The Melian Dialogue

The Melian Dialogue (Book V, Chapter XVII)

Sixteenth Year of the War — The Melian Conference — Fate of Melos

The next summer Alcibiades sailed with twenty ships to Argos and seized

the suspected persons still left of the Lacedaemonian faction to the

number of three hundred, whom the Athenians forthwith lodged in the

neighbouring islands of their empire. The Athenians also made an

expedition against the isle of Melos with thirty ships of their own,

six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, sixteen hundred heavy infantry,

three hundred archers, and twenty mounted archers from Athens, and

about fifteen hundred heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders.

The Melians are a colony of Lacedaemon that would not submit to the

Athenians like the other islanders, and at first remained neutral and

took no part in the struggle, but afterwards upon the Athenians using

violence and plundering their territory, assumed an attitude of open

hostility. Cleomedes, son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, son of Tisimachus,

the generals, encamping in their territory with the above armament,

before doing any harm to their land, sent envoys to negotiate. These

the Melians did not bring before the people, but bade them state the

object of their mission to the magistrates and the few; upon which the

Athenian envoys spoke as follows:

Athenians. Since the negotiations are not to go on before the people,

in order that we may not be able to speak straight on without

interruption, and deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive

arguments which would pass without refutation (for we know that this is

the meaning of our being brought before the few), what if you who sit

there were to pursue a method more cautious still? Make no set speech

yourselves, but take us up at whatever you do not like, and settle that

before going any farther. And first tell us if this proposition of ours

suits you.

The Melian commissioners answered:

Melians. To the fairness of quietly instructing each other as you

propose there is nothing to object; but your military preparations are

too far advanced to agree with what you say, as we see you are come to

be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from

this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and

refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

Athenians. If you have met to reason about presentiments of the future,

or for anything else than to consult for the safety of your state upon

the facts that you see before you, we will give over; otherwise we will

go on.

Melians. It is natural and excusable for men in our position to turn

more ways than one both in thought and utterance. However, the question

in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and the

discussion, if you please, can proceed in the way which you propose.

Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious

pretences—either of how we have a right to our empire because we

overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you

have done us—and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in

return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying

that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or

that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding

in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do

that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in

power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they

must.

Melians. As we think, at any rate, it is expedient—we speak as we are

obliged, since you enjoin us to let right alone and talk only of

interest—that you should not destroy what is our common protection, the

privilege of being allowed in danger to invoke what is fair and right,

and even to profit by arguments not strictly valid if they can be got

to pass current. And you are as much interested in this as any, as your

fall would be a signal for the heaviest vengeance and an example for

the world to meditate upon.

Athenians. The end of our empire, if end it should, does not frighten

us: a rival empire like Lacedaemon, even if Lacedaemon was our real

antagonist, is not so terrible to the vanquished as subjects who by

themselves attack and overpower their rulers. This, however, is a risk

that we are content to take. We will now proceed to show you that we

are come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what

we are now going to say, for the preservation of your country; as we

would fain exercise that empire over you without trouble, and see you

preserved for the good of us both.

Melians. And how, pray, could it turn out as good for us to serve as

for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before

suffering the worst, and we should gain by not destroying you.

Melians. So that you would not consent to our being neutral, friends

instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.

Athenians. No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your

friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and

your enmity of our power.

Melians. Is that your subjects’ idea of equity, to put those who have

nothing to do with you in the same category with peoples that are most

of them your own colonists, and some conquered rebels?

Athenians. As far as right goes they think one has as much of it as the

other, and that if any maintain their independence it is because they

are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are

afraid; so that besides extending our empire we should gain in security

by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than

others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed

in baffling the masters of the sea.

Melians. But do you consider that there is no security in the policy

which we indicate? For here again if you debar us from talking about

justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours,

and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you

avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at case

from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this

but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force

others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?

Athenians. Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but

little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their

taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves,

outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be

the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into

obvious danger.

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and your

subjects to get rid of it, it were surely great baseness and cowardice

in us who are still free not to try everything that can be tried,

before submitting to your yoke.

Athenians. Not if you are well advised, the contest not being an equal

one, with honour as the prize and shame as the penalty, but a question

of self-preservation and of not resisting those who are far stronger

than you are.

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more

impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to suppose;

to submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still

preserves for us a hope that we may stand erect.

Athenians. Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who

have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without

ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as

to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when

they are ruined; but so long as the discovery would enable them to

guard against it, it is never found wanting. Let not this be the case

with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be

like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still

afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible,

to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men

with hopes to their destruction.

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you of the

difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the

terms be equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good

as yours, since we are just men fighting against unjust, and that what

we want in power will be made up by the alliance of the Lacedaemonians,

who are bound, if only for very shame, to come to the aid of their

kindred. Our confidence, therefore, after all is not so utterly

irrational.

