壞,宗廟隳,刳腹折頤,首身分離,暴骨草澤,頭顱僵仆,相望於境;父子老弱係虜,相隨於路;鬼神狐祥無所食,百姓不聊生,族類離散,流亡為臣妾,滿海內矣。韓、魏之不亡,秦社稷之憂也。今王之攻楚,不亦失乎!是王攻楚之日,則惡出兵?王將藉路於仇讎之韓、魏乎!兵出之日而王憂其不反也,是王以兵資於仇讎之韓、魏。王若不藉路於仇讎之韓、魏,必攻隨陽、右壤,隨陽、右壤,此皆廣川大水,山林溪谷不食之地,王雖有之,不為得地。是王有毀楚之名,無得地之實也。且王攻楚之日,四國必應悉起應王。秦、楚之構而不離,魏氏將出兵而攻留、方與、銍、胡陵、碭、蕭、相,故宋必盡。齊人南面,泗北必舉。此皆平原四達,膏腴之地也,而王使之獨攻。王破楚於以肥韓、魏於中國而勁齊,韓、魏之強足以校於秦矣。齊南以泗為境,東負海,北倚河,而無後患,天下之國,莫強於齊。齊、魏得地葆利,而詳事下吏,一年之後,為帝若未能,於以禁王之為帝有餘。夫以王壤土之博,人徒之眾,兵革之強,一舉眾而注地於楚,詘令韓、魏,歸帝重於齊,是王失計也。

「臣為王慮,莫若善楚。秦、楚合而為一,臨以韓,韓必授首。王襟以山東之險,帶以河曲之利,韓必為關中之候。若是,王以十成鄭,梁氏寒心,許、鄢陵嬰城,上蔡、召陵不往來也。如此,而魏亦關內侯矣。王一善楚,而關內二萬乘之主注地於齊,齊之右壤可拱手而取也。是王之地一任兩海,要絕天下也。是燕、趙無齊、楚,無燕、趙也。然後危動燕、趙,持齊、楚,此四國者,不待痛而服矣。」

In the twentieth year of King Qingxiang of Chu, Qin's general Bai Qi took Chu's Xiling, then captured Yan, Ying, and Yiling, and burned the tombs of Chu's former kings. The king fled northeast and took refuge at the city of Chen. Chu was drastically weakened and held in contempt by Qin. Then Bai Qi again led an army to attack.

There was a Chu man named Huang Xie, widely traveled and learned. King Xiang considered him eloquent and sent him as envoy to Qin. He addressed King Zhao:

"The two strongest states under Heaven are Qin and Chu. Now I hear Your Majesty intends to attack Chu. This is like two tigers fighting while a mongrel dog profits from their wounds — it would be better to befriend Chu. Allow me to explain.

"I have heard it said: 'Things reach their extreme and reverse — winter and summer are proof. Push to the limit and danger follows — a tower of chess pieces shows this.' Now Your Majesty's territory covers half of All-Under-Heaven, with two frontiers extending outward — since the beginning of human habitation, no state of ten thousand chariots has ever held such territory. Through three generations — Kings Wen and Zhuang and now Your Majesty — Qin has kept its borders from touching Qi, thereby severing the vital link of the north-south coalition. Your Majesty sent Sheng Qiao three times to manage affairs in Han, and Cheng Qiao entered Yan from the north. Without deploying armor or projecting force, you gained a hundred li of territory — this may be called skillful. Then Your Majesty raised an army and attacked Wei, sealed the gates of Daliang, took Henei, and captured Yan, Suanzao, Xu, and Taoren. The forces of Chu and Yan circled like clouds but dared not engage. Your Majesty's achievements are considerable. After resting the troops for two years, you resumed, taking Pu, Yan, and Shouguan, advancing on Ren, Pingqiu, Xiaohuang, and Jiyang, forcing them behind their walls — and Wei submitted. Then Your Majesty ceded the territory north of Pu and Mo to Yan, severing the link between Qi and Qin and cutting the spine of Chu and Wei. All-Under-Heaven formed coalitions five and six times but dared not come to the rescue. Your Majesty's authority inspires dread. If you can hold these achievements and guard this authority, restrain the impulse to conquer and nourish the restraint of benevolence and righteousness, ensuring no future calamity, then the Three Kings would need a fourth and the Five Hegemons a sixth.

"But if Your Majesty relies on sheer numbers and military strength, destroys Wei's power, and tries to force All-Under-Heaven's rulers into submission by might alone, I fear there will be consequences. The Odes say: 'All have a beginning; few see it through to the end.' The Changes say: 'The fox wets its tail.' These speak of how easy it is to start and how hard to finish. How do we know? The Zhi clan saw the profit in attacking Zhao but did not foresee the disaster at Yuci. Wu saw the advantage in attacking Qi but did not foresee the defeat at Gansui. These two states did not lack great achievements — they set gain before their eyes and overlooked the peril behind them. Wu trusted Yue and went to attack Qi; having defeated Qi at Ailing, it returned only to be captured by the King of Yue at the Three Rivers. The Zhi clan trusted Han and Wei and went to attack Zhao, besieging Jinyang — victory was a matter of days — but Han and Wei turned against them and killed Zhibo Yao at Zuotai. Now Your Majesty resents that Chu has not been destroyed, but forgets that destroying Chu would strengthen Wei. I have considered this for Your Majesty and find it inadvisable.

"The Odes say: 'A great army camped far off does not cross the river.' From this we see: Chu is an ally; the neighboring states are the enemy. The Odes also say: 'Others have designs in their hearts — I measure and fathom them. The leaping hare, when it meets the hound, is caught.' Now Your Majesty trusts that Han and Wei are loyal to you midway through your campaign — this is precisely Wu trusting Yue. I have heard: 'Do not underestimate an enemy; do not miss the right moment.' I fear that Han and Wei's humble words mask their real calculations and that they are in truth deceiving Your Majesty. Why? You have no accumulated goodwill toward Han and Wei — only accumulated grievances spanning generations. The fathers, sons, and brothers of Han and Wei who have died at Qin's hands are beyond counting. Their homelands have been ravaged, their altars destroyed, their ancestral temples toppled. Disemboweled, jaws broken, heads severed from bodies, bones bleaching in the marshes, skulls scattered along the roads. Fathers, sons, the old and the young, bound as captives, filing along the highways. Their spirits and gods have nothing to eat; their people cannot sustain themselves. Clans scattered, refugees made servants and concubines throughout the realm. That Han and Wei have not yet perished is itself a worry for Qin's altars. Is it not a mistake, then, to attack Chu?

"On the day Your Majesty attacks Chu, where will you send your troops? Will you borrow passage through Han and Wei — your mortal enemies? The day your army marches out, you will fear it may never return — you will have handed your army to your mortal enemies. If you do not borrow passage through Han and Wei, you must attack through Suiyang and You Rang — but these are regions of broad rivers and deep water, mountains and forests and gorges, barren land. Even if you take them, you gain nothing. You would have the name of destroying Chu but not the reality of gaining territory. Moreover, on the day you attack Chu, the four states will certainly all rise in response. While Qin and Chu are locked in conflict, Wei will send armies to attack Liu, Fangyu, Zhi, Huling, Dang, Xiao, and Xiang — all of old Song will be taken. Qi will advance southward, and everything north of the Si River will fall. These are open plains, rich and fertile lands — and Your Majesty lets others take them. By destroying Chu you fatten Han and Wei in the Central States and strengthen Qi. Han and Wei will be strong enough to challenge Qin. Qi, with the Si as its southern border, the sea at its back, and the Yellow River to the north, will face no threats — no state under Heaven will be stronger. Once Qi and Wei gain territory and consolidate their power, even if pretending to serve you through minor officials, within a year, though they may not be able to claim the imperial title themselves, they will certainly be able to block Your Majesty from claiming it.