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we may as fairly

hope for that as yourselves; neither our pretensions nor our conduct

being in any way contrary to what men believe of the gods, or practise

among themselves. Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a

necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is

not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when

made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for

ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and

everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as

we do. Thus, as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no

reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to

your notion about the Lacedaemonians, which leads you to believe that

shame will make them help you, here we bless your simplicity but do not

envy your folly. The Lacedaemonians, when their own interests or their

country’s laws are in question, are the worthiest men alive; of their

conduct towards others much might be said, but no clearer idea of it

could be given than by shortly saying that of all the men we know they

are most conspicuous in considering what is agreeable honourable, and

what is expedient just. Such a way of thinking does not promise much

for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their

respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians,

their colonists, and thereby losing the confidence of their friends in

Hellas and helping their enemies.

Athenians. Then you do not adopt the view that expediency goes with

security, while justice and honour cannot be followed without danger;

and danger the Lacedaemonians generally court as little as possible.

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even

danger for our sake, and with more confidence than for others, as our

nearness to Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common

blood ensures our fidelity.

Athenians. Yes, but what an intending ally trusts to is not the

goodwill of those who ask his aid, but a decided superiority of power

for action; and the Lacedaemonians look to this even more than others.

At least, such is their distrust of their home resources that it is

only with numerous allies that they attack a neighbour; now is it

likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an

island?

Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide

one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept

others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And

should the Lacedaemonians miscarry in this, they would fall upon your

land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach;

and instead of places which are not yours, you will have to fight for

your own country and your own confederacy.

Athenians. Some diversion of the kind you speak of you may one day

experience, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians

never once yet withdrew from a siege for fear of any. But we are struck

by the fact that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your

country, in all this discussion you have mentioned nothing which men

might trust in and think to be saved by. Your strongest arguments

depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too

scanty, as compared with those arrayed against you, for you to come out

victorious. You will therefore show great blindness of judgment,

unless, after allowing us to retire, you can find some counsel more

prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of

disgrace, which in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time

too plain to be mistaken, proves so fatal to mankind; since in too many

cases the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are

rushing into, let the thing called disgrace, by the mere influence of a

seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so

enslaved by the phrase as in fact to fall wilfully into hopeless

disaster, and incur disgrace more disgraceful as the companion of

error, than when it comes as the result of misfortune. This, if you are

well advised, you will guard against; and you will not think it

dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Hellas, when it makes

you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally, without ceasing

to enjoy the country that belongs to you; nor when you have the choice

given you between war and security, will you be so blinded as to choose

the worse. And it is certain that those who do not yield to their

equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards

their inferiors, on the whole succeed best. Think over the matter,

therefore, after our withdrawal, and reflect once and again that it is

for your country that you are consulting, that you have not more than

one, and that upon this one deliberation depends its prosperity or

ruin.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, left

to themselves, came to a decision corresponding with what they had

maintained in the discussion, and answered: “Our resolution, Athenians,

is the same as it was at first. We will not in a moment deprive of

freedom a city that has been inhabited these seven hundred years; but

we put our trust in the fortune by which the gods have preserved it

until now, and in the help of men, that is, of the Lacedaemonians; and

so we will try and save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us

to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our

country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.”

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians now departing from

the conference said: “Well, you alone, as it seems to us, judging from

these resolutions, regard what is future as more certain than what is

before your eyes, and what is out of sight, in your eagerness, as

already coming to pass; and as you have staked most on, and trusted

most in, the Lacedaemonians, your fortune, and your hopes, so will you

be most completely deceived.”

The Athenian envoys now returned to the army; and the Melians showing

no signs of yielding, the generals at once betook themselves to

hostilities, and drew a line of circumvallation round the Melians,

dividing the work among the different states. Subsequently the

Athenians returned with most of their army, leaving behind them a

certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by

land and sea. The force thus left stayed on and besieged the place.

About the same time the Argives invaded the territory of Phlius and

lost eighty men cut off in an ambush by the Phliasians and Argive

exiles. Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the

Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from

breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed

that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians. The

Corinthians also commenced hostilities with the Athenians for private

quarrels of their own; but the rest of the Peloponnesians stayed quiet.

Meanwhile the Melians attacked by night and took the part of the

Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men, and

brought in corn and all else that they could find useful to them, and

so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep

better guard in future.

Summer was now over. The next winter the Lacedaemonians intended to

invade the Argive territory, but arriving at the frontier found the

sacrifices for crossing unfavourable, and went back again. This

intention of theirs gave the Argives suspicions of certain of their

fellow citizens, some of whom they arrested; others, however, escaped

them. About the same time the Melians again took another part of the

Athenian lines which were but feebly garrisoned. Reinforcements

afterwards arriving from Athens in consequence, under the command of

Philocrates, son of Demeas, the siege was now pressed vigorously; and

some treachery taking place inside, the Melians surrendered at

discretion to the Athenians, who put to death all the grown men whom

they took, and sold the women and children for slaves, and subsequently

sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.