"I advise Your Majesty: nothing is better than befriending Chu. If Qin and Chu unite as one and press Han, Han must surrender. With the mountain passes of the east as your collar and the bend of the Yellow River as your belt, Han will become a vassal within the passes. Then use ten cities to secure Zheng. The house of Liang will quake. Xu and Yanling will cower behind their walls. Shangcai and Shaoling will cease all traffic. Thus Wei too will become a vassal within the passes. By one act of befriending Chu, two lords of ten thousand chariots within the passes will turn their forces against Qi — Qi's western territories can be taken without lifting a hand. Your Majesty's domain will stretch between the two seas, commanding All-Under-Heaven. Then Yan and Zhao will have no Qi or Chu to rely on, and without Yan and Zhao, Qi and Chu are helpless. Threaten Yan and Zhao, hold Qi and Chu — these four states will submit without having to feel the blade."

Notes

1person楚頃襄王Chǔ Qǐngxiāng Wáng

King Qingxiang of Chu (楚頃襄王, r. 298–263 BC) presided over Chu's catastrophic loss of its heartland to Qin. His twentieth year was 279 BC.

2person白起Bái Qǐ

Bai Qi (白起, d. 257 BC) was Qin's most feared general, responsible for some of the largest massacres in Warring States history, including the burial alive of 400,000 Zhao soldiers at Changping. His campaigns against Chu in 279–278 BC destroyed the Chu capital.

3place

Ying (郢) was the ancient capital of Chu, near modern Jiangling, Hubei. Yiling (夷陵) is modern Yichang, Hubei. The burning of the royal tombs was a devastating symbolic blow.

4place

Chen (陳) was in modern Huaiyang, Henan. It became Chu's capital-in-exile after the fall of Ying.

5person黃歇Huáng Xiē

Huang Xie (黃歇, d. 238 BC) later became Lord Chunshen (春申君), one of the Four Lords of the Warring States, serving as Chu's prime minister for over twenty years. This episode shows him early in his career, before his elevation.

6context

Huang Xie's speech is the longest and most sophisticated diplomatic oration in Qin ce si. Its central argument — that destroying Chu would only strengthen Qin's real enemies, Han and Wei — is strategically sound. The historical parallels (Zhibo, Wu and Yue) are deployed to maximum effect: every example of a conqueror who overreached and was destroyed by the ally he trusted. The emotional passage about Han and Wei's accumulated hatred of Qin is particularly striking — Huang Xie is essentially arguing that decades of Qin atrocities have created enemies who will betray Qin at the first opportunity.

7textual

The quotations from the Odes (《詩》) and the Changes (《易》) are standard rhetorical ornaments in Warring States diplomatic speech. '靡不有初,鮮克有終' is from Ode 255 (Dang). '狐濡其尾' is from hexagram 64 (Wei Ji, 'Before Completion').

8place

Daliang (大梁) was the Wei capital, modern Kaifeng, Henan. Suanzao (酸棗) was near modern Yanjin, Henan. These and the other places named trace Qin's systematic dismantling of Wei's defensive network.

或為六國說秦王

Someone Addresses the King of Qin on Behalf of the Six States

或為六國說秦王曰:「土廣不足以為安,人眾不足以為強。若土廣者安,人眾者強,則桀、紂之後將存。昔者趙氏亦嘗強矣。曰趙強何若?舉左案齊,舉右案魏,厭案萬乘之國,二國,千乘之宋也。築剛平,工無東野,芻牧薪采莫敢窺東門。當是時,衛危於累卵,天下之士相從謀曰:『吾將還其委質,而朝於邯鄲之君乎!』於是天下有稱伐邯鄲者,莫不令朝行。魏伐邯鄲,因退為逢澤之遇,乘夏車,稱夏王,朝為天子,天下皆從。齊太公聞之,舉兵伐魏,壤地兩分,國家大危。梁王身抱質執璧,請為陳侯臣,天下乃釋梁。郢威王聞之,寢不寐,食不飽,帥天下百姓,以與申縛遇於泗水之上,而大敗申縛。趙人聞之至枝桑,燕人聞之至之格道。格道不通,平際絕。齊戰敗不勝,謀則不得,使陳毛釋劍掫,委南聽罪,西說趙,北說燕,內喻其百姓,而天下乃齊釋。於是夫積薄而為厚,聚少而為多,以同言郢威王於側紂之間。臣豈以郢威王為政衰謀亂以至於此哉?郢為強,臨天下諸侯,故天下樂伐之也。」

Someone addressed the King of Qin on behalf of the six states, saying: "Vast territory is not sufficient for security; a large population is not sufficient for strength. If vast territory meant security and large populations meant strength, then the descendants of Jie and Zhou would still rule. In former times, Zhao too was once powerful. How powerful was Zhao? It raised its left hand and pressed down on Qi; raised its right hand and pressed down on Wei. It bore down upon states of ten thousand chariots, and between them was Song, a state of a thousand chariots. It built fortifications at Gangping, conscripted labor with no respite for the eastern fields — no one dared even peer out the eastern gate. At that time, Wei was as precarious as stacked eggs. The men of All-Under-Heaven consulted one another and said: 'Shall we return our pledges and pay court to the lord of Handan instead?' At that point, anyone who proposed attacking Handan found himself marching at dawn.

"But then Wei attacked Handan and afterward withdrew to hold the assembly at Fengze. Riding the Xia chariot and claiming the title 'King of Xia,' Wei paid court to the Son of Heaven and All-Under-Heaven followed. Duke Tai of Qi heard this and raised an army to attack Wei. Wei's territory was split in two, and the state was in grave danger. The King of Liang himself clasped a jade tablet and grasped a jade disc, begging to become a vassal of the Lord of Chen — and only then did All-Under-Heaven relent toward Wei.

"King Wei of Chu heard of this, and could neither sleep nor eat his fill. He led the people of All-Under-Heaven and engaged Shen Fu at the Si River, inflicting a great defeat. The men of Zhao advanced to Zhisang; the men of Yan reached Gedao. The roads were blocked, all routes cut off. Qi, defeated in battle and outmaneuvered, sent Chen Mao to lay down his sword and shield, submit in the south and plead guilty, persuade Zhao to the west, persuade Yan to the north, and reassure the people at home — and only then did All-Under-Heaven release Qi.

"Thus thin things are piled up until they become thick; few things are gathered until they become many — and by the same token, people came to compare King Wei of Chu to the likes of the tyrant Zhou. Do I say that King Wei of Chu reached this pass because of failed governance and disordered counsel? No — it was because Chu was strong and lorded over the lords of All-Under-Heaven. That is why All-Under-Heaven was glad to attack it."

Notes

1context

The speaker's central thesis — that strength itself generates resentment and coalitions against the strong — is a warning directed at Qin. The historical survey traces a pattern: each state that reaches hegemonic status (Zhao, Wei, Qi, Chu) is promptly cut down by collective action. The implication is that Qin's current dominance will provoke the same reaction.

2person桀 / 紂Jié / Zhòu

Jie (桀) was the last king of the Xia dynasty; Zhou (紂, i.e., King Zhou of Shang) was the last king of the Shang dynasty. Both are archetypal tyrants in Chinese political rhetoric.

3place

Handan (邯鄲) was the capital of Zhao, in modern Handan, Hebei. Fengze (逢澤) was a lake near the Wei capital where interstate assemblies were held.

4person楚威王Chǔ Wēi Wáng

King Wei of Chu (楚威王, r. 339–329 BC) was one of Chu's more aggressive rulers. The speaker uses 'Ying' (郢) as a metonym for the King of Chu, after the Chu capital.

5place

Gangping (剛平) was a Zhao fortification, location uncertain but likely in modern Shandong. The Si River (泗水) flows through modern Shandong.

Edition & Source

Text
《戰國策》 Zhanguoce
Edition
中華古詩文古書籍網 transcription
Commentary
鮑彪 (Bao Biao) Song dynasty commentary